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Building systems with rigorous security guarantees is difficult, because most
programming languages lack support for reasoning about security. This situa-
tion is amplified by emerging timing attacks, which reveal secrets from compu-
tation time. Recent work shows that timing channels can quickly leak sensitive
information, such as private keys of RSA and AES. Such threats greatly harm
the security of many emerging applications, such as cloud computing, mobile
computing, and embedded systems.
This dissertation describes novel programming languages and run-time en-
forcement mechanisms for full-system control of timing channels. The proposed
approach has two major components: A new software-hardware security inter-
face, and control mechanisms present at separate levels of system abstraction.
These control mechanisms include:
1) A type system for an imperative language, so that well-typed programs
provably leak only a bounded amount of information via timing channels,
2) SecVerilog, a hardware description language that supports mostly-static, pre-
cise reasoning about information flows in hardware designs, and
3) Predictive mitigation, a general run-time mechanism that permits tunable
tradeoffs between security and performance.
Evaluation on real-world security-sensitive applications suggest that the
proposed approach is sound and has reasonable performance.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Timing channels have long been a difficult and important problem for com-
puter security. The difficulty has long been recognized since the 70’s [47, 26, 66],
but their importance has been reinforced by recent work that shows timing
channels can quickly leak sensitive information. Attacks exploit the timing
of cryptographic operations [43, 13] and of web server responses [11]. These
attacks work even without cooperation of any software on the system being
timed. If the system contains malicious code or hardware (e.g., [74]), timing can
also be exploited as a robust covert channel. Further, timing channels can be
exploited stealthily, at low risk to the attacker [51].
Controlling timing channels is nevertheless extremely challenging, because
confidential information can affect timing throughout the entire computer sys-
tem. At the software level, a branch or loop conditioned on secret values creates
timing channels. For instance, a branch condition depends on the private key in
an early implementation of RSA, resulting in exploitable timing channels [43].
Moreover, even machine instructions with different operators can take variable
time [18]. At the hardware level, shared hardware resources such as the data
cache also creates timing channels. For example, cache probing attacks (e.g.,
[68, 65, 32]) exploit the timing channel that arises because accesses to memory
locations by one process affect the cache, and thereby observably affect the tim-
ing behavior of later accesses by other processes. The cache is not the only
problem. Attacks have also been shown that exploit timing channels arising
from other components: instruction and data caches [2], branch predictors and
branch target buffers [3], and shared functional units [87].
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This dissertation introduces a sound and practical approach for full-system
timing channel control. The core of this approach is a new software-hardware
security interface, which for the first time, enables accurate reasoning about tim-
ing channels at the software-language level. Unlike previous work on language-
based timing channel control, such as code transformation [4], this interface
supports more realistic programs and hardware. For example, it can be im-
plemented on hardware with an instruction cache, branch predictors, shared
functional units, and so on. Such a new security interface forms a rigorous se-
curity contract between the software (language) level and the hardware imple-
mentation, enabling provable control of timing channels throughout the entire
computer system.
On the software side, this dissertation presents a type system that provides
fine-grained reasoning about timing channels, assuming the hardware follows
the security contract. The type system can distinguish between benign timing
variations and those carrying confidential information, and can distinguish be-
tween multiple distinct security levels. This fine-grained reasoning about tim-
ing channels improves the tradeoff between security and performance: benign
timing variations provably leak no confidential information, so only the timing
of code fragments that carry confidential information needs to be controlled.
On the hardware side, the security contract is formalized into three security
requirements, guiding secure hardware designs. To formally verify such secure
designs, this dissertation presents SecVerilog, a new hardware design language
that statically checks information flows within hardware, including flows via
timing channels. Unlike previous approaches, SecVerilog enables flexible, fine-
grained reuse and sharing of hardware across security domains, via a novel type
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system with dependent types. The benefit is that almost no additional run-time
overhead is added, since SecVerilog checks information flows at compile time;
little chip area and energy consumption is added since hardware resources can
be shared securely across security domains.
To control timing channels arising from code fragments that do leak infor-
mation, this dissertation proposes predictive mitigation, a practical method for
a broad class of computing systems. Unlike previous general techniques for tim-
ing channel mitigation, this framework offers tunable tradeoffs between secu-
rity and performance, so that programmers may improve system performance
with a programmer-specified leakage function. By incorporating mechanisms
for predictive mitigation of timing channels, the aforementioned software-level
type system can also permit an expressive programming model, where applica-
tions with a provably bounded amount of timing leakage are allowed.
The soundness and effectiveness of the proposed approach are demon-
strated on applications previously shown to be vulnerable to timing attacks,
as well as security benchmarks. A complete MIPS processor with modern pro-
cessor features, such as data hazard detection and data bypassing, is formally
verified in SecVerilog. The results suggest that the combination of language-
based mitigation and secure hardware works well, with overheads of only 1%
in chip area, critical path delay and power consumption. Moreover, perfor-
mance overhead for the verified applications running on the verified processor
is about 20% on average .
3
1.1 Timing channel control: challenges
Timing channels are perhaps the most challenging aspect of information flow
security, because confidential information can affect timing in various ways: at
the software level, a branch or loop conditioned on secret values creates timing
channels [43]; at the hardware level, shared hardware resources such as the data
cache also create timing channels [68, 65, 18, 32].
1.1.1 Direct and indirect timing dependencies
We first define direct and indirect timing dependencies to distinguish timing
channels arising from software and hardware respectively. We call timing chan-
nels visible at the source-language level direct timing dependencies. In the follow-
ing example, control flow affects timing.
1 if (h)
2 sleep(1);
3 else
4 sleep(10);
5 sleep(h);
Assume h holds confidential data and that sleep (e) suspends execution of the
program for the amount of time specified by e. Since line 4 takes longer to
execute than line 2, one bit of h is leaked through timing. Such control-flow-
related timing channels are real issues in practice, as demonstrated by attacks on
RSA [43, 13]. Another source of direct timing dependencies is operations whose
execution time depends on parameter values, such as the sleep command at
line 5. In general, even machine instructions can take variable time [18].
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Modern hardware also creates indirect timing dependencies in which execution
time depends on hardware state that has no source-level representation. The
following code shows that the data cache is one source of indirect dependencies.
1 if (h1)
2 h2:=l1;
3 else
4 h2:=l2;
5 l3:=l1;
Suppose only h1 and h2 are confidential and that neither l1 nor l2 are cached
initially. Even though both branches have the same instructions and similar
memory access patterns, executing this code fragment is likely to take less time
when h1 is not zero: because l1 is cached at line 2, line 5 runs faster, and the
value of h1 leaks through timing.
Some timing attacks [65, 32] exploit data cache timing dependencies to infer
AES encryption keys, but indirect dependencies arising from other hardware
components have also been exploited to construct attacks: instruction and data
caches [2], branch predictors and branch target buffers [3], and shared func-
tional units [87].
1.1.2 Limitations of previous approaches
Due to the existence of indirect timing dependencies, software-based solutions
are doomed to fail. Much prior language-based work uses simple, implicit mod-
els of timing, and no previous work fully addresses indirect dependencies. For
example, type systems have been proposed to prevent timing channels, but are
very restrictive. Often (e.g., [86, 78, 73, 76]) timing behavior of the program is
assumed to be accurately described by the number of steps taken in an opera-
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tional semantics. This assumption does not hold even at the machine-language
level. As a result, these prior methods fail to handle timing channels arising
from hardware features, such as data cache.
Some previous work uses program transformation to remove indirect de-
pendencies, though only those arising from the data cache. The main idea is to
equalize the execution time of different branches, but a price is paid in expres-
siveness, since these languages either rule out loops with confidential guards (as
in [4, 34, 10]), or limit the number of loop iterations (as in [56, 18]). Moreover,
these methods do not handle all indirect timing dependencies; for example,
the instruction cache is not handled, so verified programs remain vulnerable
to other indirect timing attacks [87, 3, 2].
Recent work in the architecture community has aimed for hardware-based
solutions to timing channels. Their hardware designs implicitly rely on assump-
tions about how software uses the secure hardware, but these assumptions have
not been rigorously defined or formally verified. For example, the cache design
by Wang and Lee [88] works only under the assumption that the AES lookup
table is preloaded into the cache and that the load time is not observable to the
adversary [44].
1.2 Sound and practical full-system timing channel control
Timing channels cannot be controlled effectively at the software level only.
Hardware mechanisms can help, but do a poor job of controlling language-level
leaks such as direct timing dependencies. The question, then, is how to usefully
and accurately characterize the timing semantics of code at the source level. Our
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insight is to combine the language-level and hardware-level mechanisms, via a
new cross-domain interface.
1.2.1 Hardware abstraction and assumptions
Throughout this dissertation, we use the term machine environment to refer to all
hardware state that is invisible at the language level but that is needed to predict
timing. Timing channels relying on indirect dependencies are at best difficult to
reason about at the language level—the semantics of programming languages
and even of instruction set architectures (ISAs) hide information about execu-
tion time by abstracting away low-level implementation details. For instance, it
is difficult to reason about timing without knowing how the data cache works.
We assume all (software-level) information is associated with a security label,
describing the confidentiality of the information. Labels `1 and `2 are ordered,
written `1 v `2, if `2 describes a confidentiality requirement that is at least as
strong as that of `1. It is secure for information to flow from label `1 to label `2
if `1 v `2. We assume there are at least two distinct labels L (low) and H (high)
such that L v H and H @ L. The label of public information is L; that of secret
information is H.
Accordingly, we can logically partition the machine environment according
to the security labels associated with hardware state. For example, a commodity
cache with no partition is a special case where all cache lines are associated with
the same label. In general, different partitions in a partitioned cache [88] can be
associated with different labels. For hardware components such as a pipeline,
we can time-multiplex their use according to different security labels.
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1.2.2 Timing interface and software enforcements
To concisely track how the machine environment affects timing, and how infor-
mation flows into the machine environment, we propose a new cross-domain
timing interface, in form of two timing labels. In particular, we associate two
timing labels with each command in the program. The first of these labels is
the command’s read label `r. The read label is an upper bound on the label of
machine environment that affects the run time of the command. For example,
the run time of a command with `r = L depends only on cache state with la-
bel L or below. The second of these labels is the command’s write label `w. The
write label is a lower bound on the label of machine environment that the com-
mand can modify. It ensures that the labels of machine environment reflect the
confidentiality of information that has flowed into that machine environment.
For example, suppose that there is only one (low) data cache, which to be
conservative means that anyone can learn from timing whether a given memory
location is cached. Therefore, both the read and write label of every command
must be L. The example in Section 1.1.1 is then annotated as follows, where the
first label in brackets is the read label, and the second, the write label.
1 if (h1)[L,L]
2 h2:=l1;[L,L]
3 else
4 h2:=l2;[L,L]
5 l3:=l1;[L,L]
This example is insecure because execution of lines 2 and 4 is conditioned
on the high variable h1. Therefore these lines are in a high context, one in which
the program counter label [21] is high. If lines 2 and 4 update cache state in the
usual way, the low write label permits low hardware state to be affected by h1.
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This insecure information flow is a form of implicit flow [21], but one in which
hardware state with no language-level representation is being updated.
Since lines 2 and 4 occur in a high context, the write label of these commands
must be H for this program to be secure. Consequently, the hardware may not
update low parts of the machine environment. One way to avoid modifying
the low parts of a commodity cache is to deactivate it in high contexts, since the
entire cache is low. A generalization of this idea is to use a partitioned cache,
where different partitions are associated with different labels. In this case, cache
misses in a high context then cause only the high cache partition to be updated.
With the read and write labels abstracting the timing behavior of hardware,
timing channel security can be statically checked at the language level, accord-
ing to the type system described in Chapter 2. Moreover, these timing labels
could be inferred automatically according to the type system, reducing the bur-
den on programmers.
1.2.3 Provably secure hardware design
The aforementioned cross-domain interface (read and write labels) communi-
cates information flows between the software and hardware, enabling timing
channels to be rigorously controlled. The interface defines a contract that both
software and hardware must follow for their composition to correctly control
information flows. The next question is how to design complex hardware that
correctly enforces its part of the contract.
To provide provable security for hardware designs, Chapter 3 presents a
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method for designing hardware that correctly, precisely, and efficiently enforces
secure information flow. This method is based on a new hardware description
language (HDL) called SecVerilog, which adds a security type system to Verilog
so that hardware-level information flows can be checked statically. In combina-
tion with software-level information flow control, our hardware design method
enables building computing systems in which all forms of information flow are
tracked, including implicit flows and timing channels.
SecVerilog has several advantages over the state of the art in secure hard-
ware design. SecVerilog checks information flows statically while providing
formal security assurance and guidance to hardware designers, avoiding run-
time costs of tracking and checking of information flow. The language is expres-
sive enough to prove security of a design even when hardware resources are
shared among multiple security levels that are changed at a per-cycle granular-
ity, avoiding the duplication of hardware resources. The novel dependent type
system of SecVerilog follows a modular design that decouples the program anal-
yses required for precision from the type system, making it more amenable to
future extension. Our prototype secure pipelined MIPS processor with a cache
adds area and clock cycle overheads of only about 1%.
1.2.4 Quantitative control of timing channels
Strictly disallowing all timing leakage can be done as sketched thus far, but
results in an impractically restrictive programming language, or computer sys-
tem, because execution time is prevented from depending on confidential infor-
mation in any way.
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To provide a strict bound on timing channel leakage while providing prac-
tical performance, Chapter 4 introduces a general framework called predictive
mitigation. The key idea is that given a prediction of how long a computation
will take, solely based on public information, a run-time enforcement can en-
sure that at least that much time is consumed by simply waiting if necessary. In
the case of a misprediction (i.e., when the estimate is too low), a larger predic-
tion is generated, and the execution time is padded accordingly. Mispredictions
also inflate the predictions generated by subsequent mitigated computation, so
that the total timing leakage is tightly bounded.
Predictive mitigation bounds the amount of information leaked through the
timing channel as a function of elapsed time. Simple mitigation schemes can
ensure that no more than log2(T ) bits of information are leaked, where T is the
running time (all logarithms in this dissertation are base 2). Further, an arbi-
trary bound on information leakage can be enforced. However, tighter bounds
have a price: they can reduce system throughput and increase system latency,
particularly if the system has unpredictable behavior.
Chapter 5 incorporates the predictive mitigation framework into the soft-
ware language in Chapter 2 by a new command called mitigate. Command
(mitigate (e, `) c) executes the command c while ensuring that timing leakage
is bounded. Here, the expression e computes an initial prediction for the execu-
tion time of c. The label ` bounds what information can be learned by observing
the timing leakage c. That is, no information at level `′ such that `′ @ ` can be
learned from c’s execution time.
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1.3 Outline
This dissertation presents and explores practical methods for full-system tim-
ing channel control. The key component, a cross-domain timing interface that
enables compositional enforcement, is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 also
includes formal restrictions that are required by the interface on hardware im-
plementation, as well as how the timing interface enables a software-level type
system that provably eliminates all timing channels, with the assumption that
hardware respects the interface.
Chapter 3 introduces the SecVerilog language, which extends Verilog with
expressive type annotations that enable precise reasoning about information
flow. The language also comes with rigorous formal assurance: SecVerilog prov-
ably enforces timing-sensitive noninterference and thus ensures secure informa-
tion flow.
Chapter 4 describes a general framework, called predictive mitigation,
which provides provable tight timing-channel leakage bound for applications
where a limited leakage is allowed. We start from a black-box model, where we
know nothing about a system other than the output events, and then extend it
to interactive systems, which receive input requests from multiple clients and
deliver responses.
Chapter 5 incorporates the predictive mitigation framework (Chapter 4) into
the software language introduced in Chapter 2. The result is an expressive pro-
gramming model, where applications with a provably bounded amount of tim-
ing leakage are allowed.
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The soundness and effectiveness of the approach proposed in this disserta-
tion is demonstrated on real-world security-sensitive applications, in Chapter 6.
The results suggest this approach controls timing channels, and has reasonable
performance for these real-world applications. Chapter 7 summarizes.
The materials presented in Chapters 2, 4 and 5 are adapted from joint work
with Aslan Askarov and Andrew Myers [95, 6, 94]. Chapter 3, the SecVerilog
language, is adapted from joint work with Yao Wang, G. Edward Suh and An-
drew Myers [96].
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CHAPTER 2
LANGUAGE-BASED CONTROL AND MITIGATION
OF TIMING CHANNELS
Timing channels have long been a difficult and important problem for computer
security. They can be used by adversaries as side channels or as covert channels
to learn private information, including cryptographic keys and passwords.
This chapter introduces a complete and effective language-based method for
controlling timing channels. An important contribution of this chapter is a sys-
tem of simple, static annotations that provides just enough information about
the underlying language implementation to enable accurate reasoning about
timing channels. These annotations form a contract (formalized in this chap-
ter) between the software (language) level and the hardware implementation.
We design a novel type system based on the annotations, and formally prove
that any well-typed program has no timing channel leakage, assuming that the
hardware implementation obeys the contract.
2.1 Assumptions
Recall that throughout this dissertation, we follow the terms and assumptions
defined in Section 1.2.1. We use the term machine environment to refer to all hard-
ware state that is invisible at the language level but that is needed to predict tim-
ing. Examples include the compiler, operating system, data cache, instruction
cache, and so on. We assume all software-level information and all components
of the machine environment are associated with security labels, describing the
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corresponding confidentiality. As a special case, commodity cache with no par-
tition has all cache lines associated with the same label. In general, different
partitions in a partitioned cache [88] can be associated with different labels. For
hardware components such as a pipeline, we can time-multiplex the use of them
according to different security labels.
2.2 A cross-domain timing interface
The syntax and semantics of programming languages and even of instruction
set architectures (ISAs) intentionally hide information about execution time by
abstracting away low-level implementation details. Doing so is beneficial for
simpler reasoning about non-timing-related software properties, as well as for
portability. But on the other hand, hiding timing information also makes it at
best difficult to reason about timing channels arising from hardware features,
such as the data cache, at the language level.
To track how information flows into the machine environment, but without
concretely representing the hardware state, we propose a novel cross-domain
interface in this dissertation. This interface consists of two labels with each com-
mand in the program. The first of these labels is the command’s read label `r. The
read label is an upper bound on the label of hardware state that affects the run
time of the command. For example, the run time of a command with `r = L de-
pends only on hardware state with label L or below. The second of these labels
is the command’s write label `w. The write label is a lower bound on the label
of hardware state that the command can modify. For example, no machine en-
vironment with a label H can be modified during the execution of a command
with `r = L.
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e ::= n | x | e op e
c ::= skip[`r ,`w] | (x := e)[`r ,`w] | c; c | (while e do c)[`r ,`w]
| (if e then c1 else c2)[`r ,`w] | (sleep e)[`r ,`w]
Figure 2.1: Syntax of the language.
Next, we introduce a core language with read and write labels. Formal defi-
nition and semantics of these labels are deferred to Section 2.3.6.
2.3 A language for controlling timing channels
Figure 2.1 gives the syntax for an imperative language with timing channel con-
trol. The novel elements—read and write labels—have already been introduced.
Notice that the sequential composition command itself needs no timing labels.
The syntax is mostly standard: it has assignments, sequential compositions,
loops and branches. Command (sleep e) suspends execution of the program
for the amount of time specified by e.
We present our semantics in a series of modular steps. We start with a core
semantics, a largely standard semantics for a simple while-language, which ig-
nores timing. Next, we develop an abstracted full semantics that describes the
timing semantics of the language more accurately while abstracting away pa-
rameters that depend on the language implementation, including the hardware
and the compiler.
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〈skip[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈stop,m〉 〈(sleep e)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈stop,m〉
〈c1,m〉 → 〈stop,m′〉
〈c1; c2,m〉 → 〈c2,m′〉
〈c1,m〉 → 〈c′1,m′〉 c′1 , stop
〈c1; c2,m〉 → 〈c′1; c2,m′〉
〈e,m〉 ⇓ v
〈(x := e)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈stop,m[x 7→ v]〉
〈e,m〉 ⇓ n n , 0 =⇒ i = 1 n = 0 =⇒ i = 2
〈(if e then c1 else c2)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈ci,m〉
〈e,m〉 ⇓ n n , 0
〈(while e do c)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈c; (while e do c)[`r ,`w],m〉
〈e,m〉 ⇓ n n = 0
〈(while e do c)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈stop,m〉
Figure 2.2: Core semantics of commands.
2.3.1 Core semantics
For expressions we use a standard big-step evaluation 〈e,m〉 ⇓ v when expres-
sion e in memory m evaluates to value v. For commands (Figure 2.2), we write
〈c,m〉 → 〈c′,m′〉 for the transition of command c in memory m to command c′ in
memory m′. Note that read and write labels are not used in these rules. The rules
use stop as a syntactic marker of the end of computation. We distinguish stop
from the command skip[`r ,`w] because skip is a real command that may consume
some measurable time (e.g., reading from the instruction cache), whereas stop
is purely syntactic and takes no time at all. Since time is not part of the core
semantics, sleep behaves like skip.
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2.3.2 Abstracted full language semantics
The core semantics discussed so far ignores timing; the job of the full language
semantics is to supply a complete description of timing so that timing channels
can be precisely identified.
Writing down a full semantics as a set of transition rules would define the
complete timing behavior of the language. But this semantics would be useful
only for a particular language implementation on particular hardware. Instead,
we permit any full semantics that satisfies a certain set of properties yet to be
described. What is presented here is therefore a kind of abstracted full semantics
in which only the key properties are fixed. This approach makes the results
more general.
These key properties fall into two categories, which we call faithfulness
requirements and security requirements. The faithfulness requirements (Sec-
tion 2.3.5) are mostly straightforward; the security requirements (Section 2.3.6)
are more subtle.
2.3.3 Configurations
Configurations in the full semantics have the form 〈c,m, E,G〉. As in the core
semantics, c and m are the current program and memory. Component E is the
machine environment, and G is the global clock. In general G can be measured
in any units of time, but we interpret it as machine clock cycles hereafter. We
write 〈c,m, E,G〉 → 〈c′,m′, E′,G′〉 for evaluation transitions.
The full semantics of expression evaluation obviously also needs to be small-
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step, but we choose a presentation style that elides the details of expression
evaluation for simplicity.
As before, the machine environment E represents hardware state that may
affect timing but that is not needed by the core semantics. Hardware compo-
nents captured by E include the data cache and instruction cache, the branch
prediction buffer, the translation lookaside buffer (TLB), and other low-level
components. The machine environment might also include hidden state added
by the compiler for performance optimization.
For example, if one considers only the timing effects of data and instruction
caches, denoted by D and I respectively, E could be a configuration of the form
E = 〈D, I〉.
Note that while both the memory m and the machine environment E can af-
fect timing, only the memory affects program control flow. This is the reason
to distinguish them in the semantics. The environment E can be completely
abstract as long as the properties for the full semantics are satisfied. This sepa-
ration also ensures that the core semantics is completely standard.
The separation of m and E also clarifies possibilities for hardware design.
For instance, it is possible for confidential data to be stored securely in a public
partition of E, but not in public memory (cf. Section 2.4.1).
2.3.4 Threat model
To evaluate whether the programming language achieves its security goals, we
need to describe the power of the adversary in terms of the semantics. We as-
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sociate an adversary with a security level `A bounding what information the
adversary can observe directly. To represent the confidentiality of memory, we
assume that an environment Γ maps variable names to security levels. If a mem-
ory location (variable) has security level ` that flows to `A (that is, ` v `A), the
adversary is able to see the contents of that memory location. By monitoring
such a memory location for changes, the adversary can also measure the times
at which the location is updated.
Two memories m1 and m2 are `-equivalent, denoted m1 ∼` m2, when they agree
on the contents of locations at level ` and below:
m1 ∼` m2 , ∀x . Γ(x) v ` . m1(x) = m2(x)
Intuitively, `-equivalence of two memories means that an observer at level `
cannot distinguish these two memories.
Projected equivalence We define projected equivalence on memories to require
equivalence of variables with exactly level `:
m1 '` m2 , ∀x . Γ(x) = ` . m1(x) = m2(x)
We assume there is a corresponding projected equivalence relation on machine
environments. If two machine environments E1 and E2 have equivalent `-
projections, denoted E1 '` E2, then `-level information that is stored in these
environments is indistinguishable. The precise definition of projected equiva-
lence depends on the hardware and perhaps the language implementation. For
example, for a two-level partitioned cache containing some entries at level L
and some at level H, two caches have equivalent H-projections if they contain
the same cache entries in the H portion, regardless of the L entries.
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Using projected equivalence it is straightforward to define `-equivalence on
machine environments:
E1 ∼` E2 , ∀`′ v ` . E1 '`′ E2
2.3.5 Faithfulness requirements for the full semantics
The faithfulness requirements for the full semantics comprise four properties:
adequacy, deterministic execution, sequential composition, as well as accurate
sleep duration.
Adequacy specifies that the core semantics and the full semantics describe
the same executions: for any transition in the core semantics there is a matching
transition in the full semantics and vice versa.
Property 1 (Adequacy of core semantics) ∀m, c, c′, E,G .
(∃E′,G′ . 〈c,m, E,G〉 → 〈c′,m′, E′,G′〉)⇔ 〈c,m〉 → 〈c′,m′〉
We also require that the full semantics be deterministic, which means that the
machine environment E completely captures the possible influences on timing.
Property 2 (Deterministic execution) ∀m, c, E,G .
〈c,m, E,G〉 → 〈c1,m1, E1,G1〉∧〈c,m, E,G〉 → 〈c2,m2, E2,G2〉 =⇒ E1 = E2∧G1 = G2
Since the core semantics is already deterministic, determinism of the machine
environment and time components suffices.
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Sequential composition must correctly accumulate time and propagate the
machine environment.
Property 3 (Sequential composition)
1. ∀c1, c2,m, E,G .
〈c1,m, E,G〉→〈stop,m′, E′,G′〉 ⇔ 〈c1; c2,m, E,G〉→〈c2,m′, E′,G′〉
2. ∀c1, c2, c′1,m, E,G such that c′1 , stop .
〈c1,m, E,G〉→〈c′1,m′, E′,G′〉 ⇔ 〈c1; c2,m, E,G〉→〈c′1; c2,m′, E′,G′〉
Finally, the sleep command must take the correct amount of time. When its
argument is negative, it is assumed to take no time.
Property 4 (Accurate sleep duration) ∀n,m, E,G, `r, `w .
〈(sleep n)[`r ,`w],m, E,G〉 → 〈stop,m, E′,G′〉 ⇒ G′ = G + max(n, 0)
Discussion The faithfulness requirements are mostly straightforward. The as-
sumption of determinacy might sound unrealistic for concurrent execution. But
if information leaks through timing because some other thread preempts this
one, the problem is in the scheduler or in the other thread, not in the current
thread. Deterministic time is realistic if we interpret G as the number of clock
cycles the current thread has used.
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Property 5 (Write label) Given a labeled command c[`r ,`w], and a level ` such that
`w @ `
∀m, E,G . 〈c[`r ,`w],m, E,G〉 → 〈c′,m′, E′,G′〉 =⇒ E '` E′
Property 6 (Read label) Given any command c[`r ,`w],
∀m1,m2,E1, E2,G . (∀x ∈ Vars1(c[`r ,`w]) . m1(x) = m2(x))
∧ E1 ∼`r E2
∧ 〈c[`r ,`w],m1, E1,G〉 → 〈c1,m′1, E′1,G1〉
∧ 〈c[`r ,`w],m2, E2,G〉 → 〈c2,m′2, E′2,G2〉 =⇒ G1 = G2
Property 7 (Single-step machine-environment noninterference) Given any
labeled command c[`r ,`w], and any level `,
∀m1,m2, E1, E2,G1,G2 . m1 ∼` m2 ∧ E1 ∼` E2
∧ 〈c[`r ,`w],m1, E1,G1〉 → 〈c1,m′1, E′1,G′1〉
∧ 〈c[`r ,`w],m2, E2,G2〉 → 〈c2,m′2, E′2,G′2〉 =⇒ E′1 ∼` E′2
Figure 2.3: Security requirements.
2.3.6 Security requirements for the full semantics
For security, the full semantics also must satisfy certain properties to ensure that
read and write labels accurately describe timing. These properties are specified
as constraints on the full semantics that must hold after each evaluation step. In
the formalization of these properties, we quantify over labeled commands with
the form c[`r ,`w]: that is, all commands except sequential composition.
Write labels The write label `w is the lower bound on the parts of the machine
environment that a single evaluation step modifies. Property 5 in Figure 2.3
formalizes the requirements on the machine environment: executing a labeled
command c[`r ,`w] cannot modify parts of the environment at levels to which `w
does not flow.
23
Example Consider program sleep(h)[`r ,H] under the two-level security lattice
L v H. This command is annotated with the write label H. The only level `
such that `w @ ` is ` = L. In this case, Property 5 requires that an execution of
sleep(h)[`r ,H] does not modify L parts of the machine environment.
Consider program sleep(h)[`r ,L] which has write label L. Because there is
no security level ` such that L @ `, Property 5 does not constrain the machine
environment for this command.
Read labels The read label `r of a command specifies which parts of the ma-
chine environment may affect the time necessary to perform the single next eval-
uation step. For a compound command such as if or while, this time does not
include time spent in subcommands.
Property 6 in Figure 2.3 formalizes the requirement that read labels accu-
rately capture the influences of the machine environment. This formalization
uses the Vars1 function, which identifies the part of memory that may affect the
timing of the next evaluation step—that is, a set of variables. We need Vars1 be-
cause parts of the memory can also affect timing, such as e in sleep (e). A simple
syntactic definition of Vars1 conservatively approximates the timing influences
of memory, but a more precise definition might depend on particularities of the
hardware implementation. For skip, this set is empty; for x := e and sleep (e),
the set consists of x and all variables in expression e; for if e then c1 else c2 and
while e do c, it contains only variables in e and excludes those in subcommands,
since only e is evaluated during the next step.
In the definition in Figure 2.3, equality of G1 and G2 means that a single step
takes exactly the same time. Both configurations take the same time, because
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m1 and m2 must agree on all variables x that are evaluated in this step. This
expresses our assumption that values of variables other than those explicitly
evaluated in a single step cannot influence its timing. Machine environments
E1 and E2 are required to be `r-equivalent, to ensure that parts of the machine
environment other than those at `r and below also cannot influence its timing.
Consider command sleep (h)[L,`w] with read-label `r = L, with respect to all
possible pairs of memories m1,m2 and machine environments E1, E2. Whenever
m1(h) and m2(h) have different values, Property 6 places no restrictions on the
timing of this command regardless of E1, E2. When m1(h) = m2(h), we require
that if E1 and E2 are L-equivalent, the resulting time must be the same. To sat-
isfy such a property, the H parts of the machine environment cannot affect the
evaluation time.
Single-step noninterference Property 5 specifies which parts of the machine
environment can be modified. However, it does not say anything more about
the nature of the modifications. For example, consider a three-level security lat-
tice L v M v H, and a command (x := y)[M,M], where both the read label and
write label are M. Property 5 requires that no modifications to L parts of the en-
vironment are allowed, but modifications to the M level are not restricted. This
creates possibilities for insecure modifications of machine environments when
H-parts of the machine environment propagate into the M-parts. To control
such propagation, we introduce Property 7 in Figure 2.3. Note that here level `
is independent of read or write labels.
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2.4 A sketch of secure hardware
To illustrate how the requirements for the full language semantics enable secure
hardware design, we sketch two possible ways for a design of cache and TLB
to realize Properties 5–7, and reason about their security informally. In Chap-
ter 3, we present a formal method for verifying more complex designs (e.g., a
complete MIPS processor).
For simplicity, we assume that the two-point label lattice L v H throughout
this section.
We start with a standard single-partition data cache similar to current com-
modity cache designs and then explore a more sophisticated partitioned cache
similar to that in prior work [88].
2.4.1 Choosing machine environments
The machine environment does not need to include all hardware state. It should
be precise enough to ensure that equivalent commands take the same time in
equal environments, but no more precise. Including state with no effect on tim-
ing leads to overly conservative security enforcement that hurts performance.
For example, consider a data cache, usually structured as a set of cache lines.
Each cache line contains a tag, a data block and a valid bit. Let us compare
two possible ways to describe this as a machine environment: a more precise
modeling of all three fields—a set of triples 〈tag,data block,valid bit〉—versus a
coarser modeling of only the tags and valid bits—a set of pairs 〈tag,valid bit〉.
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The coarse-grained abstraction of data cache state is adequate to predict ex-
ecution time, since for most cache implementations, the contents of data blocks
do not affect access time at all. The fine-grained abstraction does not work as
well. For example, consider the command h := h’ occurring in a low context.
That is, variables h and h’ are confidential, but the fact that the assignment is
happening is not. With the fine-grained abstraction, the low part of the cache
cannot record the value of h if Property 7 is to hold, because the low-equivalent
memories m1 and m2 appearing in its definition may differ on the value of h’.
However, with the coarse-grained abstraction, the location h can be stored in
low cache, because Property 7 holds without making the value of h’ part of the
machine environment.
The coarse-grained abstraction shows that high variables can reside in low
cache without hurting security in at least some circumstances. This treatment of
cache is quite different from the treatment of memory, because public memory
cannot hold confidential data. Without the formalization of Property 7, it would
be difficult to reason about the security of this treatment of cache. Yet this insight
is important for performance: otherwise, code with a low timing label cannot
access high variables using cache.
2.4.2 Realization on standard hardware
At least some standard CPUs can satisfy the security requirements (Proper-
ties 5–7). Intel’s family of Pentium and Xeon processors has a “no-fill” mode
in which accesses are served directly from memory on cache misses, with no
evictions from nor filling of the data cache.
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Our approach can be implemented by treating the whole cache as low, and
therefore disallowing cache writes from high contexts. For each block of instruc-
tions with `w = H, the compiler inserts a no-fill start instruction before, and a
no-fill exit instruction after.
It is easy to verify that Properties 5–7 hold, as follows:
Property 5 For commands with `w = L, this property is vacuously true since
there is no ` such that L @ `. Commands with `w = H are executed in “no-fill”
mode, so the result is trivial.
Property 6 Since there is only one (L) partition, E1 ∼`r E2 is equivalent to
E1 = E2. The property can be verified for each command. For instance, consider
command sleep (e)[`r ,`w]. The condition ∀x ∈ Vars1(c[`r ,`w]).m1(x) = m2(x) ensures
that m1(e) = m2(e). Thus, this command is suspended for the same time. More-
over, since E1 = E2, cache access time must be the same according to Property 2.
So, we have G1 = G2.
Property 7 We only need to check the L partition, which can be verified for
each command. For instance, consider command sleep (e)[`r ,`w]. When `w =
H, the result is true simply because the cache is not modified. Otherwise, the
same addresses (variables) are accessed. Since initial cache states are equivalent,
identical accesses yields equivalent cache states.
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2.4.3 A more efficient realization
A more efficient hardware design might partition both the cache(s) and the TLB
according to security labels. Let us assume both the cache and TLB are equally,
statically partitioned into two parts: L and H. The hardware accesses different
parts as directed by a timing label that is provided from the software level. Here
we focus on the correctness of this hardware design; a simulation of this design
is discussed in Section 6.2.
One subtle issue is consistency, since data can be stored in both the L and the
H partitions. We avoid inconsistency by keeping only one copy in the cache and
TLB. In any CPU pipeline stage that accesses memory when the timing label is
H, both H and L partitions are searched. If there is a cache miss, data is installed
in the H partition. When the timing label is L, only the L partition is searched.
However, to preserve consistency, instead of fetching the data from next level or
memory, the controller moves the data from the H partition if it already exists
there. To satisfy Property 6, the hardware ensures this process takes the same
time as a cache miss.
We can informally verify Properties 5–7 for this design as well:
Property 5 When the write label is L, this property holds trivially because
there is no label such that L @ `. When the write label is H, a new entry is
installed only in the H partition, so E ∼L E′.
Property 6 The premise of Property 6 ensures that all variables evaluated in
a single step have identical values, so any variation in execution time is due to
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the machine environment. When the read label is H, E1 ∼H E2 ensures that the
machine environments are identical; therefore, the access time is also identical.
When the read label is L, the access time depends only on the existence of the
entry in L-cache/TLB. Even if the data is in the H partition, the load time is the
same as if there were an L-partition miss.
Property 7 This requirement requires noninterference for a single step. Con-
tents of the H partition can affect the L part in the next step only when data is
stored in the H partition and the access has a timing label L. Since data is in-
stalled into the L part regardless of the state of the H partition, this property is
still satisfied.
Discussion on formal proof and multilevel security We have discussed effi-
cient hardware for a two-level label system. Verification of multilevel security
hardware is more challenging. In Chapter 3, we present SecVerilog to formally
verify multilevel security hardware.
2.5 A type system for controlling timing channels
Next, we present the security type system for our language. We show that the
type system eliminates all timing channels in a well-type program, with the
assumption that Properties 1–7 hold.
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pc v `w
Γ, pc, τ ` skip[`r ,`w] : τ unionsq `r
T-SKIP
Γ ` e : ` pc v `w ` unionsq pc unionsq τ unionsq `r v Γ(x)
Γ, pc, τ ` x := e[`r ,`w] : Γ(x)
T-ASGN
Γ ` e : ` pc v `w
Γ, pc, τ ` (sleep (e))[`r ,`w] : τ unionsq ` unionsq `r
T-SLEEP
Γ ` e : ` pc v `w Γ, ` unionsq pc, ` unionsq τ unionsq `r ` ci : τi i = 1, 2
Γ, pc, τ ` (if e then c1 else c2)[`r ,`w] : τ1 unionsq τ2
T-IF
Γ ` e : ` pc v `w ` unionsq τ unionsq `r v τ′ Γ, ` unionsq pc, τ′ ` c : τ′
Γ, pc, τ ` (while e do c)[`r ,`w] : τ′
T-WHILE
Γ, pc, τ ` c1 : τ1 Γ, pc, τ1 ` c2 : τ2
Γ, pc, τ ` c1; c2 : τ2
T-SEQ
Figure 2.4: Typing rules: commands.
2.5.1 Security type system
Typing rules for expressions have form Γ ` e : ` where Γ is the security environ-
ment (a map from variables to security labels), e is the expression, and ` is the
type of the expression. The rules are standard [72] and we omit them here. Typ-
ing rules for commands, in Figure 3.5, have form Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′. Here pc is the
usual program-counter label [72], τ is the timing start-label, and τ′ is the timing
end-label. The timing start- and end-labels bound the level of information that
flows into timing before and after executing c, respectively. When timing end-
labels are not relevant, we write Γ, pc, τ ` c. We use Γ ` c to denote Γ,⊥,⊥ ` c.
All rules enforce the constraint τ v τ′ because timing dependencies accumu-
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late as the program executes. Every rule also propagates the timing end-labels
of subcommands. This can be seen most clearly in the rule for sequential com-
position (T-SEQ): the end-label from c1 is the start-label for c2.
All remaining rules require pc v `w. This restriction, together with Prop-
erty 5, ensures that no confidential information about control flow leaks to the
low parts of the machine environment. We do not require τ v `w because we
assume the adversary cannot directly observe the timing of updates to the ma-
chine environment. This assumption is reasonable since the ISA gives no way
to check whether a given location is in cache.
Rule (T-SKIP) takes the read label `r into account in its timing end-label. The
intuition is that reading from confidential parts of the machine environment
should be reflected in the timing end-label.
Rule (T-ASGN) for assignments x := e requires ` unionsq pc unionsq τ unionsq `r v Γ(x), where
` is the level of the expression. The condition ` unionsq pc v Γ(x) is standard. We also
require τ unionsq `r v Γ(x), to prevent information from leaking via the timing of the
update, from either the current time or the machine environment. The timing
end-label is set to Γ(x), bounding all sources of timing leaks.
Notice that the write label `w is independent of the label on x. The reason is
that `w is the interface for software to tell hardware which state may be modified.
A low write label on an assignment to a high variable permits the variable to be
stored in low cache.
Because sleep has no memory side effects, rule (T-SLEEP) is slightly sim-
pler than that for assignments; the timing end-label conservatively includes all
sources of timing information leaks.
32
Rule (T-IF) restricts the environment in which branches c1 and c2 are type-
checked. As is standard, the program-counter label is raised to `unionsqpc. The timing
start-labels are also restricted to reflect the effect of reading from the `r-parts of
the machine environment and of the branching expression. Rule (T-WHILE)
imposes similar conditions on end-label τ′, except that τ′ can also be used as
both start- and end-labels for type-checking the loop body.
We have seen that for security, the write label of a command must be higher
than the label of the program counter. There is no corresponding restriction
on the read label of a command. The hardware may be able to provide better
performance if a higher read label is chosen. For instance, in most cache designs,
reading from the cache changes its state. The cache can only be used when
`r = `w, so this condition should be satisfied for best performance.
2.5.2 Machine-environment noninterference
An important property of the type system is that it guarantees machine envi-
ronment noninterference. This property requires execution to preserve low-
equivalence of memory and machine environments.
Theorem 1 (Memory and machine-environment noninterference)
∀E1, E2,m1,m2,G, c, ` . Γ ` c ∧ m1 ∼` m2 ∧ E1 ∼` E2
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′1, E′1,G1〉
∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′2, E′2,G2〉
=⇒ m′1 ∼` m′2 ∧ E′1 ∼` E′2
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Theorem 1 guarantees the adversary obtains no information by observing public
parts of the memory and machine environments. Therefore, for any well-typed
program, information leakage via storage channels and machine environment
is eliminated.
More importantly, the type system guarantees that a well-typed program
leaks no information via timing channels. To formalize this property, we start
from observable assignment events.
Observable assignment events As discussed in Section 2.3.4, an adversary at
level `A observes memory, including timing of updates to memory, at levels up
to `A. To formally define adversary observations, we refine our presentation of
the language semantics with observable assignment events.
Let α ∈ {(x, v, t), } range over observable events, which can be either an as-
signment to variable x of value v at time t, or an empty event . An event (x, v,G′)
is generated by assignment transitions 〈x := e,m, E,G〉 → 〈stop,m′, E′,G′〉,
where 〈m, e〉 ⇓ v, and by all transitions whose derivation includes a subderiva-
tion of such a transition.
We write 〈c,m, E,G〉 V (x, v, t) if configuration 〈c,m, E,G〉 produces a se-
quence of events (x, v, t) = (x1, v1, t1) . . . (xn, vn, tn) and reaches a final configura-
tion 〈stop,m′, E′,G′〉 for some m′, E′,G′.
`A-observable events An event (x, v, t) is observable to the adversary at level `A
when Γ(x) v `A. Given a configuration 〈c,m, E,G〉 such that 〈c,m, E,G〉V (x, v, t),
we write 〈c,m, E,G〉V`A (x′, v′, t′) for the longest subsequence of (x, v, t) such that
for all events (xi, vi, ti) in (x′, v′, t′) it holds that Γ(xi) v `A.
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For example, for program l1 := l2; h1 := l1, the H-adversary observes two as-
signments: 〈c,m, E,G〉 VH (l1, v1, t1), (h1, v2, t2) for some v1, t1, v2 and t2. For the
L-adversary, we have 〈c,m, E,G〉 VL (l1, v1, t1), which does not include the as-
signment to h1.
Timing-sensitive noninterference Now we are ready to state the most impor-
tant property of the type system. That is, all well-typed programs are timing
channel free.
Theorem 2 (Timing-sensitive noninterference)
∀E1, E2,m1,m2,G, c, ` . Γ ` c ∧ m1 ∼` m2 ∧ E1 ∼` E2
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G〉V` (x1, v1, t1) ∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G〉V` (x2, v2, t2)
=⇒ x1 = x2 ∧ v1 = v2 ∧ t1 = t2
In other words, given two different secrets, an adversary who observes
memory, including timing of updates to memory, at levels up to `, will always
observe the same observations regardless of the secrets.
Proofs For technical reasons, we defer the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
until Chapter 5, where these results become corollaries of more general results
presented in that chapter.
A note on termination The definition of memory and machine noninter-
ference in Theorem 1 is presented in the batch-style termination-insensitive
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form [5]. Such definitions are simple but ordinarily limit one’s results to pro-
grams that eventually terminate. Because termination channels are a special
case of timing channels, using a batch-style definition is not fundamentally lim-
iting here.
2.6 Related work
Control of internal timing channels has been studied from different perspec-
tives, and several papers have explored a language-based approach. Low ob-
servational determinism [93, 37] can control these channels by eliminating dan-
gerous races.
External timing channels are harder to control. Much prior language-based
work on external timing channels uses simple, implicit models of timing, and no
previous work fully addresses indirect dependencies. Type systems have been
proposed to prevent timing channels [86], but are very restrictive. Often (e.g.,
[86, 78, 73, 76]) timing behavior of the program is assumed to be accurately de-
scribed by the number of steps taken in an operational semantics. This assump-
tion does not hold even at the machine-language level, unless we fully model
the hardware implementation in the operational semantics and verify the entire
software and hardware stack together. Our approach adds a layer of abstraction
so software and hardware can be designed and verified independently.
Some previous work uses program transformation to remove indirect de-
pendencies, though only those arising from data cache. The main idea is to
equalize the execution time of different branches, but a price is paid in expres-
siveness, since these languages either rule out loops with confidential guards (as
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in [4, 34, 10]), or limit the number of loop iterations [56, 18]. These methods do
not handle all indirect timing dependencies; for example, the instruction cache
is not handled, so verified programs remain vulnerable to other indirect timing
attacks [87, 3, 2].
Secure multi-execution [22, 42] provides timing-sensitive noninterference
yet is probably less restrictive than the prior approaches discussed above. The
security guarantee is weaker than in our approach: that the number of instruc-
tions executed, rather than the time, leaks no information for incomparable lev-
els. Extra computational work is also required per security level, hurting per-
formance, and no quantitative bound on leakage is obtained.
Though security cannot be enforced purely at the hardware level, hardware
techniques have been proposed to mitigate timing channels. Targeting cache-
based timing attacks, both static [67] and dynamic [88, 89, 50] mechanisms,
based on the idea of partitioned cache, have been proposed. Such designs are
ad hoc and hard to verify against other attacks. For example, Kong et al. [44]
show vulnerabilities in Wang’s cache design [88]. SecVerilog, the new hardware
description language introduced in Chapter 3, and languages designed by Li et
al. [49, 48] are statically verifiable hardware description languages for building
hardware that is information-flow secure by construction. We defer a detailed
comparison to Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
A HARDWARE DESIGN LANGUAGE FOR
TIMING-SENSITIVE INFORMATION-FLOW SECURITY
Chapter 2 shows that a new timing contract can communicate information flows
between the software and hardware, enabling timing channels to be rigorously
controlled in the entire computer system. Left open is the question of how to
design complex hardware that correctly enforces its part of the contract.
This chapter fills in the critical missing piece, offering a method for designing
hardware that correctly and precisely enforces secure information flow. Our
approach is based on a new hardware description language, called SecVerilog,
that statically checks information flows within hardware using a security type
system. This hardware design method enables computing systems in which all
forms of information flow are tracked, including explicit flows, implicit flows,
and flows via timing channels.
3.1 Background and approach
3.1.1 Information flow control in hardware
Recall that information flow control aims to ensure that all information flows in
a system respect a security policy. For this purpose, information in the system
is associated with a security level drawn from a lattice L whose partial ordering
v specifies which information flows are allowed. As defined in Section 1.2.1, a
lattice with two security levels L (low, public) and H (high, secret) can be used
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to forbid information labeled as H from flowing into L (H 6v L) while allowing
the other direction (L v H).
The goal of SecVerilog is to enforce fine-grained information flow control for
hardware designs in a statically verifiable fashion. With SecVerilog, hardware
designers specify hardware-level information flow policies by annotating wires
and registers with security labels and specifying a security lattice. Then, the
SecVerilog type system statically checks and verifies timing-sensitive informa-
tion flow properties within hardware at design time. While we use a simple
lattice with two security levels (L and H) in our examples, the approach applies
to an arbitrary security lattice.
3.1.2 Threat model
We follow the threat model in Section 2.3.4. In particular, we assume a software-
level adversary, who can observe all information at or below a certain security
level that we will call low (L). We assume the adversary may either directly
or indirectly (e.g., by measuring the timing of L instructions) observe machine
environment state at or below the level L. Hence, both storage and timing chan-
nels [47] are considered.
Moreover, we target synchronous circuits driven by a fixed-frequency clock.
We assume the software-level adversary has no physical access to the hardware,
and we do not consider physical attacks such as directly tapping internal cir-
cuits. Therefore, the adversary may only observe machine environment at the
granularity of a clock cycle. In other words, the instable circuit state between
clock ticks is invisible to the adversary.
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1 if (h1)[L]
2 h2:=l1;[H]
3 else
4 h2:=l2;[H]
5 l3:=l1;[L]
Security policy on hardware designs:
1) The high partition cannot affect the timing of instruc-
tions with label L,
2) the low partition cannot be modified when the tim-
ing label is H, and
3) the contents of the high partition cannot affect those
of the low partition.
Figure 3.1: An example of full-system timing channel control. The well-
typed program on the left is secure if the hardware enforces
the security policy on the right.
Furthermore, we do not consider side channels that require physical prox-
imity, such as power consumption analysis.
3.1.3 Controlling timing channels in hardware
The ability to verifiably control fine-grained information flow in hardware can
enhance security in many applications. One notable example, and a focus of
this chapter, is designing efficient hardware that controls timing channels.
Our goal is an efficient hardware design that enforces the complex security
policy required by the full-system timing channel control mechanism proposed
in Chapter 2. Recall that in this approach, the security of the whole system rests
on a concise contract between the software and hardware, provably controlling
timing channels if both meet their requirements. For example, the code frag-
ment in Figure 3.1 illustrates a well-typed program, in which timing labels are
shown in brackets; h1 and h2 are confidential, and other variables are public1.
1The general contract in Chapter 2 uses two timing labels, called the read and write labels.
SecVerilog is expressive enough to verify the general contract, which is implemented in our
verified MIPS processor (Section 6.3). For simplicity, we assume these two labels are equal in
most of examples.
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1 reg[18:0] {L} tag0[256],tag1[256];
2 reg[18:0] {H} tag2[256],tag3[256];
3 wire[7:0] {L} index;
4 //Par(0)=Par(1)=L Par(2)=Par(3)=H
5 wire[1:0] {Par(way)} way;
6 wire[18:0] {Par(way)} tag_in;
7 wire {Par(way)} write_enable;
8
9 always @(posedge clock) begin
10 if (write_enable) begin
11 case (way)
12 0: tag0[index]=tag_in;
13 1: tag1[index]=tag_in;
14 2: tag2[index]=tag_in;
15 3: tag3[index]=tag_in;
16 endcase
17 end
18 end
(a) SecVerilog code for cache tags
1 wire {L} isLoad,isStore;
2 wire {L} hit0,hit1; // hitX: 1 iff way
3 wire {H} hit2,hit3; // X gets a cache hit
4 //LH(0)=L LH(1)=H
5 wire {LH(timingLabel)} stall, hit, timingLabel;
6 reg[2:0] {LH(timingLabel)} dFsmState;
7
8 assign stall = ((isLoad | isStore) &
9 (˜hit | (dFsmState != DFSM_IDLE)));
10 assign hit = (timingLabel == 0) ?
11 ((hit0|hit1)?1:0):((hit0|hit1|hit2|hit3)?1:0);
12 ...
13 case (dFsmState)
14 DFSM_IDLE: begin
15 // load hit
16 if (isLoad && hit) begin
17 dFsmState <= DFSM_IDLE;// nonblocking
18 ...
19 endcase
(b) SecVerilog code for a cache controller
Figure 3.2: SecVerilog extends Verilog with security label annotations
(shaded in gray).
Here, the existence of h1 in data cache, rather than the value of h1, can affect
the execution time of line 1. Hence, line 1 has a timing label of L. The benefit of
these timing labels is that only the timing of instructions with H timing labels
needs to be controlled and mitigated at software level, as long as the security
policy in Figure 3.1 is enforced on hardware.
3.1.4 Example: secure cache design
Designing hardware to meet the complex security policy in Figure 3.1 is chal-
lenging. As an illustration, we consider designing a secure cache, statically
partitioned between security levels L (low) and H (high) as proposed in prior
work [67, 88]. The L and H partition correspond to the L and H machine envi-
ronment respectively.
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Figure 3.2(a) presents a simplified fragment of SecVerilog code to update
cache tags. For now, ignore the shaded annotations. This design logically par-
titions a 4-way set-associative cache so that ways 0 and 1 (tag0 and tag1) are
used as the L partition, and the other ways (tag2 and tag3) are used as the
H partition. The code writes a new cache tag to a way specified by way when
write_enable is asserted.
This simple example shows the intricacy of correctly enforcing the afore-
mentioned security policy in hardware. First, tag_in must not contain high
information when way is 0 or 1, to prevent the H partition from affecting the
state of the L partition (tag0 and tag1). Second, write_enable, which controls
whether a write occurs, cannot be influenced by high information when way is
0 or 1 (an instance of implicit flows [72]). Verifying these restrictions is tricky
since the cache partition that tag_in and write_enable belong to can change at
run time.
More challenging is to enforce secure timing: the H partition cannot af-
fect the timing of instructions with timing label L. A simplified fragment of
the SecVerilog code for the cache controller is shown in Figure 3.2(b), where
timingLabel represents the timing label of a cache access, propagated from the
software level, hiti (0 ≤ i ≤ 3) indicates if way i gets a cache hit, and the stall
signal indicates when a cache access completes.
Since the stall signal affects the execution time of an instruction, a secure
design must ensure that only the L partition can affect the execution time when
timingLabel is 0 (encoding L). Verifying this property is difficult, since the
cache controller may access H data even when timingLabel is 0 (e.g., to execute
line 1 of the example in Figure 3.1). Perhaps counterintuitively, this access is se-
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cure, because timing may be affected by the existence of H data in the cache but
not by the value of the data. Moreover, the hit and dFsmState signals, which
affect stall (line 8), are shared across both cache partitions. A secure design
must ensure that no information leaks through these shared variables, which is
difficult since their uses are spread across multiple statements (lines 13–19 only
show a snippet).
3.1.5 The SecVerilog approach
SecVerilog extends Verilog with the ability to give each variable a label that spec-
ifies the security level of the variable. In Figure 3.2, these labels are the shaded
annotations, which indicate, e.g., that variables tag0 and tag1 are labeled L
whereas tag2 and tag3 are labeled H. Using these annotations, the SecVerilog
type system automatically verifies information flow properties of Verilog code
at compile time.
Programming languages that provide the ability to label variables have been
developed before [9, 59, 75], but their labels are not expressive enough to han-
dle practical hardware designs where resources need to be shared across secu-
rity levels. In effect, the security levels might be changed at run time. We use
dependent types to address this challenge.
Consider the example in Figure 3.2(a). The labels of way, write_enable, and
tag_in depend on which cache way is being accessed. In fact, we observe that a
precise dependent label can be assigned to these variables without any change
to the Verilog code. The proper label is Par(way), where the name Par denotes a
type-level function that maps 0 and 1 to level L, and 2 and 3 to level H (concisely,
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Par = {0 7→ L, 1 7→ L, 2 7→ H, 3 7→ H}). Intuitively, these dependent labels
express a lightweight invariant on variables (e.g., when way is 0, write_enable
must have level L).
For the example in Figure 3.2(b), stall, hit and dFsmState can be labeled
with LH(timingLabel) where LH = {0 7→ L, 1 7→ H} to ensure that they can be
affected only by the low partition when timingLabel is 0.
Such invariants can be maintained by the type system described in Sec-
tion 3.3. For instance, to ensure that the explicit flow from tag_in to tag0 at
line 12 in Figure 3.2(a) is secure, the type system generates a proof obligation
(way = 0 ⇒ Par(way) v L), meaning that when way is 0, information flow from
tag_in (with label Par(way)) to tag0 (with label L) is permissible. This proof
obligation can easily be discharged by an external solver.
The soundness of our type system (Section 3.4) guarantees that all security
violations are detected at compile time. For example, consider the case when
timingLabel is 0 in line 11 in Figure 3.2(b). If the H partition, such as variable
hit2, were accessed in that case, an error would be reported because the type
system would generate an invalid proof obligation: (timingLabel = 0) ⇒ H v
LH(timingLabel).
3.1.6 Benefits over previous approaches
Our approach enjoys several benefits compared with prior efforts with verifi-
able information-flow security for hardware [84, 49, 48]. First, verification is
done at compile time, avoiding run-time overhead and detecting errors at an
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Program Prog ::= B1 . . . Bn
Thread B ::= always@(γ) c
Trigger γ ::= posedge clock | negedge clock | ~v
Cmds c ::= skipη | begin c1; . . . ; cn; end
| v =η e | v⇐η e | ifη (e) c1 else c2
Expr e ::= v | n | uop e | e bop e
Vars x, y, v ∈ Vars
Figure 3.3: Syntax of SecVerilog.
early design stage. This is not possible with GLIFT [84] and Sapper [48]. Sec-
ond, variables and logic can be shared across multiple security levels (e.g., way
and hit are shared with various timing labels), which is not possible with Cais-
son [49]. Moreover, SecVerilog adds little programming effort: Verilog code
can be verified almost as-is, with annotations (security labels) required only for
variable declarations.
3.2 SecVerilog: Syntax and semantics
Except for added annotations, SecVerilog has essentially the same syntax and
semantics as Verilog [30]. It builds on the synthesizable subset of the Verilog lan-
guage. The target language of our compiler is synthesizable Verilog from which
hardware can be generated using existing tools. We restrict to synthesizable
code because unsynthesizable Verilog code is used only for testing purposes; it
has no effect on the final hardware.
A core subset of SecVerilog is shown in Figure 3.3. We choose this subset
because it includes all interesting features, and the omitted features (e.g., case,
assign and the ternary conditional) can be translated into the core language.
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A SecVerilog program (Prog) consists of a set of variable declarations and a
set of thread definitions that use these variables. Variable v can represent either
a register or a wire. The difference is that wires are stateless, and must be driven
by other signals. We do not distinguish them in the syntax.
“Always blocks” (B) in (Sec)Verilog are similar to threads from the software
perspective. Each always block translates into a hardware module that operates
in parallel to other modules.
Threads are activated by triggers. A trigger γ can either be a change to the
clock signal (posedge/negedge means the rising/falling edge of the clock sig-
nal), or a change to a variable in a variable list ~v. For example, commands in the
always block at line 9 in Figure 3.2(a) are activated at every rising edge of the
clock signal.
Commands c are similar to those in software languages. Symbols η are
unique identifiers for program points and can be ignored for now. A feature
of Verilog not found in most programming languages is the distinction between
blocking assignment v =η e and nonblocking assignment v ⇐η e. The effects of
blocking assignments are visible immediately, but those of nonblocking assign-
ments are delayed until the end of the current time unit. For example, consider
the two code fragments x = 1; y ⇐ x and x ⇐ 1; y ⇐ x. If the value of x is
initially 0, then y becomes 1 in the first piece of code, but 0 in the second.
We provide a formal operational semantics for SecVerilog in Section 3.5.1.
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Level ` ∈ L
Family f ∈ Zn → L
Label τ ::= ` | f (v) | τ1 unionsq τ2 | τ1 u τ2
Figure 3.4: Syntax of security labels.
3.3 SecVerilog: Type system
The SecVerilog type system statically controls information flow in a rigorous
and verifiable way. The most novel features of the type system include: 1) mu-
table, dependent security labels, 2) a permissive yet sound way of controlling
label channels, and 3) a modular design that decouples the program analyses
required for precision from the type system. These novel features are essential
for statically verifying highly efficient, practical hardware designs.
3.3.1 Type syntax
Types in SecVerilog are simply Verilog types extended with security label ex-
pressions, whose syntax is shown in Figure 3.4. The simplest form of label τ is a
concrete security level ` drawn from the security lattice L.
Unlike in most previous work on language-based security, SecVerilog sup-
ports dynamic labels: labels that can change at run time. A dynamic label f (v) is
constructed using a type-valued function f applied to a variable v. Type-valued
functions are needed in order to decode the simple values that the hardware can
convey into labels from the lattice L.
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Γ, pc,M ` skipη
T-SKIP
Γ, pc,M ` c1 Γ, pc,M ` c2
Γ, pc,M ` c1; c2
T-SEQ
Γ ` e : τ v < FV(Γ(v)) |= P(•η)⇒ τ unionsq pc v Γ(v)
Γ, pc,M ` v =η e Γ, pc,M ` v⇐η e
T-ASSIGN
Γ ` e : τ v ∈ FV(Γ(v))v′ < Γ
|= P(•η)⇒ pc v Γ(v) if v<M
|= P(•η), v′ = beca ⇒ τ unionsq pc v Γ(v) {v′/v}
Γ, pc,M ` v =η e Γ, pc,M ` v⇐η e
T-ASSIGN-REC
Γ ` e : τ Γ, pc unionsq τ,M∩ DA(η) ` c1
Γ, pc unionsq τ,M∩ DA(η) ` c2
Γ, pc,M ` ifη (e) c1 else c2
T-IF
Figure 3.5: Typing rules: commands.
Dynamic labels are needed to accurately describe information flows in com-
plex hardware designs, where resources are used by multiple security levels.
One example is the label Par(way) used in Figure 3.2(a). Note that all secu-
rity labels in SecVerilog, including dynamic labels and label-decoding functions,
only exist for compile-time type checking; they have no run-time manifestation.
Because security labels can mention terms (in particular, variables such as
way), the type system has dependent types. Dependent security types have
been explored in some prior work on security type systems that track infor-
mation flow (e.g., [59, 85, 97]), where they provide valuable expressive power.
However, in order to support analysis of hardware security, the type system
for SecVerilog includes some unique features: first, the use of type-valued func-
tions for label decoding, and second, even more unusual, the presence of muta-
ble variables in types—that is, types may depend on variables whose value can
change at run time.
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The design philosophy of SecVerilog is to offer an expressive language with
a low annotation burden, along with fast, automatic type checking. Following
this philosophy, the only kind of term to which a label decoding function can be
applied is a variable. This restriction ameliorates two problems: first, the unde-
cidability of type equality involving general program expressions, and second,
side effects changing the meaning of types.
Despite this restriction, dependent types in SecVerilog nevertheless turn out
to be expressive enough for the intended use in hardware design. Restricting
dependent types allows type checking to be fast (e.g., two seconds to verify
a complete MIPS CPU in Section 6.3.1) and fully automatic. The syntax also
alleviates the resulting limitations on expressiveness by allowing joins (unionsq) and
meets (u) of labels.
3.3.2 Typing rules
Typing rules for expressions have the form Γ ` e : τ where Γ is a typing environ-
ment that maps variables to security labels, e is the expression, and τ is its label.
Since these rules are mostly standard [72], we leave the details in Section 3.5.
The typing rules for commands are shown in Figure 3.5. The typing judg-
ment has the form Γ, pc,M ` c. Similar to the usual program-counter label [72]
for software languages, pc is used to control implicit flows. More interesting
is M, which tracks a set of variables that must be modified in all alternative
executions. The type system usesM to improve its precision, as we see shortly.
In the next three sections, we explore the challenges of designing the SecVer-
ilog type system and along the way explain the rules of Figure 3.5 in more depth.
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1 reg[7:0] {H} secret, {L} public, {L} x;
2 reg[7:0] {LH(x)} y; // LH(0)=L LH(1)=H
3 always@(posedge clock) begin
4 if (x==1) begin y ⇐ secret; end
5 else begin public ⇐ y; end
6 end
7 end
Figure 3.6: An example of implicit declassification.
3.3.3 Mutable dependent security labels
Dependent types need to mention mutable variables in practical hardware de-
signs. For example, the variable way in Figure 3.2(a) can be modified whenever
a new read request comes to the data cache, updating which cache way to use.
Mutability creates challenges for the soundness of the type system. We begin by
illustrating these challenges.
Implicit declassification Whenever a variable changes, the meaning of any
security label that depends on it also changes. To be secure, SecVerilog needs to
prevent such changes from implicitly declassifying information. Consider the
example in Figure 3.6. This code is clearly insecure since it copies secret into
public when x changes from 1 to 0 (not shown for brevity).
At the assignment to y in the first branch, its level is H, but at the assignment
to public, the level of y has become L. The insecurity arises from the change to
the label of y during the execution, while its content remains the same. In other
words, if x changes from 1 to 0, the label of y cannot protect its content.
We rely on a dynamic mechanism to ensure register contents are erased
when the old label is not bounded by the new one. This is captured by the
50
〈σ, e〉 ⇓ n σ′ = switch(v, σ[v 7→ n])
〈σ, v =η e〉 ⇓ σ′
S-ASGN1
switch(v, σ)(v′) =
0 if v′ , v ∧ v ∈ FV(Γ(v′))σ(v) otherwise
Figure 3.7: Dynamic erasure of contents.
small-step rule for assignments, shown in Figure 3.7. Note that since wires in
hardware are stateless, this rule only applies to registers. The rule (S-ASGN1)
ensures that after an assignment that changes the label of a variable, that vari-
able’s value is zeroed out. Code to dynamically zero out registers is automat-
ically inserted as part of the translation to Verilog. In the rule, the expression
FV(τ) returns the set of free variables in type τ.
While this dynamic mechanism may affect the functionality of the original
hardware design, we believe that it is not a major issue in practice for the fol-
lowing reasons:
1. Dynamic erasure happens very rarely in our design experience. Most vari-
ables with dynamic labels are wires in our prototype processor design
(e.g., way, tag_in and write_enable in Figure 3.2(a)). So the dynamic
mechanism has no effect on these variables.
2. For registers with dynamic labels, this clearing is indeed necessary for se-
curity; hardware designers need to explicitly implement it anyway. Con-
sider dFsmState in Figure 3.2(b), the state of the cache controller. It is reset
anyway in a secure design, when the pipeline is flushed in the case that
the timing label changes from H to L.
3. Further, the compiler can notify a designer when automatic clearing is
generated, and ask the designer to explicitly approve such changes.
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1 reg{H} high;
2 reg{L} low, low’;
3 reg{LH(x)} x;
4 //LH(0)=L LH(1)=H
5 ...
6 if (high) begin
7 x ⇐ 1;
8 end
9 if (x==0 && low==1) begin
10 low’ ⇐ 0;
11 end
12 low ⇐ 1;
13 ...
(a) Insecure program with a
label channel.
1 reg{H} hit2, hit3;
2 reg[1:0]{Par(way)} way;
3 // Par(0)=Par(1)=L
4 // Par(2)=Par(3)=H
5 ...
6 if (hit2 || hit3) begin
7 way ⇐ (hit2?2’b10:2’b11);
8 end
9 else begin
10 way ⇐ 2’b10;
11 end
12 ...
(b) No-sensitive-upgrade rejects se-
cure code.
1 reg{H} high;
2 reg{L} low, low’;
3 reg{Par(x)} x;
4 // Par(0)=Par(1)=L
5 // Par(2)=Par(3)=H
6 ...
7 if (x==0) begin
8 low ⇐ 1;
9 end
10 else begin
11 high ⇐ 1;
12 end
13 low’ ⇐ low;
14 ...
(c) Flow-sensitive
systems reject secure
code.
Figure 3.8: Examples illustrating the challenges of controlling label chan-
nels.
Label channels Mutable dependent types create label channels in which the
value of a label becomes an information channel. For instance, consider the
code snippet in Figure 3.8(a). This example appears secure as the assignment to
low’ only occurs when the label of x is L (when x is 0). When high is 1, the label
of x becomes H, which correctly protects the secrecy of high. However, this code
is insecure because the change of label x also leaks information. Suppose that the
variables represent flip-flops that are initialized to (x = 0, low = 0, low′ = 1) on
a reset. The value of x in the second clock cycle after a reset is determined by
the value of high in the first cycle; 1 if high is 1, 0 if high is 0. Then, low’ in the
third clock cycle reflects the value of x in the second cycle, leaking information
from high to low’.
Similar vulnerabilities have also been observed in the literature on flow-
sensitive security types, in which security labels of a variable may change dy-
namically (e.g., [71, 38, 8]). However, prior solutions are all too conservative
(i.e., they reject secure programs) for practical hardware designs.
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The first approach is no-sensitive-upgrade [8], which forbids raising a low la-
bel to high in a high context. However, this restriction rules out useful secure
code, such as the secure code in Figure 3.8(b), adapted from our partitioned
cache design. This code selects a cache way to write to. Variables hit2 and hit3,
representing the existence of a hit in high cache, have label H. No-sensitive-
upgrade rejects this program, since way might be L before the assignment.
The second approach [38, 71] raises the label of variables modified in any
branch to the context label (the label of the branch condition). Returning to
the example in Figure 3.8(a), the label of x would become H because of the if-
statement at lines 6–8. This over-approximation can be too conservative as well.
For example, consider the secure code in Figure 3.8(c). Here, the label of x spec-
ifies an invariant: whenever x is 0 or 1 (i.e., Par(x)=L), nothing is leaked by the
value of x nor by the time at which its value changes. Hence, low’s transition
to 1 at line 8 is secure. However, the approach in [38] raises the label of low to
Par(x) after the if-else statement. This conservative label of low makes checking
at line 13 fail, since there is a flow from H to L when x is 2 or 3. Even a more
permissive approach rejects this secure code. When x is 2 or 3, the dynamic
monitor described in [71] tracks a set of variables that may be modified in an-
other branch (low in this case), and raises their label to the context label (H).
Hence, line 13 is still rejected.
We propose a more permissive mechanism that accepts the secure programs
in Figure 3.8(b) and 3.8(c). Our insight is that no-sensitive-upgrade is needed
for security, but only when the modified variable might not be assigned in an
alternative path. For example, in Figure 3.8(b), the variable way is modified in
both branch paths. Here, the label of way is checked for both branch paths on
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the assignments to way (line 7 and 10), ensuring that the label of way must be
higher than the context label (H) at the merge point. In other words, the fact
that the label of way becomes H leaks no information. Hence, the no-sensitive-
upgrade check is unnecessary in this case. This insight is formally justified in
our soundness proof in Section 3.5.
This insight motivates using a definite-assignment analysis, which identifies
variables that must be assigned to in any possible execution. Definite as-
signment analysis is a common static program analysis useful for detecting
uninitialized variables. Since SecVerilog, like Verilog, has no aliasing, definite-
assignment analysis is simple; we omit the details.
We assume an analysis that returns DA(η), variables that must be assigned
to in any possible execution of the command at location η. The type system
propagates this information to branches, so that for an assignment to v, the no-
sensitive-upgrade check is avoided if v must be assigned to in other paths. For
example, the program in Figure 3.8(b) is well-typed because the variable way is
modified in both branches, avoiding the limitations of [8]. Moreover, the type
system still enables the remaining (necessary) no-sensitive-upgrade checks. So
there is no need to raise the label of a variable assigned to in an alternative
path. For example, there is no need to check the assignment to low at line 8 of
Figure 3.8(c) in a high context (the else branch), avoiding the limitations of [38,
71]. Soundness is preserved despite the extra permissiveness (see Section 3.4).
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3.3.4 Constraints and hypotheses
The design goal of SecVerilog is to achieve both soundness and precision, with
a low annotation burden. The key to precision is to make enough information
about the run-time values of variables available to the type system. For instance,
consider the assignment to hit at line 10 in our cache controller (Figure 3.2(b)).
To rule out an insecure flow from hit2 and hit3 (with label H) to hit (with
label LH(timingLabel)), the type system must ensure H v LH(timingLabel).
In other words, in any possible evaluation of the assignment, the label H
must be bounded by LH(timingLabel). In fact, this must be true because the
condition timingLabel=1 holds whenever the assignment happens (note that
timingLabel is a single bit). However, a naive type system without knowledge
of run-time values of timingLabel has to conservatively reject the program.
We use a modular design to separate the concerns of soundness and pre-
cision of our type system. In this design, the type system, along with a race-
condition analysis in Section 3.4.3, ensures soundness (i.e., observational deter-
minism in Section 3.4.2). The precision of the type system is improved further,
without harming soundness, by integrating two program analyses: a predicate
transformer analysis and the definite-assignment analysis already discussed.
Specifically, the type system generates proof obligations: partial orderings
that must hold on pairs of security labels, regardless of the run-time values of
those labels. To statically check a partial ordering on labels, we might require
the partial ordering to hold for any possible values of free variables:
τ1 v τ2 ⇔ ∀~n . τ1 {~n/~v} v τ2 {~n/~v}
where ~v = FV(τ1)∪FV(τ2), and FV(τ) is the free variables in τ. However, this static
approximation is too conservative.
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To escape this conservatism, the type system uses a more precise approxima-
tion of the possible hardware states that can arrive at each program point. We
denote the facts that program analysis has derived about the hardware states as
predicates indexed by command identifiers η. The predicates P(•η) and P(η•)
respectively denote overapproximations of the hardware states that can exist
before and after the execution of the command at location η. Using even sim-
ple program analyses to generate these predicates considerably improves the
precision of information flow analysis without harming soundness. Returning
to our example, supposing that the program analysis can derive the predicate
P(•η) = (timingLabel = 1). The type system then only needs to know that
the flow from H to LH(timingLabel) is secure when timingLabel is 1. This
requirement can be expressed as an (easily verified) constraint:
timingLabel = 1⇒ H v LH(timingLabel)
3.3.5 Generating state predicates
Many techniques can be used to generate predicates describing the run-time
state, with a tradeoff between precision and complexity. For example, weakest
preconditions [23] could be used. However, shallow knowledge of run-time
state is enough for our type system to be effective. We use a simple abstract
interpretation to propagate predicates forward through each thread definition,
starting from the predicate true and overapproximating the postcondition at
each program point. The rules defining this analysis are given in Figure 3.9.
The algorithm generates predicates in linear time.
Expression results are coarsely approximated by tracking only constant val-
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bnca=n bvca = v beca = > (otherwise)
be1 bop e2cb=

be1cb bop be2cb if bop ∈ {∧,∨}
be1ca bop be2ca if bop ∈ {=,,}
> otherwise
buop ecb=
¬becb if uop ∈ {¬} , becb , >> otherwise
{P} skipη {P}
{P} c1 {Q} {Q} c2 {R}
{P} c1; c2 {R}
Q = remove(v, P)
{P} v =η e {Q ∧ (v = beca)} {P} v⇐η e {P}
{P ∧ (becb)} c1 {Q} {P ∧ (¬becb)} c2 {R}
{P} ifη (e) c1 else c2 {Q ∩ R}
Figure 3.9: Predicate generation in Hoare logic.
ues and variables, and replacing more complex expressions with the “un-
known” value >. Operators beca and becb estimate the arithmetic and boolean
values of e, respectively. The result of binary operators is > if any operand is >.
The translation rules on commands are written as admissible weakenings of the
rules of Hoare Logic [35]. They specify how to compute a postcondition from a
precondition. To make reasoning practical, the rules do not derive the strongest
possible postcondition—but of course it is sound to weaken postconditions.
Consequently, postconditions and preconditions are represented as conjunc-
tions. The rule for assignment weakens the strongest-postcondition rule [25]
by discarding all conjuncts that mention the assigned variable, in remove(v, P).
For efficiency, the rule for if weakens the obvious postcondition, Q∨R, by syn-
tactically intersecting the sets of conjuncts in Q and R.
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3.3.6 Discussion of typing rules
The most interesting rules in Figure 3.5 are (T-ASSIGN), (T-ASSIGN-REC) and
(T-IF). Proof obligations are generated for assignments v =η e and v⇐η e. These
proof obligations are discharged by an external solver; our implementation uses
Z3 [58]. The informal invariants the type system maintains are 1) the new label
of v is more restrictive than both the context label pc and label of e, 2) the no-
sensitive-upgrade check is enabled if there might not be an assignment to v in
an alternative branch. Rule (T-ASSIGN-REC) checks these invariants explicitly.
To check the invariant after update, the rule generates a fresh variable v′ to rep-
resent the new value of v. Though pc and the security level of e may also change
after the assignment, the rule checks against the old value since semantically,
information flows from the old state to variable v. The no-sensitive-upgrade
check is enforced with the condition v < M adding precision in the case where
the variable is assigned in every branch. The single check in Rule (T-ASSIGN)
is sufficient for these invariants since Γ(v) remains the same when there is no
self-dependency, and the check entails no-upgrade-check (because pc v τ unionsq pc).
To improve precision of the type system, predicates on states are used only as
hypotheses in these proof obligations. Blocking and nonblocking assignments
use the same typing rule, differing only on when the assignment takes effect.
Rule (T-IF) propagates the set of variables that must be modified in both
branches (DA(η)) to c1 and c2. Taking the intersection ofM and DA(η) is needed
for nested if-statements.
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3.3.7 Scalability of type checking
Queries sent to Z3 are generated by typing rules (T-ASSIGN) and (T-ASSIGN-
REC) in Figure 3.5. Note that these queries are essentially predicates on a (finite)
lattice of security labels. In other words, only simple theories (e.g., no quan-
tifiers, no real numbers) of the full-fledged Z3 solver are needed by the type
system. These queries can be efficiently solved by Z3.
Moreover, the static analyses used by SecVerilog to enable precise type
checking (definite assignment analysis and predicate generation) are both mod-
ular. Race condition analysis may vary depending on the hardware design tool,
but is scalable for most tools.
For the complete MIPS CPU in Section 6.3.1, it takes a total of only two sec-
onds to generate all 1257 constraints by the type system, and solve them with
Z3, suggesting that type checking is likely to scale to larger hardware designs.
3.3.8 Well-formed typing environments
The use of dynamic labels also puts constraints on the typing environment Γ: Γ
is well-formed, denoted ` Γ, when 1) no variable depends on a more restrictive
variable, preventing secrets from flowing into a label, and 2) no dependencies
are chained, preventing cyclic dependencies. If FV(τ) is the free variables in τ,
this can be expressed formally as follows:
Definition 1 (Well-formedness) Γ is well-formed iff
∀v ∈ Vars . (∀v′ ∈ FV(Γ(v)) . Γ(v′) v Γ(v)) ∧ (∀v′ ∈ FV(Γ(v)) . v′ , v⇒ FV(Γ(v′)) = ∅)
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3.4 Soundness
Central to our approach is rigorous enforcement of a strong information security
property. We formalize this property in this section and show the full proofs in
Section 3.5.
3.4.1 Proving hardware properties from HDL code
Our goal is to prove that the actual hardware implementation controls infor-
mation flow. However, information flow is analyzed at the level of the HDL.
The argument that language-level reasoning is accurate has two steps. First, the
operational semantics of SecVerilog correspond directly to hardware simulation
at the RTL (Register Transfer Level) of abstraction. Second, for a synchronously
clocked design, these RTL simulations accurately reflect behavior of synthesized
hardware; in fact, functional verification of modern hardware relies mainly on
RTL simulation. Thus, HDL-level reasoning suffices to prove hardware-level
security properties.
3.4.2 Observational determinism
Our formal definition of information flow security is based on observational de-
terminism [70, 93], a generalization of noninterference [28] that provides a strong
end-to-end security guarantee even for nondeterministic systems. Observa-
tional determinism requires that in any two executions that receive the same low
(adversary-visible) input, the system’s low behavior must also be indistinguish-
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able regardless of both high inputs and (possibly adversarial) nondeterministic
choices.
Formalizing this property in the presence of dynamic labels presents some
challenges, since the security level of a variable may differ in two hardware
states. We start by defining a low-equivalence relation ≈` on hardware states σ,
indexed by a level ` ∈ L. Two states are low-equivalent at level ` if they cannot
be distinguished by an adversary able to observe information only at that level
or below.
We assume a typing environment Γ that maps variables to security labels.
Given state σ, the security level of a variable x is: T (x, σ) = `′, where `′ is the
value of label Γ(x) in σ. We formalize the low-equivalence relation as follows:
Definition 2 (Low equivalence at level `) Two states are low-equivalent at level `
iff any variable whose label is below ` in one state must have the same label and value
in the other:
∀σ1, σ2 . σ1 ≈` σ2 ⇐⇒ ∀x∈Vars . (T (x, σ1) v ` ⇔ T (x, σ2) v `)
∧ (T (x, σ1) v ` ⇒ σ1(x) = σ2(x))
It is straightforward to check that ≈` is an equivalence relation. Note that
we require the level of x to be bounded by ` in σ2 whenever T (x, σ1) v `. This
definition corresponds to our adversary model: all variables below ` are ob-
servable to the adversary. For example, consider the case Γ(x) = LH(x), σ1(x) = 0
and σ2(x) = 1. Since x has different labels in the two states, σ1 6≈L σ2. This is
necessary because the ability to make the observation itself leaks information.
An event is a pair (t, σ), meaning that state σ occurred at clock cycle t. As-
suming synchronous logic, events are produced only when a clock tick occurs
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(formalized as the semantic rule (S-CLOCK) in Section 3.5.1). A trace T is a
countably infinite sequence of events. We write 〈σ, Prog〉 ↪→ T if executing Prog
with initial states σ produces a trace T . Since the semantics is nondetermin-
istic, there can be multiple traces T such that 〈σ, Prog〉 ↪→ T . Two traces are
low-equivalent when the states in traces are clockwise low-equivalent.
We formalize observational determinism as follows:
Definition 3 (Observational Determinism) Program Prog obeys observational de-
terminism if for any low-equivalent states σ1 and σ2, execution from those states always
produces low-equivalent traces:
σ1 ≈L σ2 ∧ 〈σ1, Prog〉 ↪→ T1 ∧ 〈σ2, Prog〉 ↪→ T2 =⇒ T1 ≈L T2
Note that traces include the clock-cycle counter, so this definition is timing-
sensitive, controlling timing channels.
In principle, observational determinism restricts expressiveness, since the
scheduling of low assignments must be deterministic even when refinements
cannot leak secret information. In practice, it rules out few useful designs, since
nondeterministic behavior is caused by race conditions, which for hardware
design are usually bugs.
3.4.3 Soundness of SecVerilog
The type system in Section 3.3 along with a race-condition analysis ensures that
well-typed SecVerilog programs satisfy observational determinism.
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Race freedom Today’s synchronous hardware design methods disallow race
conditions in order to produce deterministic systems. Existing synthesis tools
prevent races by ensuring that only one thread updates each variable once per
clock cycle. Intuitively, a program is race-free if the sequence of thread execu-
tions does not affect the synchronized state. This assumption is formalized as
the following property.
Definition 4 (Race Freedom) Program c is race free if for any state σ,
〈σ, c〉 ↪→ T1 ∧ 〈σ, c〉 ↪→ T2 =⇒ T1 = T2
Soundness proof We use the notation 〈c, σ〉 ⇓ σ′ for a big step: fully evaluat-
ing command c in state σ results in state σ′. To simplify notation, V(τ, σ) rep-
resents the security level resulting from evaluating type τ in σ. We sketch one
lemma and two theorems in this section and defer formal proofs to Section 3.5.
The first lemma states that any variable assigned to in a high context has a
high label in the final state.
Lemma 1 (Confinement) Let 〈σ, c〉 ⇓ σ′. If c can be typed under a given program
counter label pc and well-formed typing environment Γ, then for every variable v as-
signed in command c, we have
V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ′)
The next theorem states that running a command atomically to finish en-
forces noninterference.
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Theorem 3 (Single-command noninterference) If the states σ1, σ2 are low-
equivalent at the beginning of a clock cycle, running any well-typed command c in
σ1 and σ2 produces low-equivalent states at the beginning of next cycle as well:
(` Γ) ∧ (Γ ` c) ∧ (σ1 ≈L σ2) ∧ 〈σ1, c〉 ⇓ σ′1 ∧ 〈σ2, c〉 ⇓ σ′2 =⇒ σ′1 ≈L σ′2
Finally, any well-typed SecVerilog program obeys observational determin-
ism and is therefore secure:
Theorem 4 (Soundness of the type system) If a SecVerilog program is well-typed
under any well-formed typing environment, the program obeys observational determin-
ism:
(` Γ) ∧ (Γ ` Prog) ∧ (σ1 ≈L σ2) ∧ 〈σ1, Prog〉 ↪→ T1 ∧ 〈σ2, Prog〉 ↪→ T2
=⇒ T1 ≈L T2
3.5 Soundness proof
3.5.1 Semantics
We now present a formal small-step operational semantics of SecVerilog.
Though expressed more concisely, this semantics is largely motivated and justi-
fied by prior semantics for Verilog [30, 24].
We separate the semantics into command-level and thread-level semantics.
A command-level configuration consists of a global store σ (a map from vari-
ables to values), a command c to be executed (or stop), a set of active assign-
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S-SKIP
〈σ, skip, AS, NB〉 → 〈σ, stop, AS, NB〉
S-SEQ1
〈σ, c1, AS, NB〉 → 〈σ′, stop, AS′, NB′〉
〈σ, c1; c2, AS, NB〉 → 〈σ′, c2, AS′, NB′〉
S-SEQ2
〈σ, c1, AS, NB〉 → 〈σ′, c′1, AS′, NB′〉
〈σ, c1; c2, AS, NB〉 → 〈σ′, c′1; c2, AS′, NB′〉
S-ASSIGN
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ n AS′ = AS ∪ {(v, n)}
〈σ, v =η e, AS, NB〉 → 〈σ[v 7→ n], stop, AS′, NB〉
S-NBASSIGN
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ n NB′ = NB ∪ {(v, n)}
〈σ, v⇐η e, AS, NB〉 → 〈σ, stop, AS, NB′〉
S-IF
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ v v , 0⇒ i = 1 v = 0⇒ i = 2
〈σ, if e then c1 else c2, AS, NB〉 → 〈σ, ci, AS, NB〉
Figure 3.10: Small-step operational semantics of commands.
S-ADV
〈σ, ci, ∅, NB〉 → 〈σ′, c′i , AS, NB′〉
~c′ = ~c
{
c′i/ci
} ∪ B AS
〈t, σ,~c, B, NB〉 → 〈t, σ′, ~c′, B − B AS, NB′〉
S-TRANS
NB , ∅ @i . 〈σ, ci, ∅, NB〉 → 〈σ′, c′i , AS, NB′〉
m′ = apply(m, NB)
〈t, σ,~c, B, NB〉 → 〈t, σ′, B NB, B − B NB, ∅〉
S-CLOCK
@i . 〈σ, ci, ∅, ∅〉 → 〈σ′, c′i , AS, NB〉
〈t, σ,~c, B, ∅〉 (t,σ)→ 〈t + 1, σ,S,C, ∅〉
Figure 3.11: Small-step operational semantics of threads.
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ments AS and a set of pending assignments NB. Commands merely accumulate
AS and NB; their use will be clear in the thread-level semantics.
The semantics of commands are presented in Figure 3.10. Most rules are self-
explanatory. The most interesting part is the difference between (S-ASSIGN)
and (S-NBASSIGN), where the latter captures the delayed effect of nonblocking
assignments.
The thread-level semantics in Figure 3.11 is also complicated by the need
to defer effects of nonblocking assignments until the end of the current clock
cycle. A thread-level configuration consists of the current clock cycle counter
(t), global store (σ), a set of active commands to be executed in parallel (~c), a set
of inactive combinational blocks (B) and a set of delayed updates accumulated
from the execution of commands (NB).
We explain these rules by imagining the run of sequential blocks S and com-
binational blocks C from initial state 〈0, σ, ∅, ∅, ∅〉 for some initial store σ. The
(S-CLOCK) rule applies when the system is quiescent: no thread can make any
progress and there are no pending nonblocking assignments. This applies to
the initial state. When a clock tick occurs (the clock counter increases), all se-
quential blocks are activated2 and all combinational blocks are waiting to be
activated. Rule (S-ADV) then applies as long as there are activated and unfin-
ished commands. In this step, an arbitrary thread ci is scheduled and executed
nondeterministically, using the rules in Figure 3.10. Combinational blocks that
are activated by the execution (B AS) are moved to the active commands. All
previously active threads remain the same, except that the scheduled thread
advances by one step (~c
{
c′i/ci
}
).
2to overapproximate all schedules, sequential logic on falling edges are also activated.
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When all active threads finish, delayed assignments accumulated in NB take
effect by rule (S-TRANS). To do that, the store is updated by applying all
changes in NB in the order that assignments are added to NB (apply(σ, NB)). At
this point, the semantics allows all possible orders of applying assignments in
NB to model all possible schedulers. Meanwhile, combinational logic triggered
by these delayed assignments (B NB) is activated. Notice that the semantics per-
mits race conditions. Therefore, different positions of an assignment in NB may
result in different store states. Events, pairs of (t, σ), are produced only by the
rule (S-CLOCK) since we focus on synchronous logic. We write 〈σ, Prog〉 ↪→ T
if 〈0, σ, ∅, ∅, ∅〉 ↪→ T .
3.5.2 Typing rules
The typing rules for expressions and threads are shown in Figure 3.12 and Fig-
ure 3.13 respectively. The rules for expressions are standard. To type-check a
combinational always block (rule (T-ALWAYS-COMB)), the join of all variables’
label in the sensitive list is used as the pc label since the execution of block c re-
veals the fact that some of these variables are modified. The must-be-modified
set of variables M is set to ∅ since combinational logic only executes when a
variable in the sensitive list changes. On the other hand, the rule (T-ALWAYS-
SEQ) uses ⊥ as the pc label since c is executed whenever a clock tick comes. We
say a program is well-typed under Γ (Γ ` Prog) when all blocks are well-typed.
M is initialized to Vars since sequential logic is always triggered by the clock.
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Γ ` n : ⊥ T-CONST
Γ(v) = τ
Γ ` v : τ T-VAR
Γ ` e : τ1 Γ ` e′ : τ2
Γ ` e bop e′ : τ1 unionsq τ2
T-BOP
Γ ` e : τ
Γ ` uop e : τ T-UOP
Figure 3.12: Typing rules: expressions.
Γ ` vi : τi Γ,unionsqτi, ∅ ` c
Γ ` always@(~v) c
T-ALWAYS-COMB
Γ,⊥,Vars ` c
Γ ` always@(posedge (negedge )clock) c
T-ALWAYS-SEQ
Figure 3.13: Typing rules: threads.
3.5.3 Proofs
To aid the proof, we first define a big-step semantics of SecVerilog, shown in
Figure 3.14 and 3.15. It is easy to check that this semantics defines one particular
run of all threads in SecVerilog, according to the small-step semantics. Showing
two runs starting from low-equivalent memory in this big-step semantics obeys
observational determinism is sufficient to prove for any possible scheduling in
the small-step semantics, due to the race-freedom assumption.
To simplify notation, we write 〈σ, c〉 instead of 〈σ, c, AS, NB〉 when AS and NB
are irrelevant. To aid the proof, in the big-step semantics, AS and NB are ex-
tended with a security level `, the concrete level of v after the execution. One
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S-SKIP
〈σ, skip, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ, AS, NB〉
S-SEQ
〈σ, c1, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′′, AS′′, NB′′〉 〈σ′′, c2, AS′′, NB′′〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉
〈σ, c1; c2, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉
S-ASSIGN
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ n σ′ = σ{v 7→ n} AS′ = AS ∪ {(v, n,T (v, σ′))}
〈σ, v =η e, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB〉
S-NBASSIGN
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ n NB′ = NB ∪ {(v, n,T (v, σ{v 7→ n}))}
〈σ, v⇐η e, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ, AS, NB′〉
S-IF1
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ 1 〈σ, c1, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉
〈σ, if e then c1 else c2, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉
S-IF2
〈e, σ〉 ⇓ 0 〈σ, c2, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉
〈σ, if e then c1 else c2, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉
Figure 3.14: Big-step operational semantics of commands.
S-ADV
~c , ∅ 〈σ, c1, ∅, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ
′, AS, NB′〉
~c′ = (~c − {c1}) ∪ B AS
〈t, σ,~c, B, NB〉 → 〈t, σ′, ~c′, B − B AS, NB′〉
S-TRANS
NB , ∅ ~c = ∅ σ′ = apply(σ, NB)
〈t, σ,~c, B, NB〉 → 〈t, σ′, B NB, B − B NB, ∅〉
S-CLOCK
~c = ∅
〈t, σ,~c, B, ∅〉 (t,σ)→ 〈t + 1, σ,S,C, ∅〉
Figure 3.15: Big-step operational semantics of threads.
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exception is the rule (S-NBASSIGN), where ` is a hypothetical security level, as
if the delayed assignment occurs immediately as a blocking assignment. Notice
that this change does not affect the semantics: the purpose is solely to facilitate
the proof.
The projection up to level L (L) of AS is the longest subsequence of AS such
that ∀(x, v, `) ∈ AS L we have ` v L. We define NB L in a similar way. Similar to
the definition of low-equivalence on memory, AS1 ≈L AS2 ⇔ AS1 L= AS2 L and
NB1 ≈L NB2 ⇔ NB2 L= NB2 L.
We first prove several useful lemmas, and then show the type system en-
forces noninterference.
Lemma 2 Let 〈σ, v =η e〉 ⇓ σ′ (or 〈σ, v⇐η e〉 ⇓ σ′). We have
∀u ∈ FV(Γ(v)) . (u , v⇒ σ(u) = σ′(u))
Proof. Trivial for ⇐ since σ′ = σ. For blocking assignments (=), since u ∈
FV(Γ(v)), we have FV(Γ(u)) = ∅ due to the well-formedness of Γ. Hence, by the
semantics of assignment and switch, u will not be zeroed. So σ(u) = σ′(u). 
Lemma 3 (Assignment) Let 〈σ, v =η e, ∅, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, (v, n, `), NB〉. If ` Γ ∧ Γ, pc,M `
v =η e and Γ ` e : τ, we have the following properties:
1. if v < FV(Γ(v)), thenV(pc, σ) unionsqV(τ, σ) v ` andV(pc, σ) v T (v, σ)
2. if v ∈ FV(Γ(v)), thenV(pc, σ) unionsqV(τ, σ) v ` andV(pc, σ) v T (v, σ) if v <M
3. ∀v < FV(Γ(u)) ∧ u , v . σ(u) = σ′(u) ∧ T (u, σ) = T (u, σ′)
Proof. By induction on the typing rules.
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1. By the typing rule (T-ASSIGN), we have P(•η) → pc unionsq τ v Γ(v). By the
correctness of P and Lemma 5,V(pc, σ) unionsqV(τ, σ) = V(pc unionsq τ, σ) v T (v, σ).
By the property of unionsq,V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ).
Now consider any u ∈ FV(Γ(v)), we have u , v by assumption. By Lemma 2,
σ(u) = σ′(u). This is true for all u ∈ FV(Γ(v)), hence T (v, σ) = T (v, σ′).
Therefore,V(pc, σ)unionsqV(τ, σ) v T (v, σ′) = `, andV(pc, σ)unionsqV(τ, σ) v T (v, σ).
2. When v < M, we have P(•η) → pc v Γ(v) by the typing rule (T-ASSIGN-
REC). By the correctness of P and Lemma 5,V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ).
By the typing rule (T-ASSIGN-REC), we have P(•η), v′ = ~e → τ v
Γ(v) {v′/v}. By the correctness of beca, beca = n where 〈e, σ〉 ⇓ n. We extend
σ to σe s.t. ∀u ∈ Vars . σe(u) = σ(u) ∧ σe(v′) = n. Easy to check σe satis-
fies the precondition. By Lemma 5, T (pc, σe) unionsq T (τ, σe) = T (pc unionsq τ, σe) v
σe(Γ(v) {v′/v}). Since σe agrees with σ for all variables except v′, which is
not in pc and τ, T (pc, σ) unionsq T (τ, σ) v σe(Γ(v) {v′/v}).
Now consider any u ∈ FV(v) such that u , v. By Lemma 2, σ′(u) = σ(u) =
σe(u). By the semantics, σ′(v) = n = σe(v′). Hence, T (v, σ′) = σe(Γ(v) {v′/v}).
Therefore,V(pc, σ) unionsqV(τ, σ) v T (v, σ′) = `.
3. σ(u) = σ′(u) is clear from the semantics of assignment. For any w ∈
FV(Γ(u)), we prove σ(w) = σ′(w) by contradiction.
Otherwise, we have w = v or v ∈ FV(Γ(w)) from the semantics of assign-
ment. In the first case, v ∈ FV(Γ(u)) which contradicts our assumption that
v < FV(Γ(u)).
In the second case, v ∈ FV(Γ(w)). The case w = v is already considered.
When w , v, by the well-formedness of Γ, we have FV(Γ(w)) = ∅ since
w ∈ FV(Γ(u)). This contradicts the fact that v ∈ FV(Γ(w))).
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Since σ(w) = σ′(w) for all w ∈ FV(Γ(u)), T (u, σ) = T (u, σ′).

Lemma 4 (NBAssignment) Let 〈σ, v ⇐η e, AS, ∅〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS, (v, n, `)〉. If ` Γ ∧
Γ, pc,M ` v⇐η e and Γ ` e : τ, we have the following properties:
1. if v < FV(Γ(v)), thenV(pc, σ) unionsqV(τ, σ) v ` andV(pc, σ) v T (v, σ)
2. if v ∈ FV(Γ(v)), thenV(pc, σ) unionsqV(τ, σ) v ` andV(pc, σ) v T (v, σ) if v <M
3. ∀v < FV(Γ(u)) ∧ u , v . σ(u) = σ′(u) ∧ T (u, σ) = T (u, σ′)
Proof. Similar to the proof for blocking assignments since they have the same
typing rules. The last claim holds trivially since σ = σ′. 
Lemma 5 The lifted partial order on labels (v) is conservative:
∀σ, τ1, τ2 . P(σ) ∧ P⇒ τ1 v τ2 =⇒ V(τ1, σ) v V(τ2, σ)
Proof. Clear from the definition of v. 
Lemma 6 Low expressions may only contain low variables:
Γ ` e : τ ∧V(τ, σ) v L =⇒ for all v in e T (v, σ) v L
Proof. By induction on the structure of expressions.
• n: trivial.
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• v: by the typing rule, Γ(v) = τ. Hence, T (v, σ) = V(Γ(v), σ) = V(τ, σ) v L.
• e1 bop e2: by the typing rule, Γ ` τ1∧Γ ` τ2∧τ = τ1unionsqτ2. Hence,V(τ1unionsqτ2, σ) =
V(τ1, σ) unionsq V(τ2, σ) v L, which gives us V(τ1, σ) v L and V(τ2, σ) v L. By
the induction hypothesis, for all v in e1 or e2 (that is, in e), T (v, σ) v L.
• uop e: by the induction hypothesis.

Lemma 7 Low expressions must have the same concrete label in low-equivalent mem-
ories:
σ1 ≈L σ2 ∧ Γ ` e : τ ∧V(τ, σ1) v L =⇒ V(τ, σ1) = V(τ, σ2)
Proof. By induction on the structure of τ.
• `: V(`, σ2) = ` = V(`, σ1).
• f i: by the well-formedness of Γ, Γ(i) v f i. By Lemma 5, T (i, σ1) =
V(Γ(i), σ) v V( f i, σ1). By the transitivity of v, T (i, σ1) v L. Since σ1 ≈L σ2,
T (i, σ2) v L as well andV(i, σ1) = V(i, σ2). Hence,V( f i, σ1) = V( f i, σ2).
• τ1 unionsq τ2: V(τ1, σ1) unionsq V(τ2, σ1) = V(τ1 unionsq τ2, σ1) v L. Hence, V(τ1, σ1) v
L ∧ V(τ2, σ1) v L. By the induction hypothesis, V(τ1, σ1) = V(τ1, σ2) and
V(τ2, σ1) = V(τ2, σ2). Therefore,V(τ1 unionsq τ2, σ1) = V(τ1 unionsq τ2, σ2).
• τ1u τ2: since no typing rule generates meet labels, there must be a variable
v such that Γ(v) = τ1 u τ2. By the well-formedness of Γ, ∀u ∈ FV(τ1 u τ2) . u v
τ1 u τ2. By Lemma 5, V(u, σ1) v V(τ1 u τ2, σ1) v L. By the induction
hypothesis, we haveV(u, σ1) = V(u, σ2). Since this is true for all variables
in τ1 u τ2,V(τ1 u τ2, σ1) = V(τ1 u τ2, σ2).
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Lemma 8 Low expressions must evaluate to the same value in low-equivalent memo-
ries:
σ1 ≈L σ2 ∧ Γ ` e : τ ∧V(τ, σ1) v L ∧ 〈e, σ1〉 ⇓ n1 ∧ 〈e, σ2〉 ⇓ n2
=⇒ V(τ, σ2) v L ∧ n1 = n2
Proof. We haveV(τ, σ2) = V(τ, σ1) v L by Lemma 7.
By Lemma 6, for all v in e, we have T (v, σ1) v L and T (v, σ2) v L. Since
σ1 ≈L σ2, σ1(v) = σ2(v). This is true for all v in e, hence n1 = n2. 
Lemma 9 (PC Subsumption) If a command can be typed under a given program
counter label pc, it can also be typed under a lower level pc′:
Γ, pc,M ` c ∧ pc′ v pc =⇒ Γ, pc′,M ` c
Proof. By induction on the typing rules.
• Case T-Seq, T-If: by the induction hypothesis.
• Case T-Assign: from the typing rule, we have P(•η)⇒ τ unionsq pc v Γ(x) where
Γ ` e : τ. Since τ unionsq pc′ v τ unionsq pc, P(•η) ⇒ τ unionsq pc′ v Γ(x). Hence, Γ, pc′,M `
x =η e.
• Case T-Assign-Rec: similar to T-Assign.

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Lemma 10 (Aliveness Subsumption) If a command can be typed under a given
alive setM, it can also be typed under a larger setM′:
Γ, pc,M ` c ∧M ⊆ M′ ⇒ Γ, pc,M′ ` c
Proof. By induction on the typing rules.
• Case T-Seq, T-If: by the induction hypothesis.
• Case T-Assign, T-Stop: trivial sinceM is not used in the promise.
• Case T-Assign-Rec: since M ⊆ M′, for all v < M′, we have v < M. Since
Γ, pc,M ` v =η e, we have P(•η)⇒ τ unionsq pc v Γ(v). Hence, Γ, pc,M′ ` v =η e.

Proof of Lemma 1 [Confinement] If 〈σ, c〉 ⇓ σ′ and c can be typed under a
given program counter label pc and well-formed typing environment Γ, then
for every v assigned to in c, we have
V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ′) ∧V(pc, σ) v V(pc, σ′)
Proof. By induction on the structure of c.
• c1; c2: by the typing rule, we have Γ, pc,M ` ci where i ∈ {1, 2}. From
semantics of sequential statement, we have
〈σ, c1〉 ⇓ σ′′ 〈σ′′, c2〉 ⇓ σ′
〈σ, c1; c2〉 ⇓ σ′
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By the induction hypothesis, for every u assigned to in c1, we have
V(pc, σ) v T (u, σ′′) and V(pc, σ) v V(pc, σ′′). Also, for every w assigned
to in c2, we haveV(pc, σ′′) v T (w, σ′) andV(pc, σ′′) v V(pc, σ′).
Therefore,V(pc, σ) v V(pc, σ′) is straightforward by the transitivity of v.
Hence, for every v assigned to in c1; c2. If v is assigned to in c2, we have
V(pc, σ) v V(pc, σ′′) v T (v, σ′). If v is assigned to in c1 but not in c2,
we have V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ′′). It must hold that T (v, σ′′) = T (v, σ) since
otherwise, there must be some v′ ∈ FV(Γ(v)) be assigned to in c2. However,
by the semantics of assignment, either v = v′ or v is assigned to in c2.
Contradiction.
• v =η e: By Lemma 3, we have V(pc, σ) unionsq V(τ, σ) v T (v, σ′) no matter
v ∈ FV(Γ(v)) or not. Therefore,V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ′).
By the semantics of assignment, v ∈ FV(Γ(u)) may also be assigned to. By
the well-formedness of Γ, we have Γ(v) v Γ(u). By Lemma 5, T (v, σ′) v
T (u, σ′). Hence,V(pc, σ) v T (u, σ′) as well.
Now consider u ∈ FV(pc). If u is not assigned to, we have V(u, σ′) =
V(u, σ). Otherwise, V(pc, σ) v T (u, σ′) by the argument above. Due to
the well-formedness of Γ, Γ(u) v pc. By Lemma 5, T (u, σ) v V(pc, σ).
Hence,V(u, σ) v V(u, σ′). Putting together, for every u ∈ FV(pc),V(u, σ) v
V(u, σ′). Therefore,V(pc, σ) v V(pc, σ′).
• if e then c1 else c2: by the typing rule (T-IF), we have Γ ` e : τ and
Γ, pc unionsq τ,M′ ` ci where i ∈ {1, 2} and M′ = M ∩ DA(η). By Lemma 9 and
Lemma 10, Γ, pc,M ` ci.
Consider the case when the if branch is taken. From semantics of if state-
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ment, we have
〈σ, e〉 ⇓ 1 〈σ, c1〉 ⇓ σ′
〈σ, if e then c1 else c2〉 ⇓ σ′
By the induction hypothesis, we have V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ′) for every v
assigned to in c1 , which is the same set of variables assigned to in
if e then c1 else c2.
V(pc, σ) v V(pc, σ′) can be derived directly from the induction hypothe-
sis.
The case when the else branch is taken is similar.

Lemma 11 (Definite Assignments) If 〈σ, c, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉 and c can be
typed under someM returned by a definite-assignments analysis, pc and well-formed
Γ, then we have
∀(v, n, `) ∈ (AS′ − AS) ∪ (NB′ − NB) . v <M⇒V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ)
Proof. By induction on the structure of c.
• c1; c2: by the typing rule, both c1 and c2 can be typed under M. By the
induction hypothesis if (v, n, `) is generated in c1. Otherwise, by Lemma 1,
V(pc, σ) v V(pc, σ′′). Therefore,V(pc, σ) v ` by the induction hypothesis.
• v =η e: by Lemma 3.
• v⇐η e: by Lemma 4.
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• if e then c1 else c2: by the typing rule (T-IF), we have Γ ` e : τ and
Γ, pc unionsq τ,M′ ` ci where i ∈ {1, 2} and M′ = M ∩ DA(η). By Lemma 9 and
Lemma 10, Γ, pc,M ` ci. Consider evaluation rules (S-IF1) and (S-IF2),
V(pc, σ) v ` by the induction hypothesis.

Proof of Theorem 3 [Single-command Noninterference]
` Γ ∧ Γ ` c ∧ σ1 ≈L σ2 ∧ 〈σ1, c〉 ⇓ σ′1 ∧ 〈σ2, c〉 ⇓ σ′2 =⇒ σ′1 ≈L σ′2
Proof. Induction on the structure of c.
• c1; c2: by the typing rule, we have Γ, pc,M ` ci where i ∈ {0, 1}. From
evaluation rule, we have
〈σ, c1, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′′, AS′′, NB′′〉 〈σ′′, c2, AS′′, NB′′〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉
〈σ, c1; c2, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉
From the induction hypothesis, σ′′1 ≈L σ′′2 ∧AS′′1 ≈L AS′′2 ∧NB′′1 ≈L NB′′2 . Using
the induction hypothesis again on c2, we get σ′1 ≈L σ′2∧AS′1 ≈L AS′2∧NB′1 ≈L
NB′2.
• v =η e: From the evaluation rules, we have for i ∈ {1, 2}
〈σi, e〉 ⇓ ni σ′i = switch(v, σi[v 7→ ni])
〈σi, v =η e, ASi, NBi〉 ⇓ 〈σ′i , AS′i , NB′i〉
Let ` e : τ and (v, n1, `1) is generated for AS1, (v, n2, `2) is generated for AS2.
First consider the case when `1 v L.
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We have V(τ, σ1) ≤ `1 v L by Lemma 3. By Lemma 28, n1 = n2. So σ′1(v) =
σ′2(v).
Next, we prove `2 v L. Consider any u ∈ FV(v) ∧ u , v. By the well-
formedness of Γ, Γ(u) v Γ(v). By Lemma 5, T (u, σ′1) v T (v, σ′1) v L. By
Lemma 2, we also have σ′1(u) = σ1(u). Hence, T (u, σ1) = T (u, σ′1) = ` v L.
By the assumption, σ1 ≈L σ2, so T (u, σ1) = T (u, σ2). By Lemma 2 again,
we have T (u, σ′2) = T (u, σ2) = T (u, σ1) = T (u, σ′2). This is true for all
u ∈ FV(v) ∧ u , v. Since we already shown σ′1(v) = σ′2(v), `2 = T (v, σ′2) =
T (v, σ′1) = `1 v L. Hence, we have AS′1 ≈L AS′2.
For variables v < FV(Γ(u)) ∧ u , v. There are two possibilities: T (u, σ1) =
T (u, σ2) v L or 6v L by Lemma 7. By Lemma 3, T (u, σ1) = T (u, σ′1) and
T (u, σ2) = T (u, σ′2). Hence, T (u, σ′1) = T (u, σ′2) v L or 6v L by Lemma 7. In
the first case, we have σ′1(u) = σ1(u) = σ2(u) = σ2(u)
′ by Lemma 3. In the
second case, ≈L has no restriction on the values of u.
For variables v ∈ FV(Γ(u)) ∧ u , v, σ′1(u) = σ′2(u) = 0 by the semantics.
Now consider any w ∈ FV(Γ(u)). We observe that FV(Γ(w)) = ∅ by the well-
formedness of Γ. Hence, v < FV(Γ(w)) ∨ w = v. By the argument above, for
any w, T (w, σ′1) v L ⇔ T (w, σ′2) v L and T (w, σ′1) v L ⇒ σ′1(w) = σ′2(w).
If ∀w ∈ FV(Γ(u)) . T (w, σ′1) v L, we have σ′1(w) = σ′2(w). So T (u, σ′1) v
L ⇔ T (u, σ′2) v L because T (u, σ′1) = T (u, σ′2). Otherwise, there is some
w such that T (w, σ′1) 6v L and T (w, σ′2) 6v L. By the well-formedness of Γ,
Γ(w) v Γ(u). By Lemma 5, T (u, σ′1) 6v L and T (u, σ′2) 6v L as well. Still
T (u, σ′1) v L⇔ T (u, σ′2) v L holds.
Next, consider the case when `v 6v L. It must be true that T (v, σ′2) 6v L since
otherwise, we can derive `v v L as above.
For variables v ∈ FV(Γ(u))∧ u , v, Γ(v) v Γ(u) due to the well-formedness of
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Γ. Hence, T (u, σ′1) 6v L and T (u, σ′2) 6v L.
For variables v < FV(Γ(u)) ∧ u , v. There are two possibilities: T (u, σ1) =
T (u, σ2) v L or 6v L by Lemma 7. By Lemma 3, T (u, σ1) = T (u, σ′1) and
T (u, σ2) = T (u, σ′2). Hence, T (u, σ′1) = T (u, σ′2) v L or 6v L by Lemma 7. In
the first case, we have σ′1(u) = σ1(u) = σ2(u) = σ2(u)
′ by Lemma 3. In the
second case, ≈L has no restriction on the values of u.
NB′1 ≈L NB′2 is trivial since NB1 = NB1 and NB2 = NB′2
• v⇐η e: σ′1 ≈L σ′2 is trivial since σ1 = σ′1 and σ2 = σ′2.
Let ` e : τ and (v, n1, `1) is generated for NB1, (v, n2, `2) is generated for NB2.
First consider the case when `1 v L.
We have V(τ, σ1) v `1 v L by Lemma 4. By Lemma 28, n1 = n2. So σ′1(v) =
σ′2(v). Similar to the proof for blocking assignments, we can prove `2 v L.
Hence, NB2 ≈L NB′2.
Next, consider the case when `1 6v L. It must be true that `2 6v L since
otherwise, we can derive `1 v L as above. Hence, NB′1 ≈L NB′2.
AS′1 ≈L AS′2 is trivial since AS1 = AS1 and AS2 = AS′2
• if e then c1 else c2: let Γ ` e : τ. Since σ1 ≈L σ2, there are two possibilities
due to Lemma 7: V(τ, σ1) = V(τ, σ2) v L or 6v L. First case is easy by the
induction hypothesis.
When 6v L, the interesting case is different branches are taken, say σ1 eval-
uates to σ′1 and generates AS
′
1 and NB
′
1; σ2 evaluates to σ
′
2 and generates AS
′
2
and NB′2.
By the typing rules, we have Γ, pc unionsq τ,M′ ` ci, where i ∈ {1, 2}. We de-
note the triple of variables, values and levels in (AS′1 − AS1) ∪ (NB′1 − NB1)
as assign(c1) and that for second evaluation assign(c2) respectively. By
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Lemma 1, we have ∀(v1, n1, `1) ∈ assign(c1) . V(pc unionsq τ, σ1) v `1 and
∀(v2, n2, `2) ∈ assign(c2) . V(pc unionsq τ, σ2) v `2. Since V(τ, σ1) 6v L and
V(τ, σ2) 6v L, `1 6v L and `2 6v L. Hence we have AS′1 ≈L AS′2 and NB′1 ≈L NB′2.
Hence, ∀(v, n, `) ∈ assign(c1) ∩ assign(c2), we have T (v, σ′1) 6v L and
T (v, σ′2) 6v L. That is, σ′1 and σ′2 are low-equivalent on these variables.
∀(v, n, `) ∈ assign(c1) − assign(c2), it must be true that v < DA(η). From
the typing rules, Γ, pc unionsq τ,M′ ` ci, where M′ = M ∩ DA(η) ⊆ DA(η). Since
v < DA(η), v <M′ as well. By Lemma 11,V(τ, σ1) v V(pc unionsq τ, σ1) v T (v, σ1).
SinceV(τ, σ1) 6v L, T (v, σ1) 6v L as well. Since σ1 ≈L σ2, we have T (v, σ2) 6v
L by Lemma 7. Since v is not assigned in c2, σ′2(v) = σ2(v). Hence, T (v, σ′2) 6v
L. Therefore, σ′1 and σ
′
2 agrees on these variables as well. Similarly, we can
prove for all v in v ∈ assign(c2) − assign(c1).
∀v < assign(c1) ∪ assign(c2), v is not assigned in both c1 and c2. Hence,
σ′1(v) = σ1(v) ∧ σ′2(v) = σ2(v). Therefore, σ′1 and σ′2 must agree on v since
σ1 ≈L σ2.

Next, we prove several lemmas that are useful for the results on the thread-
level semantics.
Lemma 12 (High PC)
∀pc, σ, c .V(pc, σ) 6v L ∧ (` Γ ∧ Γ, pc, ∅ ` c) ∧ 〈σ, c, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ′, AS′, NB′〉 ⇒
σ ≈L σ′ ∧ AS ≈L AS′ ∧ NB ≈L NB′
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Proof. For variables not assigned to in c, σ and σ′ are trivially low-equivalent
for them. Moreover, AS, AS′, NB, NB′ contain no events for these variables.
Now consider any v that is assigned to in c. By Lemma 1,V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ′).
Since V(pc, σ) 6v L, T (v, σ′) 6v L as well. For the label of v in σ, because the
typing rules for commands only narrows the set M, which is ∅, M must be ∅
when any assignment in c is typed. Hence, by Lemma 3, V(pc, σ) v T (v, σ).
Given V(pc, σ) 6v L, T (v, σ) 6v L for any v assigned to in c. Hence, σ and σ′ are
low-equivalent for variables assigned in c as well. Moreover, by Lemma 3 and 4,
V(pc, σ) v V(pc, σ) unionsq V(τ, σ) v `, where ` is label of the generated assignment
events in AS′ − AS and NB′ − NB. Since T (pc, σ) 6v L, ` 6v L as well.
Therefore, σ ≈L σ′ ∧ AS ≈L AS′ ∧ NB ≈L NB′. 
Lemma 13 (Stable event labels) If an assignment event (v, n, `) is produced in some
clock cycle with cycle counter t, then T (v, σ) = ` for all configurations 〈t′, σ,~c, B, NB〉
where t′ = t after the event is produced.
Proof. By the semantics, we know there exists some store σ0, when the event
is generated, such that T (v, σ0) = `. If T (v, σ0) , T (v, σ), it must be true that
at least a variable in FV(Γ(v)) is modified in between. However, by the rule for
dynamic erasure of contents (S-ASGN1), modifying any variable that v’s type
depends on resets the value of v. This contradicts the race-free assumption.
Hence, T (v, σ) = T (v, σ0) = `. 
Lemma 14 (Delayed assignment) If NB1 ≈L NB2 and σ1 ≈L σ2, then we have
apply(σ1, NB1) ≈L apply(σ2, NB2)
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Proof. By induction on the length of NB1 and NB2. Denote the first events NB1
and NB2 as (v1, n1, `1) and (v2, n2, `2) respectively.
When `1 v L and `2 v L, it must be true that v1 = v2 ∧ n1 = n2 by the def-
inition of low-equivalence on assignment events. Hence, apply(σ1, v1 = n1) ≈L
apply(σ2, v2 = n2). The result for the remaining events in NB1 and NB2 is true by
induction hypothesis.
When at least one event has a label not bounded by L. Without losing gen-
erality, assume `1 6v L. By Lemma 13, T (v1, σ1) = `1 6v L. We next show
T (v1, σ1{v1 7→ n1}) = `1 6v L as well.
Suppose the event (v1, n1, `1) is generated when the following rule is applied:
〈e, σ0〉 ⇓ n1 NB′ = NB ∪ {(v1, n1,T (v1, σ0{v1 7→ n1}))}
〈σ0, v1 ⇐η e, AS, NB〉 ⇓ 〈σ0, AS, NB′〉
By the dynamic erasure of contents rule (S-ASGN1), ∀x ∈ FV(v1) . σ0(x) =
σ1(x). Hence, T (v1, σ1{v1 7→ n1}) = T (v1, σ0{v1 7→ n1}) = `1 6v L.
Therefore, apply(σ1, (v1, n1, `1)) ≈L σ1 ≈L σ2. The result for the remaining
events in NB1 and NB2 is true by the induction hypothesis.

Before proving our final soundness theorem, we first define a low projection
of command sequence. In the thread-level semantics, a sequence of commands
to be executed, ~c as the third element in the configuration, can either be part
of a sequential logic, or part of a combinational logic triggered by some event
(v, n, `) according to the semantics. We write ~c  L as the longest subsequence
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of ~c such that any command in ~c  L is not triggered by some event (v, n, `)
where ` 6v L. Two command sequences are low-equivalent (≈L) when they have
identical L-projections. Similarly, two sets of threads are low-equivalent when
their command sets are low-equivalent.
We define a low-equivalent relation thread-level configurations in the fol-
lowing way:
〈t1, σ1, ~c1, B1, NB1〉 ≈L 〈t2, σ2, ~c2, B2, NB2〉 ⇔
t1 = t2 ∧ σ1 ≈L σ2 ∧ ~c1 ≈L ~c2 ∧ B1 ≈L B2 ∧ NB1 ≈L NB2
Proof of Theorem 4 [Soundness]
` Γ ∧ Γ ` Prog⇒ σ1 ≈L σ2 ∧ 〈σ1, Prog〉 ↪→ T1 ∧ 〈σ2, Prog〉 ↪→ T2 =⇒ T1 ≈L T2
Proof. We prove a stronger result, a thread-level noninterference result for the
small-step semantics of threads. The desired result is a direct implication of this
stronger result. We proceed by induction on the number of steps in the thread-
level semantics.
Base case: given σ1, σ2 and Prog, the machine starts from the states
〈0, σ1,S,C, ∅〉 and 〈0, σ2,S,C, ∅〉, where S and C are the sequential and combi-
national threads of Prog. So the initial configurations are low-equivalent.
For the induction step, we induct on the number of steps in the thread-level
semantics. To simplify notation, we refer to the configurations before (after)
the semantic steps starting from σ1 as conf1 (conf′1), and that from σ2 as conf2
(conf′2).
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• (S-ADV): since ~c1 ≈L ~c2, either the same command is executed in conf1
and conf2, or at least one command executed is from combinational logic,
and it is triggered by some event (v, n, `) where ` 6v L by definition.
In the first case, by Theorem 3, σ′1 ≈L σ′2, AS′1 ≈L AS′2 and NB′1 ≈L NB′2. Since
AS′1 ≈L AS′2, B AS may only differ for the ones triggered by (v, n, `) where
` 6v L. Hence, ~c′1 ≈L ~c′2, where ~c′1 and ~c′2 are the third dimension of conf′1
and conf′2. Therefore, conf
′
1 ≈L conf′2.
In the second case, we assume it is the command executed under σ1, say
c1, that is triggered by some assignment (v, n, `) where ` 6v L. By Lemma 13,
T (v, σ) = ` 6v L. By the typing rule (T-ALWAYS-COMB) and Lemma 9, c1
can be typed with pc label Γ(v) andM = ∅. Hence, by Lemma 26, we have
σ′1 ≈L σ1 ∧ NB′1 ≈L NB1 and ∅ ≈L AS1. Hence, commands in B AS1 are all
triggered by (v, n, `) where ` 6v L. So, B1 − B1 AS1≈L B1.
Therefore, conf′1 ≈L conf1 ≈L conf2.
• (S-TRANS): by Lemma 14, σ′1 ≈L σ′2. Since NB1 ≈L NB2, B NB may only differ
for the ones triggered by (v, n, `) where ` 6v L. Hence, B1 NB1≈L B2 NB2 .
Therefore, conf′1 and conf
′
2.
• (S-CLOCK): trivial.

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3.6 Related work
Verifiable secure hardware Dynamic information flow tracking is applied at
the logic-gate level in GLIFT [84, 82, 62, 63, 83]. Dynamic checks in the ini-
tial GLIFT design [84] add high overheads in area, power, and performance.
Subsequent work [62, 63, 83] checks designs before fabrication, but enumerates
all possible states through gate-level simulation, an approach unlikely to scale
to large designs without rigid time-and-space multiplexing. SecVerilog allows
more flexible resource sharing and identifies security issues early in the design
process.
Sapper [48] also adds logic for tracking information flows, incurring run-
time overhead. Sapper cannot capture the dependencies between types and val-
ues needed for complex security policies. For example, it would not be possible
to use the label LH(timingLabel) for variable stall, as shown in Figure 3.2(b),
to capture the policy that the label of stall must be L when timingLabel is 0.
Caisson [49] supports static analysis but with purely static security levels
that prevent fine-grained sharing of hardware resources across security levels.
E.g., write_enable, tag_in and stall in Figure 3.2 would require duplication
(per security level) since their labels cannot be determined at compile time. Du-
plicated resources must be controlled by extra encoders and decoders, adding
run-time overhead (Section 6.3).
Dynamic security labels Some prior type systems for information flow also
support limited forms of dynamic labels [59, 97, 85, 39, 81, 31, 52]. The type-
valued functions needed to express the communication of security levels at the
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hardware level are absent in most of these, and none permit dynamic labels
to depend on mutable variables, a feature key to allowing SecVerilog to verify
practical hardware designs. The modular design of the SecVerilog type system
makes it more amenable to future extension. Fine [79] and F∗ [80] can verify
stateful information flow policies, modeling state changes with affine types.
Affine types suffice for functional programming, but HDLs need SecVerilog’s
new feature of dependence on mutable variables.
Flow-sensitive information flow control Flow-sensitive information flow
control [71, 38, 8], where security labels may change during execution, encoun-
ters label channels similar to those observed in our type system. Our type sys-
tem controls these channels more permissively (Section 3.3.3) because it cap-
tures the dependency between types and values.
Dependent type systems Dependent types have been widely studied and
have been applied to practical programming languages (e.g., [92, 91, 59, 17, 7]).
Information flow adds new challenges, such as precise, sound handling of label
channels. RHTT [61] supports rich information flow policies with dependent
types, but has much more complex specifications and verification is not auto-
matic.
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CHAPTER 4
PREDICTIVE MITIGATION OF TIMING CHANNELS
Strictly disallowing all timing leakage can be done as sketched thus far, but
results in an impractically restrictive programming language, or computer sys-
tem, because execution time is not permitted to depend on confidential infor-
mation in any way.
To enable general computation with a strict bound on timing channel leak-
age while providing practical performance, this chapter introduces a general
framework called predictive mitigation. We start from a simple black-box system
model, and then generalize it to interactive systems.
4.1 Simple mitigation schemes
4.1.1 Black-Box system model
We begin with a simple model of a computing system that produces externally
observable events whose timing may introduce a timing channel. Because the
mitigation scheme works regardless of the internal details of computation, the
event
source
      mitigator
b
u
ff
e
r
source
events
delayed
events
Figure 4.1: System overview.
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computing system is treated simply as a black-box source of events. As de-
picted in Figure 4.1, the event source generates events that are delayed by the
mitigation mechanism so that their times of delivery convey less information.
Delaying events while preserving their order is the only behavior of the mitiga-
tor that we consider.
We ignore for now the attributes of events other than time. These attributes
include the actual content of an event and also the choice of communication
medium (e.g., different networks, or even visual displays or sound) over which
it can be conveyed. Both content and choice of medium can be viewed as storage
channels [47], which we assume are controlled by other means. Therefore we
assume that the only information requiring control is encoded in the times at
which events arrive from the source. This separate treatment of timing and
storage channels is justified in Section 4.2.5.
We assume the attacker observes delayed events and knows the design of
the mitigator though not its internal state. The goal of the attacker is to commu-
nicate information from inside the event source to the outside. Therefore the at-
tacker consists of two parts: an insider that controls the timing of source events,
and an external observer that attempts to learn sensitive information from this
timing channel. The content of the events may also be observable to the attacker,
which motivates our choice to not have the mitigator generate dummy events.
The observer may combine information from both the content and timing of
messages. In real world this corresponds to attacker-controlled software that
communicates seemingly benign messages on a storage channel, but transmits
sensitive information using timing.
As shown in the figure, it is useful to allow the mitigation system to buffer
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events in a queue so that the event source can run ahead, generating more events
without waiting for previous event to be delivered. We consider adding input
events to the system model in Section 4.2.6.
4.1.2 Leakage measures
We can bound the amount of information that leaks through the adversary’s
observations through a combinatorial analysis of the number of possible distinct
observations the adversary can make. An observation consists of a sequence of
times at which events are released by the mitigator. For a total number of n
possible distinct observations, the information leakage is at most log(n) bits.
Two other ways to measure information leakage have recently been popu-
lar. The information-theoretic measure of mutual information has a long history
of use; it is advocated, for example, by Denning [21], and has been used for
the estimation of covert channel capacity, including timing channel capacity, in
much prior work (e.g., [54, 55, 57]). Recently, min-entropy leakage has become
a popular measure, motivated by the observation that two systems with the
same leakage according to mutual information may have very different security
properties [77]. Fortunately, the combinatorial analysis used here is sufficiently
conservative that it bounds both the mutual information and the min-entropy
measures of leakage.
The information-theoretic (Shannon) entropy of a finite distribution X over
its n possible values is written as H(X). It achieves its maximal value of log(n)
bits when all n possible values have equal probability. Suppose that O is the
distribution over n possible timing observations by the adversary, and S is the
90
distribution over possible secrets that the adversary wants to learn. The mu-
tual information between O and S , written I(O; S ), is equal to H(O) − H(O|S ),
whereH(O|S ) is the conditional entropy of O on S—how much entropy remains
in O once S is fixed. In our context, the conditional entropy describes how ef-
fectively the adversary encodes the secrets S into the observations O. But since
conditional entropy is always positive, the mutual information between O and
S is at mostH(O), or log(n).
Smith argues [77] that the min-entropy of a distribution is a better basis for
assessing the vulnerability introduced by quantitative leakage because it de-
scribes the chance that an adversary is able to guess the value of the secret in
one try. The min-entropy of a distribution is defined as H∞(O) = − logV(O)
where V(O) is the worst-case vulnerability of O to being guessed: the maximum
over the probabilities of all values in O. Let us write P(o|s) for the probability of
observation o given secrets s. Ko¨pf and Smith [46] show that the min-entropy
channel capacity from S to O is equal to log
∑
o∈Omaxs∈S P(o|s). This capacity is
maximized when P(o|s) = 1 at all o, in which case it is equal to log(n). Therefore
log(n) is a conservative bound on this measure of leakage as well.
4.1.3 Quantizing time
A very simple mitigation scheme that has been explored in prior work [29, 27,
13] permits events to leave the mitigator only at scheduled times that are mul-
tiples of a particular time quantum q. We refer to the times when events are
permitted as slots, which in this case occur at times q, 2q, etc. Without loss of
generality, let us use q = 1 to analyze this scheme.
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Suppose we allow the system to run for time T , and during that time there
is an event ready to be delivered in every slot except that at some point the
event source may stop producing events (effectively, it terminates). The total
number of events delivered must be an integer between 0 and T . Because all
the slots filled with events precede all the empty slots, the external observer can
make at most T + 1 possible distinct observations. According to information
theory, the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted by one
of T + 1 possible observations is achieved when the possible observations are
uniformly distributed. This value, in bits, is the log base 2 of the number of
possible observations, or log(T + 1). For q , 1, it is log(T+1q ).
4.1.4 A basic mitigation scheme: fast doubling
An asymptotically logarithmic bound on leakage sounds appealing, but such
leakage bounded is achieved only for an event source that fills every slot with
an event. In the general case, maximum leakage from the simple quantizing
approach is one bit per quantum, leading to an unpleasant tradeoff between
security and performance.
However, a sublinear (in fact, polylogarithmic) bound is achievable even if
the event source misses some slots. Perhaps the simplest way to achieve this is
to double the quantum q every time a slot is missed, which we call fast doubling.
Doubling the quantum ensures that in time T there can be at most log(T + 1)
misses. Effectively, the event source is penalized for irregular behavior. For the
penalty will be effective, the multiplicative factor need not be 2; the number of
misses will grow logarithmically for any multiplicative factor greater than 1.
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We can represent all behaviors of the resulting system as strings constructed
from the symbols e (for an event that fills a slot) and − (for a missed slot). A
given string generated by the regular expression (e|−)∗ precisely determines the
times at which events emerge from the mitigator, so the distinct strings corre-
spond exactly to the possible external timing observations. Therefore, the maxi-
mum of the expected number of bits of information transmitted by time T is the
log base 2 of the number of strings that can be observed within time T . These
strings contain at most log(T + 1) occurrences of −. Between and around these
occurrences are consecutive sequences of between 0 and T filled slots (e’s), as
suggested by this figure:
eeee!eee!ee!eeeee..eee!eeee
at most log(T+1) occurrences of  !
0..T occurrences of  e  per epoch
q=1 q=2 ...
Each sequence of e’s falls into a different epoch with its own characteris-
tic quantum. There are at most log(T + 1) + 1 epochs, so the number of pos-
sible strings observable within time T is at most (T + 1)log(T+1)+1. The maxi-
mum information content of the timing channel is the log of this number, or
log(T + 1) · (log(T + 1) + 1) = log2(T + 1) + log(T + 1). This is bounded above
by (1 + ) log2 T where  can be made arbitrarily small for sufficiently large T .
With the more careful combinatorial analysis given next, we can show leak-
age is bounded by O(logT (logT − log logT )). In either case, timing leakage is
O(log2(T )), which is a slowly growing function of time.
A more precise bound on leakage of the basic scheme This derivation is
based on the fact that each possible string can be determined by the placement
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of the misses, that is, the locations of “–” in the string. For m misses in time T ,
there are at most
(
T
m
)
different strings. So
All possible strings ≤
logT∑
m=0
(
T
m
)
≤ (logT + 1)
(
T
logT
)
≤ (logT + 1) T
logT
(logT )!
Thus, the leakage can be no more than log(logT + 1) + log2 T − log((logT )!), and
by Stirling’s approximation,
log((logT )!) = logT log logT − logT + o(logT )
So the whole leakage term is O(logT (logT − log logT ))).
4.1.5 Slow-doubling mitigation
Doubling on every miss performs poorly if the event source is quiescent for long
periods. The quantum-doubling scheme can be refined further to accommodate
quiescent periods, by doubling the quantum only when a missed slot follows a
filled slot (that is, a − after an e). With this mitigator, no performance penalty is
suffered by an event source that is initially quiescent, but then generates all its
output in a rapid series of events.
In this case we have epochs consisting of sequences like “−−−−” and “eeee”.
There can be at most 2 log(T + 1) epochs, and there can be at most T strings per
epoch, so the information content of the channel is no more than 2 log(T ) log(T +
1) ≤ (2 + ) log2 T . Thus, slow doubling gives much more flexibility without
changing asymptotic information leakage.
In the next section we see that both the fast and slow doubling schemes are
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instances of a more general framework for epoch-based timing mitigation, en-
abling further important refinements such as adaptively reducing the quantum.
4.2 General epoch-based mitigation
The common feature of the mitigation schemes introduced thus far is that the
mitigator divides time into epochs. During each epoch the mitigator operates
according to a fixed schedule that predicts the future behavior of the event
source. As long as the schedule predicts behavior accurately, the event source
leaks no timing information except for the length of the epoch. However, a mis-
prediction by the mitigator causes it to construct a new schedule; because this
choice is in general observable by the adversary, some information leaks.
We can describe the mitigation schemes seen so far in these terms. For exam-
ple, the slow doubling scheme has “e” epochs in which the mitigator predicts
there will be an event ready for slots spaced at the current quantum q. It also
has “−” epochs in which the mitigator predicts there will be no event ready for
slots spaced at the quantum q. On a mispredicted slot (a miss) during an “e”
epoch, the mitigator switches to a “−” epoch with a doubled quantum.
Let us now explore this framework more formally, to enable generating and
analyzing a variety of mitigation schemes that meet specified bounds on timing
channel transmission.
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4.2.1 Mitigation
The mitigator is oblivious to the content of the events and does not alter their
content. From the mitigator’s point of view, source events and delayed events
are considered abstractly as timestamps at which the events are received and
delivered respectively.
Let source events be denoted by a monotonic sequence s1 . . . sn, where 0 ≤ s1
and each si specifies when the i-th event is received by the mitigator. We denote
the mitigator by M. Given a sequence of source events s1 . . . sn, let M(s1 . . . sn) be
the sequence of possibly delayed timestamps d1 . . . dm produced by the mitiga-
tor. The sequence is again monotonically increasing; also, we have m ≤ n and
si ≤ di. The last inequality means the mitigator cannot produce events before
they are received from the source.
A mitigation scheme is online if the delayed sequence does not depend on
timing or contents of future source messages. In this dissertation we are only
interested in online mitigation schemes.
Timing leakage Because timing of the events may depend on the sensitive
data at the source, any variation in observed event timing creates an information
channel. The larger the number of different observable variations, the more
information can be transmitted over this channel. When events are mitigated,
the number of possible sequences of events that a mitigator M can deliver by
time T is
M(T ) = |{d1 . . . dm = M(s1 . . . sn) | dm ≤ T }|
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The amount of information that can be leaked by such mitigator, when the run-
ning time is bounded by T , is a logarithm of M(T ).
Definition 5 (Leakage of the mitigator) Given a mitigator M, the leakage of the
mitigator M is logM(T ).
This definition implicitly assumes that the mitigator can control the timing
of events with perfect precision, but also credits the adversarial observer with
perfect measurement abilities. More realistically, we can assume that the miti-
gator can control timing to at least the measurement precision of the observer,
in which case the above formula still bounds leakage.
Bounding leakage We specify the security requirements for timing leakage as
a bound, expressed as a function on running time T .
Definition 6 (Bounding mitigator leakage) Given a mitigator M, and a leakage
bound B(T ), we say that the leakage of M is bounded by B(T ) if for all T , we have
logM(T ) ≤ B(T ).
4.2.2 Epoch-based mitigation
In this dissertation we focus on a specific class of mitigators that we dub epoch-
based mitigators. An epoch represents a period of time during which the behavior
of the mitigator meets the epoch schedule.
An epoch schedule is a sequence of epoch predictions, one for each slot.
Epoch predictions can be either positive or negative. A positive prediction, de-
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noted by [t]+, means the mitigator expects to be able to deliver an event at time
t. A negative prediction, denoted by [t]−, says that no source events are expected
to be available for delivery at time t. We may simply write t when the sign of
the prediction is not important for the context. A prediction is an element of
R × {+,−}, because times t are real-valued. An epoch schedule S is therefore a
function from slot indices (from the natural numbers N) to predictions.
Definition 7 (Epoch schedule) An epoch schedule is a function S : N→ R × {+,−},
where S (n) is a prediction for the n-th slot in the epoch.
We say that a positive prediction S (n) = [t]+ holds or is valid if at time t,
the mitigator can deliver an event; in this case, this is also the n-th event in
the epoch. A negative prediction S (n) = [t]− holds when no source events are
available at time t.
Conversely, failing a positive prediction [t]+ means that there are no events
(available or buffered) to be delivered at time t. Failing a negative prediction
[t]− means that there are buffered source events that have not yet been delivered
by time t.
When a mitigator prediction S (n) fails at the n-th slot, we observe an epoch
transition. In addition to prediction failure, an epoch transition may be caused
by mitigator adjustments. For example, the mitigator might adjust for a faster
rate of source events, or might improve performance by flushing or partially
flushing the buffer queue. We can now formally define an epoch:
Definition 8 (Epoch) An epoch is a triple (τ, τ′, S ) where timestamps τ and τ′ corre-
spond to the beginning and the end of the epoch, and S is the epoch schedule.
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When the number of the epoch is important, we write S N for the schedule in
epoch N.
Example Revisiting the basic doubling scheme from Section 4.1.4, we see that
the prediction for every N-th epoch that starts at time t is given by the function
S N(i) = [t + i · 2N]+.
For the slow doubling scheme of Section 4.1.5, every odd prediction is
positive—it expects the events to be delivered at regular intervals, and every
even prediction is negative—no events are expected from the source. These
predictions can be expressed as follows:
S N(i) =

[t + i · 2k]+ if N = 2k − 1
[t + i · 2k]− if N = 2k
On the form of schedules Most of the examples of schedules in this disserta-
tion are constant-quantum functions, where prediction times depend linearly on
the epoch sequence number of the events. However, when timing pattern of the
source events is well-understood, a finer prediction, described by an arbitrary
function, could yield better performance. From the standpoint of security, the
form of the schedule is irrelevant as long as the mitigator satisfies the leakage
bound discussed in Section 4.2.4.
4.2.3 Leakage of epoch-based mitigators
Epoch-based design allows us to reduce the analysis of epoch-based mitigation
to the analysis of individual epochs and of the transitions between them.
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Variations within an epoch Because prediction times during an epoch are de-
terministic, the only source of timing variation within an epoch is the number
of valid predictions. The latter is the key element in bounding the number of
possible event sequences within an epoch. The number of valid predictions is
bounded by the duration of the epoch, which itself is bounded by the current
running time T + 1. Therefore the current running time T + 1 is a bound on the
number of variations within each epoch.
Transition variations Epoch transitions may depend on source events too.
Therefore, one needs to take into account the number of possible schedules for
the next epoch. We denote by ΛN the number of possible schedules when tran-
sitioning from epoch N to epoch N + 1.
The exact number of transition variations depends on the particular mitiga-
tion scheme. In the two schemes described thus far, the transition into a new
epoch occurs only when a miss occurs, and only one new schedule is possible;
hence, for all epochs N, we have ΛN = 1.
An example mitigator for which ΛN is greater than 1 is an adaptive scheme that
uses the average rate of the previously received source events to choose the new
schedule. In this case, ΛN can be bounded by the current running time T + 1.
Section 4.3.1 describes the convergence experiment where the number of
possible predictions for a given epoch is chosen from a fixed table and is ex-
actly two.
Bound on the number of total variations Consider an epoch-based mitigator
at time T that has reached at most N epochs. Assume that within each epoch
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the number of variations is at most T + 1, and the number of possible transition
variations into epoch i is Λi, where i ranges from 1 to N. We include ΛN to ac-
commodate the transition from epoch N to epoch N +1 at time T . We can bound
the number of possible variations of such a mitigator by a function M(T,N):
M(T,N) = (T + 1)N · Λ1 · Λ2 · . . . · ΛN
The leakage of this mitigator is bounded by the logarithm
logM(T,N) = N log(T + 1) +
N∑
j=1
logΛ j (4.1)
We refer to the term log(T + 1) as epoch leakage and to the terms logΛi as
transition leakage.
Basic schemes revisited Revisiting the simple mitigators from Section 4.1.1,
we see that because ΛN = 1, the leakage of such mitigators is bounded by
N log(T + 1).
4.2.4 Bounding leakage
Using Definition 6 and Equation 4.1 we may derive a leakage bound for epoch-
based mitigation.
N log(T + 1) +
N∑
j=1
logΛ j ≤ B(T ) (4.2)
Furthermore, if we consider mitigators where the transition variations are
fixed—that is, there is λmax ≥ logΛ j for all j—then the leakage bound criterion
for such mitigators can be expressed as a bound on the number of epochs.
N ≤ B(T )
log(T + 1) + λmax
(4.3)
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Define the deferral point DN for epoch N to be the solution to the equation N =
B(T )/(log(T + 1) + λmax). The importance of DN is that until DN there must be at
most N epochs; that is, the start of the N+1-th epoch has to be deferred until DN .
Because the N + 1-th epoch starts with the misprediction at the N-th epoch, this
leads us to the only security constraint for the choice of schedule S N . Namely,
for all events i, we should have ∀ N ≥ 1 . S N(i) ≥ DN , and consequently,
∀N ≥ 1 . S N(1) ≥ DN (4.4)
Example Consider the basic scheme from Section 4.1.4, which has prediction
function S N(i) = [t + i · 2N−1]+. For this scheme, we have λmax = 0. Consider
bound log2(T + 1), which leads to deferral points DN for N-th epoch DN = 2N − 1.
The leakage bound requires S N(1) ≥ DN . Since in the basic scheme, the N-th
epoch starts at 0 for N = 1, and at least at time
∑N−2
i=0 2
i for all N ≥ 2, therefore the
leakage bound follows from S N(1) = 0 + 20 = 1 ≥ 21 − 1 = DN for N = 1, and
S N(1) ≥ ∑N−2i=0 2i + 2N−1 = 2N−1 − 1 + 2N−1 = 2N − 1 = DN for all N ≥ 2.
Figure 4.2 shows the deferral points for the basic scheme from Section 4.1.1.
Here the bound is B(T ) = log2 T , λmax = 0, and the deferral points correspond to
the intersections of the curves N logT with the bound curve.
Adaptive mitigators In the absence of a misprediction for a sufficiently long
time, the difference B(T ) − N log(T + 1) − ∑Nj=1 logΛ j may allow an extra epoch
transition. An epoch transition is adaptive when it is initiated by the mitigator
rather than by a misprediction. Equations 4.2 and 4.3 are useful as design crite-
ria for adaptive transitions. In particular, an adaptive transition is secure when
B(T ) − N log(T + 1) −
N∑
j=1
logΛ j ≥ log(T + 1) + logΛN+1
Here ΛN+1 is the number of possible new predictions for epoch number N + 1.
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Figure 4.2: Target bound, capacity approximation for individual epochs,
and deferral points.
One use for adaptive transitions is to help reduce the size of the event buffer.
Past deferral points, the mitigator can choose to release more than one event
from the buffer. The number of choices for how many events can be flushed
from the buffer then contribute to ΛN for the mitigation scheme at that defer-
ral point. Prudent mitigator design probably avoids completely emptying the
buffer, since an empty buffer may risk an unpredicted miss.
A second example of using adaptive transitions to improve performance is
given in Section 4.3.1.
On the choice of bound functions Because the epoch-based mitigation
scheme is parametric on the choice of the bound function B(T ), we briefly dis-
cuss possible choices for practical bounds.
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Recall that we assume the number of processed events in an epoch may
leak information. Under this assumption, the most draconian bound possible
is logT . Enforcing such a bound effectively restricts output to a single epoch for
the entire run of the program. In case of a misprediction, all subsequent events
would have to be delayed until the end of the program.
Our simple and adaptive mitigators use the polylogarithmic bound log2 T ,
which appears to make a reasonable trade-off between performance and secu-
rity. However, as this section illustrates, even with this more relaxed bound, the
distance between deferral bounds increases exponentially.
A third choice corresponds to a larger, more permissive, class of bounds such
as kT + logn T , for n ≥ 2 and small (or zero) k. We have not explored such bounds
in this dissertation, though it is possible that a linear, albeit slowly growing,
bound may be useful in bringing deferral points closer in practice.
4.2.5 Mixing storage and timing
A variety of information flow control techniques have been developed for con-
trolling leakage through storage channels. We can now show that these tech-
niques combine well with timing mitigation.
We use the information theoretic measure of mutual information, to measure
leakage. Given random variables A and B, their mutual information I(A; B) is
the information that A conveys about B, and vice versa. It is defined as I(A; B) =
H(A)+H(B)−H(A, B), where the functionH gives the entropy of a distribution.
Note that the entropy of a variable with n possible values is maximized when
all n outcomes are equally probable, in which case it is log n bits.
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Assume X is a random variable that corresponds to secret input, Y is a ran-
dom variable that corresponds to the storage channel, and Z is a random vari-
able that corresponds to the timing channel. The amount of information that
the attacker gains by observing both storage and timing channel is the mutual
information between the secret and the joint distribution of Y and Z: that is,
I(X;Y,Z). Similarly, the amount of information that the attacker gains by ob-
serving just the storage channel is I(X;Y).
The following easy theorem states that the amount of information leaked by
the combination of timing and storage channels is bounded by the information
leaked by the storage channel, plus the maximum information content of the
timing channel.
Theorem 5 (Separation of storage channel)
I(X;Y,Z) ≤ H(Z) + I(X;Y)
Proof. We prove the theorem by using the definition of I(X;Y) to show that the
expressionH(Z) + I(X;Y) − I(X;Y,Z) is nonnegative.
H(Z) + I(X;Y) − I(X;Y,Z)
= H(Z) +H(X) +H(Y) −H(X,Y)
−H(X) −H(Y,Z) +H(X,Y,Z)
= H(Z) +H(Y) −H(X,Y) −H(Y,Z) +H(X,Y,Z)
≥ H(Z) +H(Y) −H(X,Y) −H(Y) −H(Z) +H(X,Y,Z)
= H(X,Y,Z) −H(X,Y) ≥ 0

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A symmetric theorem can be stated for the timing channel, but seems less
useful because of the difficulty of estimating I(X;Z). A direct corollary to this
theorem is that if the system enforces noninterference [28, 54] on the storage
channel, the total secret information leaked from the system is bounded by the
entropy of the timing channel.
4.2.6 Input
Event sources often communicate with the external world by accepting input,
and block waiting for input when no input is available. Let us assume that the
timing of input does not contain sensitive information, or at least that it is the re-
sponsibility of the input provider to control the input timing channel. The time
spent by a computing system waiting for input clearly does not communicate
anything about its internal state provider. Therefore, the system comprising the
event source and mitigator should not be penalized for time spent blocked wait-
ing for input. For the purposes of mitigation, the clock controlling the schedul-
ing of slots can be stopped while the event course is blocked waiting for input.
This refinement is particularly helpful when the event source is a service whose
service time does not fluctuate much.
4.2.7 Leakage with beliefs about execution time
Finally, we consider a particular case of server applications that handle client re-
quests. In this special case, a tighter, albeit probabilistic, bound on leakage can
be established than is possible with the general framework presented thus far.
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For many real applications that handle sequential client requests, such as
RSA encryption and simple web services (see Section 4.3.4), execution times fall
within a narrow range, regardless of the values of secrets. We show that un-
der the assumption that the distribution of execution times is approximately as
expected, expected mitigated leakage can be given a tighter bound than log2 T .
Suppose that with probability at least p, the execution time for a single re-
quest is at most Tbig. That is, the adversarial insider controls execution time
but cannot make the probability of exceeding Tbig greater than 1 − p. For some
computations, such as blinded cryptographic operations on sufficiently iso-
lated computers, p can be gained by sampling with randomly generated inputs.
Given Tbig, a corresponding number of epochs Nbig can be calculated, giving the
number of transitions that must occur before executions of length Tbig are pos-
sible. For instance, in the basic doubling scheme, Nbig = dlog(Tbig)e. Under these
assumptions, expected leakage L(Nbig,T ) is derived using conditional entropy:
L(Nbig,T ) = p · logM(T,Nbig) + (1 − p) ·M(T,N)
where, as before, M(T,Nbig) is the bound on the number of possible variations
of a mitigator when N is at most Nbig.
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Example For the basic doubling scheme, given Tbig, we know that Nbig ≤
dlog(Tbig + 1)e. Using the formula for M(T,N), we can derive
L(Nbig,T ) = p · logM(T,Nbig) + (1 − p) ·M(T,N)
= p · (Nbig · log(T + 1) −
Nbig(Nbig − 1)
2
) + (1 − p) · (N · log(T + 1) − N(N − 1)
2
)
≤ p · (Nbig · log(T + 1) −
Nbig(Nbig − 1)
2
)
+ (1 − p) · (log2(T + 1) − log(T + 1)(log(T + 1) − 1)
2
)
= p · (Nbig · log(T + 1) −
Nbig(Nbig − 1)
2
) +
1 − p
2
· (log2(T + 1) + log(T + 1))
This leakage bound is tighter than (log2 T ), although they have the same
asymptotic complexity of O(log2 T ).
4.3 Adaptive mitigation results
Some simple experiments with predictive mitigation help us understand how
the mitigator can converge on the right separation between slots.
4.3.1 Convergence
Buffering source events helps prevent slowing down the event source and ab-
sorbs temporary variations in event rate. However, it is undesirable for the
buffer to grow too large, because it increases latency. If the buffer fills, the event
source must be paused to allow the buffer to drain. We would like to avoid
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significantly pausing well-behaved applications, because pauses could disrupt
their functionality.
In this part, we focus on a simplified event source, and propose one way to
add adaptive transitions to the basic mitigation mechanism of Section 4.1.4. This
particular design typically allows the quantum converge to the event rate, while
still keeping the information leakage lower than the desired bound. Empirical
results demonstrate the convergence of the mitigator in face of many different
event rates. Although currently our solution is restricted to certain input event
patterns, the experiment suggests that adaptive, epoch-based mitigation may
be practical for different applications.
Suppose we use the simple mitigation mechanism with constant-quantum
positive predictions for every epoch. Consider an event source that generates
events at a constant rate, say 1 event per every 8 seconds; call the interval be-
tween events the event interval. When the quantum of the mitigation system is
higher than the event interval—say, 10 seconds—the mitigator begins accumu-
lating events in its buffer queue. Eventually, an increase in the buffer size may
increase the latency and reduce the throughput of the mitigator. On the other
hand, if the quantum is smaller than the event rate—say, 6 seconds—then the
buffer quickly drains, causing unwanted epoch transitions.
Therefore, designing an adaptive mitigation scheme that can converge
roughly to the event interval of the source system is important for reducing
performance overhead for practical applications.
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4.3.2 Assumptions
We now show that adaptive mitigation can work for relatively well-behaved
event source. To capture the behavior of an event source that generates events
at some average rate but with local variation around that rate, we work with
an event source that generates one event at a random point during each fixed
interval. It is easy to see the optimal prediction for an event source of this type is
the one whose constant quantum matches the average interval between events.
The basic intuition behind the construction of the adaptive mitigation mech-
anism is that the size of the buffer indicates how the quantum should be ad-
justed. A quantum that is too large causes the buffer to grow large; a quantum
that is too small causes the buffer to empty. Both of these conditions can be
taken into account by the mitigator.
4.3.3 An adaptive mitigation heuristic
Following the idea of adaptive mitigation from Section 4.2.4, we heuristically
extend the basic mitigator of Section 4.1.1 to adjust future schedules based the
buffer size. There is no reason to believe that the particular mechanism is opti-
mal; we describe this mechanism as a way of illustrating what is possible with
adaptive mitigation.
In this mitigator, an adaptive epoch transition happens when both of the
following conditions hold:
1. the size of the buffer queue is increasing, and
2. the mitigator would meet the leakage bound even if it transitioned into a
new epoch.
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Note that condition (1) here is specific to the design of the current mitiga-
tor, while condition (2) is a necessary condition for all adaptive transitions, as
described in Section 4.2.4.
The adaptive mitigation heuristic works as follows. It doubles the quantum
on each miss transition, which lets the quantum quickly approach the event
interval. Next, the mitigator adjusts the quantum closer to the event interval by
raising or lowering the quantum deterministically at every adaptive transition.
The current quantum ideally fluctuates around the desired quantum and finally
converges to it. We constrain the mitigator to have a deterministic reduction
rate, enabling a deterministic (and small) bound on possible schedule functions.
This scheme uses reduction rates that regulate how quantum size is adapted.
We denote reduction rates by r j, where j ranges from 1 to 9, such that r1 =
0.95, r2 = 0.9, . . . , r9 = 0.55. Note that the number of reduction rates and the
corresponding values for this experiment have been derived empirically, based
on the experimental results, reported in Section 4.3.4.
The mitigator has an internal state, which is a pair (q, j). Here q is current
quantum and j is the current reduction rate. Call the condition that guards
when an adaptive transition may be done an adaptive condition; the next state
(q′, j′) is computed at a transition point and is derived as follows:
(q′, j′) =

(q/2r j, next j) if adaptive condition holds
(2q · r j, next j) if miss occurs
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where function next specifies the choice of the next reduction rate
next j =

j + 1 when j < 9
5 when j = 9
Using this new state, the schedule for the next epoch can be computed as
S N(i) = [τ + i · q′]+.
According to our discussion in Section 4.2.4, since the multiplier rates are
deterministic, and there are only two possible transitions (speed up or slow
down), we have λmax = 1. If we set the total information leakage B(T ) to be
log2(T +1), the number of transitions must be no more than (log2(T +1))/(log (T +
1) + 1) as derived from the leakage bound criterion in Section 4.2.4. Adaptive
transitions are not allowed if this constraint is not met.
4.3.4 Empirical results
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the quantum converges to the event interval through
the adaptive mitigation mechanism, with event interval of 18 seconds. In this
figure, the quantum is indicated by the dashed line and the buffer size is rep-
resented by the solid line. Initially the mitigator doubles the quantum quickly
to 32, and then lowers the quantum because the queue size has grown, around
the 350-second point. Then, the queue slowly drains because the quantum is
smaller than the event interval. When the queue empties around 2000 seconds,
the quantum is raised again. After several adjustments, the quantum finally
converges to 18 at around 5000 seconds and stays constant thereafter. Once con-
verged, the queue size remains small (around 2–3), ensuring low latency.
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Figure 4.3: Adaptive mitigation with average interval of 18 seconds.
While perfect convergence is not required for this scheme to be useful, we
tested the convergence with event intervals ranging from 1 second to 100 sec-
onds, with the results shown in Figure 4.4. Each dot represents the final quan-
tum arrived at by the mitigation system after different total run times. Three
curves are shown, one for the final quantum after 10000 seconds, one for af-
ter 100000 seconds, and one for after 1000000 seconds. The plot shows that
the adaptive mitigation heuristic converges closely to the event interval in most
cases. However, there are certain cases where convergence never occurs, such
as at an event interval of 42; here, the mitigation system loops among five val-
ues close to 42. The current set of reduction rates were chosen in a largely ad
hoc fashion; we leave finding an optimal set for a broad class of event sources
to future work.
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Figure 4.5: Convergence of composition of mitigators with average inter-
val of 18 seconds.
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4.3.5 Composing mitigators
Figure 4.5 illustrates convergence of composition of two adaptive mitigators.
Here the first mitigator processes events received from a source system with an
18 sec. event interval. The second mitigator processes events that it receives
from the first one. The lines on the graph illustrate the change of quantum
values in each mitigator. Based on the similar experiments for other event in-
tervals, we observe that composed mitigators converge in most cases. We leave
identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to future work.
4.4 Application-level experiments
We evaluated the effectiveness of the basic timing mitigation mechanism on two
published timing channel attacks: RSA timing channels [13] and remote web
server timing channels [11].
Both experiments show that the basic mitigation mechanism of Section 4.1.4
can successfully defend against these timing channel attacks, although with a
latency penalty.
4.4.1 RSA
To demonstrate the effectiveness of timing mitigation, we applied it to OpenSSL
0.9.7, a widely used open-source SSL library that was shown to be vulnerable
to RSA timing channel attacks [13]. The results show that timing mitigation
eliminates the time difference targeted by RSA timing channel attack, making
this attack infeasible.
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Experiment setup
The experiment was performed on OpenSSL 0.9.7. This version was used be-
cause it is the same version shown to be vulnerable by Brumley et al, and by
default it does not use blinding to prevent timing channels. Measurements were
made on a 3.16GHz Intel Core2 Due CPU, with 4G of RAM, using GCC 4.4.1.
The attacker continuously asks the target to decrypt a message and records all
decryption times, starting a new decryption request whenever the last one is
done. The Intel CPU cycle count obtained using the rdtsc instruction provided
a precise, accurate clock.
Attack strategy
We used the timing channel attack strategy proposed in [13] for this experiment,
attacking RSA keys with 1024 bits. Instead of trying to get the secret key directly,
this attack targets the smaller factor of N used in RSA key generation. More
specifically, the attacker attacks q, where N = pq with q < p. Once q (512 bits for
a 1024-bit key pair) is released, the attacker can easily derive the secret key by
computing d = e−1 mod (p − 1) (q − 1).
The attack works by learning a bit of q at a time, from most significant to
least. In each request, the attack generates two guesses (512-bit numbers) and
records the decryption time for each guess. To set up, the attacker guesses the
first 2–3 bits of q by trying all possible combinations (feeding rest of the bits as
0), and plots all decryption times in a graph where the x-axis is all guesses. The
first peak in the graph corresponds to q. Once the attacker has recovered the top
i − 1 bits of q, two new guesses g1 and g2 are generated, where
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1. g1 has the same top i − 1 bits as q and the remaining are zero.
2. g2 differs from g1 only at the ith bit, by setting it to 1
The attacker then computes ug1 = g1R
−1 mod N and ug2 = g2R
−1 mod N
(where R is some power of 2 used in Montgomery Reduction), and measures
the time to decrypt both ug1 and ug2 . Denote by ∆ the difference between these
two decryption times.
The goal of this RSA timing channel attack is to find a 0–1 gap when a certain
bit of q is 0 or 1. More specifically, when the ith bit of q is 0, the decryption time
difference ∆ will be large, otherwise small. So the attacker wins by analyzing
the significance of 0–1 gap to get all bits of q. Actually, after recovering the most
significant half of the bits of q, attacker can use Coppersmith’s algorithm [19] to
recover the rest of the bits. So we only show the 0–1 gap for the first 256 bits of
q in this experiment.
Parameter choices
To overcome the effects of a multi-user environment, multiple decryptions for
same guesses are necessary to cancel out the timing differences. Experimentally,
we found the median time of 7 samples gives a reliable decryption time with
very small variation, so this is the sample size used hereafter.
Measuring the decryption time for n + 1 guesses ranging from g, g + 1, . . . ,
g+ n can make the 0–1 gap more significant, and thus brings more confidence in
the attacker’s guess, though at a computational cost to the attacker as well [13].
We chose 600 as the value for n, because it was enough to gain a significant 0–1
gap in most cases.
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Timing mitigation of RSA Attack
Since the 0–1 gap does not depend on any specific key [13], we used a randomly
generated 1024-bit key for our experiment. Figure 4.6(a) shows the result with-
out any timing mitigation mechanism. The dotted line is the zero–one gap when
the corresponding bit of q is 1, and the solid one is when the bit is 0. It is easy
to see that an attacker can infer certain bits of q by observing this zero–one gap,
especially when guessing a bit whose position is larger than 30. For bit indices
less than 30, it is possible to increase the 0–1 gap by calculating a larger neigh-
borhood set, with more cost to the attacker.
On the other hand, Figure 4.6(b) shows a RSA decryption process with the
simple timing mitigation mechanism we proposed in Section 4.1.1. The timing
channel attack on RSA is defeated because the two curves are indistinguishable
regardless of which bit is being guessed: our timing mitigation scheme elimi-
nates the 0–1 gap. The mitigation mechanism makes the time difference drop
by four orders of magnitude, because the only source of time difference is the
request time, which does not depend on the currently guessed bit.
Expected leakage
If we are willing to make assumptions about the distribution of encryption time,
we can apply the method for estimating expected leakage that is discussed in
Section 4.2.7. Using 1000 randomly generated inputs to estimate Tbig, we find
that 99% of them are handled within 1∗108 clock cycles, which is approximately
1×108×103
3.16×109 = 31.65 ms (this is a 3.6GHz CPU). With an initial quantum of 1 ms, it is
easy to see that Nbig = dlog(31.65)e = 5. The leakage bound in this case is shown
in Figure 4.7, topping out for practical purposes around 100 bits.
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Figure 4.6: Simple mitigation of the RSA timing attack.
4.4.2 Timing attacks on web servers
Web applications have been shown vulnerable to timing channel attacks, either
by direct timing or cross-site timing. For instance, many web applications try
to keep secret whether a given username is valid, by returning the same error
message regardless of validity. They do this because learned usernames can
be abused for spam, invasive advertising, and phishing. However, timing can
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Figure 4.7: Expected leakage for RSA timing channel attack.
expose username validity, because sites usually execute different code paths for
valid and invalid user names [11].
We implemented a simple web server to expose this timing channel and ap-
plied our mitigation scheme to eliminate this channel. The result shows that our
mitigation mechanism is also useful in the face of web applications, although
with a latency cost.
Experimental setup
We build a small HTTP web service on Tomcat 5.5.28. It takes a username/pass-
word pair as a request and checks its validity. We randomly generate 10,000
username/password pairs, and store the username with a SHA-1 password
hash of passwords into Berkeley DB (Java Edition, 4.0.92) [64]. This experiment
is done between two computers connected by a campus network.
The login service proceeds as follows: first, it checks the database for valid-
ity of the given username. If the username is invalid, this server just returns
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an error message. Otherwise, the server computes the SHA-1 hash of the given
password and checks if it matches the one stored in the database. If the pass-
word does not match, the server returns the same error message as for an in-
valid username, to conceal username validity. This captures the essence of a
login service. However, despite its simplicity, this service also exhibits a pos-
sible timing channel, because the computation of the SHA-1 hash depends on
username validity.
To reduce network timing noise, we measure the query time 20 times for each
username, and choose the smallest one as our sample. For each experiment, we
randomly choose 400 valid usernames from a valid username list, as well as
400 randomly generated invalid usernames to determine the timing difference
between them. As in the RSA experiment, we use a sequential attacker model,
where the attacker issues a query immediately after the response. To make the
difference more precise, we alternately issue valid and invalid queries.
For the basic mitigation mechanism, instead of modifying the Tomcat source
code, we wrap the doGet function in our login service servlet with code imple-
menting the basic mitigation scheme, to control leakage of the time needed to
look up and check the password. Because it is not implemented as part of Tom-
cat, this implementation cannot mitigate timing information communicated by
web service setup time. However, the experiment still shows that timing miti-
gation can defend against this timing channel attack.
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Results
Figure 4.8(a) shows how query time differs for valid and invalid usernames.
Queries for valid usernames take significantly longer, so a timing channel attack
is feasible. Web server setup adds about 1.5ms latency to queries in the begin-
ning of a run, but the query time stabilizes after around 50 queries. An attacker
can determine the validity of an arbitrary username with high confidence.
Figure 4.8(b) shows the response time with the basic mitigation mechanism.
Since server replies only at the end of the current quantum, the time difference is
independent of the validity of username. Close inspection of the results reveals
that there is an initial 1.5ms timing difference that is not mitigated by our im-
plementation. This timing difference is caused by the setup of the web service,
rather than by the login service we mitigated, and underscores the importance
of mitigating timing end-to-end rather than on individual system components.
Another observation not shown in the time difference graph of RSA ex-
periment is that our simple timing mitigation mechanism also adds a latency
penalty to the web service, since the service time is unified to the closest power
of 2 of the largest service time. This latency can be seen in Figure 4.8(b), where
mitigation is seen to add about 9 ms latency.
Expected leakage
We applied the expected-leakage approach of Section 4.2.7 to the web service.
Using 1000 random requests, we determined that 99% of them are below 8 ms.
Replacing Tbig = dlog 8e and p = 0.99 with these two numbers, the expected
leakage for this application as shown in Figure 4.9, with q0 = 1 ms. Clearly, the
mitigated version leaks information slowly in practice.
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Figure 4.8: Simple mitigation of the web server timing attack.
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Figure 4.9: Expected leakage for web server timing attack.
4.5 Generalizing the black-box model for interactive systems
Predictive mitigation introduced so far assumes very little about the event
source, which means that it can be applied to a wide range of systems. However,
its very generality can make the leakage bounds conservative, and performance
of the system is then hurt because the mitigator excessively delays the release of
events. By refining the system model, we can make more accurate predictions
and also bound timing leakage more accurately. The result is a better tradeoff
between security and performance.
Timing channels in network-based services are particularly of interest for
timing channel mitigation. These services are interactive systems that accept
input requests from a variety of clients and send back responses. Figure 4.10
illustrates how we extend predictive mitigation for such a system.
Here, the abstract event source in the black-box model is replaced by a more
concrete interactive system that accepts input messages on multiple input chan-
nels and delivers output messages to corresponding output channels. Output
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Figure 4.10: Predictive mitigation of an interactive system.
messages are passed through the timing mitigator, as before, and released by
the timing mitigator in accordance with the prediction for that message. If a
message arrives early, the mitigator delays it until the predicted time. If it does
not arrive in time—a misprediction has happened—the mitigation starts a new
epoch and makes a new, more conservative prediction.
This scheme significantly generalizes the black-box scheme. First, the time
to produce each event is predicted separately, rather than requiring the mitiga-
tor to predict the entire schedule in advance—which is rather difficult for an
interactive system. Second, the prediction may be computed using any public
information in the system. This public information may be anything deemed
public (the “non-secrets” in the diagram), possibly including some information
about input requests. For example, the mitigator may use the time at which a
given input request arrives to predict the time at which the corresponding out-
put will be available for release. The model also permits the content of input
requests to be partly public. Each request has an application-defined request
type capturing what information about the request is public. If no information
in the request is public, all requests have the same request type.
To see why this generalizes the original black-box scheme, consider what
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happens if the prior history of mitigator predictions is the only information con-
sidered public when predicting the time of output events. In this case, all pre-
dictions within an epoch can be generated at the start of the epoch, yielding
a completely determined schedule for the epoch. By contrast, our generalized
predictive mitigation can make use of information that was not known at the
start of the epoch, such as input time. Therefore, predictions can be made dy-
namically within an epoch.
4.6 Predictions for interactive systems
The system model described in Section 4.5 permits a great deal of flexibility in
constructing predictions. We now begin to explore the possibilities.
Throughout the rest of this chapter we assume that the mitigator has an in-
ternal state, denoted by S. In the simplest schemes, the state only records the
number of epochs N, that is, S = N. But more complex internal state is possible,
as discussed in Section 4.7.2.
4.6.1 Inputs, outputs, and idling
For simplicity, we assume that inputs to and outputs from the interactive system
correspond one-to-one: each input has one output and vice versa. If inputs can
cause multiple output events, this can be modeled by introducing a schedule
for delivering the multiple outputs as a batch.
Many services generate output events only as a response to some external
126
input. In the absence of inputs, such systems are idle and produce no output.
If the predictor cannot take this into account when generating predictions, the
failure to generate output produces gratuitous mispredictions. With general-
ized predictive mitigation, these mispredictions can be avoided.
For example, consider applying the original black-box scheme to a service
that reliably generates results in 10ms. If the service is idle for an hour, the series
of ensuing mispredictions will inflate the interval between predicted outputs to
more than an hour, slowing the underlying service by more than five orders of
magnitude. Clearly this is not acceptable.
Consider inputs arriving at times inp1, inp2, . . . inpn, . . . , where each inpi is the
time of input i. We assume that the mitigator has some public state S, and that
this state always includes the index of the current mitigation epoch, denoted
by N. Let the prediction for events for state S be described by a function p(S),
where p gives a bound on how long it is expected to take to compute an answer
to a request in state S.
Whenever the structure of the mitigator state is understood, we use more
concrete notation. For example, in the simple mitigator we have S = N, so
we we write p(N) for p(S). Simple fast doubling has the prediction function
p(N) = 2N−1. For more complex predictors, p might depend on other (public)
parameters as well. If S N(0) is the time of the start of the N-th epoch, subsequent
event i in epoch N is predicted to occur at time S N(i):
S N(i) = max(inpi, S N(i − 1)) + p(N)
The two terms in the expression above correspond to the predicted start of
the computation for event i and the predicted amount of time it takes to com-
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pute the output, respectively. To predict the start of computation for event i, we
take the later of two times: the time when input i is available, and the time when
event i − 1 is delivered.
4.6.2 Multiple input and output channels
Now let us consider mitigation on multiple channels, where requests on differ-
ent channels may be handled in parallel.
There are at least two reasonable concurrency models. The first model as-
sumes that every request type has an associated process and that processes han-
dling requests of one type do not respond to requests of other types. The second
model assumes a shared pool of worker processes that can handle requests of
any type as they become available.
In either model, the mitigator is permitted to use some information about
which channel an input request arrives on and about the content of the request.
This information about the channel and the request is considered abstractly to
be the request type of the request. There is a finite set of request types numbered
1, . . . ,R. Requests coming at time inp with request type r are represented as a
pair (inp, r). A request history is a sequence of requests (inp1, r1) . . . (inpi, ri) . . . ,
where inpi is the time of request i, and ri is the type of the request: 1 ≤ ri ≤ R.
The mitigator makes predictions separately for each request type; however,
with multiple request types, an epoch is a period of time during which predic-
tions are met for all request types. A misprediction for one request type causes
an epoch transition for the mitigator, and may change predictions for every re-
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quest type. We denote the prediction for computation when mitigator is in state
S on request type r by a function p(S, r). When the state consists only of the
number of epochs (S = N), we simply write p(N, r).
Individual processes per request type
In the case where each request type has its own individual process, the predic-
tion for output event i is
S N(i) = max(inpi, S N( j)) + p(N, ri)
where j is the index of the previous request of type ri; that is, j = max{ j′ | j′ <
i ∧ ri = r j′}. Hence S N( j) is the prediction of the previous request of type ri. We
define S N( j) to be zero when there are no previous requests of the same type.
Example Consider a simple system with two request types A and B (for clar-
ity we index request types with letters), and consider a mitigator with these
prediction functions p(N, r) for N = 1:
N p(N, A) p(N, B)
1 10 100
Assume the following input history: (2, A), (4, B), (6, A), and (30, B). That is,
two inputs of type A arrive at times 2 and 6, and two of type B arrive at times 4
and 30.
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The inputs (2, A) and (4, B) are the first requests of the corresponding types.
The predictions for these requests are
S 1(1) = max(2, 0) + 10 = 12
S 1(2) = max(4, 0) + 100 = 104
For the next request of type A, the prediction is
S 1(3) = max(6, 12) + 10 = 22
This prediction takes into account the amount of time it would take for the pro-
cess for request type A to finish processing the last input and then to delay the
message for p(1, A). Similarly, the predicted output time for the fourth request
(30, B) is
S 1(4) = max(30, 104) + 100 = 204
Shared worker pool
For a shared pool of worker processes, predictions must be derived with more
careful computation. Suppose the system has at least n worker processes that
handle input requests. To compute a prediction for input request i that arrives
at time inpi with type ri, the mitigator needs to know two terms: when the han-
dling of that request will start, and an estimate of how long it takes to complete
the request. We assume that the completion estimate is given by p(N, r) and fo-
cus instead on the first term. The main challenge is to predict when a worker
will be available to process a request. For this we introduce a notion of worker
predictions. Intuitively, worker predictions are a data structure internal to the
mitigator that allows it to predict when different requests will be picked up by
worker processes.
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Concretely, worker predictions are n sets W1, . . . ,Wn in which every Wm con-
tains pairs of the form (i, q). When (i, q) ∈ Wm, it means request i is predicted to
be delivered at time q by worker m. Therefore, a given index i appears in at most
one of the sets Wm. The function avail(W) predicts when a worker described by
set W will be available, by choosing the time when the worker should deliver
its last message.
avail(W) ,

max{q | (i, q) ∈ W} if W , ∅
0 otherwise
We describe next the algorithm for computing worker predictions.
Initialization In the initial state of worker predictions, all sets Wm (for 1 ≤ m ≤
n) are empty.
Prediction Given an event i with input time inpi and request type ri, the pre-
diction S N(i) is computed as follows:
1. The earliest available worker j is predicted to handle request i. Therefore,
we find j such that avail(W j) = min1≤m≤n{avail(Wm)}
2. Since worker j is assumed to handle request i, we make the following
prediction q for the i-th output:
q = max(inpi, avail(W j)) + p(N, ri)
The prediction for S N is S N(i) = q.
3. Finally, worker predictions are updated with prediction (i, q):
W j := W j ∪ {(i, q)}
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Misprediction When a misprediction occurs, the mitigator resets the state of
worker predictions. Consider a misprediction at time τN , which defines the start
time of epoch N. We reset the state of worker predictions as follows:
1. For every worker m, we find the earliest undelivered request i′; that is,
request received before the misprediction but not delivered by the mitigator at
τN :
i′ = min{i | (i, q) ∈ Wm ∧ inpi < τN ≤ q}
2. If such i′ cannot be found, that is, the set in the previous equation is empty,
we set Wm to ∅. Otherwise, we let q′ = τN + p(N, ri′) and set Wm = {(i′, q′)}.
3. Note that the above step resets the state of each Wm in the worker pre-
dictions. Using these reinitialized states, we can compute predictions for the
unhandled requests, i.e., all requests j with predicted time q such that q ≥ τN
according to the steps 1) and 2) described in Prediction.
Example Reusing the settings from the example in Section 4.6.2, we have four
inputs: (2, A), (4, B), (6, A) and (30, B), and prediction function p(1, A) = 10 and
p(1, B) = 100. Suppose we have two shared workers.
As described above, the worker predictions are both initialized to be empty:
W1 = ∅ and W2 = ∅. For the first input, both workers are available; that is,
avail(W1) = avail(W2) = 0 since W1 and W2 are all empty sets now. We break the
tie by selecting the worker with smaller index, worker 1, and then we set the
prediction for input (2, A) as
S 1(1) = max(2, 0) + 10 = 12
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Finally, the worker prediction of worker 1 is updated to {(1, 12)}.
For the second input, avail(W1) = 12 and avail(W2) = 0. Worker 2 is the ear-
liest available worker. Similarly to the first input, the prediction for the second
output is S 1(2) = max(4, 0) + 100 = 104. The worker prediction of worker 2 is
updated to {(2, 104)}.
Computation of the predicted worker becomes more interesting for the third
input (6, A). We have
avail(W1) = max{q | (i, q) ∈ {(1, 12)}} = 12
avail(W2) = max{q | (i, q) ∈ {(2, 104)}} = 104
The mitigator picks the worker with earliest availability, worker 1. The third
output is predicted at: S 1(3) = max(6, 12)+10 = 22, and the prediction for worker
1 is updated to {(1, 12), (3, 22)}.
For the last input (30, B), the mitigator first computes the available times for
both workers:
avail(W1) = max{q | (i, q) ∈ {(1, 12), (3, 22)}} = 22
avail(W2) = max{q | (i, q) ∈ {(2, 104)}} = 104
Based on these values, the mitigator picks worker 1 as the predicted worker
for the fourth input. The prediction for corresponding output is S 1(4) =
max(30, 22) + 100 = 130, and the prediction of worker 1 becomes {(1, 12),
(3, 22),(4, 130)}.
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4.7 Leakage analysis
As in Section 4.2, we use a combinatorial analysis to bound how much infor-
mation leaks via predictive mitigation in interactive systems. One difference is
that we take into account the interactive nature of our model and derive bounds
based on the number of input requests and the elapsed time. To conservatively
estimate leakage we bound the number of possible timing variations that an ad-
versary can observe, as a function of the running time T and the length of the
input history M.
We show that a leakage bound of O(logT × logM) can be attained, with a
constant factor that depends on the choice of penalty policy. When there is a
worst-case execution time for every request, a tighter leakage bound of O(logM)
can be derived.
4.7.1 Bounding the number of variations
To bound the number of possible timing variations, we need to know three val-
ues: (1) the number of timing variations within each epoch, (2) the number of
variations introduced by the schedule selector, and (3) the number of epochs.
Let us consider the number of variations within each epoch. Because mes-
sages within a single epoch are delivered according to predictions, the only
source of variations within an individual epoch is whether there is a mispre-
diction, and if so, when the misprediction occurs. This can be specified by the
length of the epoch. When the mitigator has received at most M messages, the
length of any single epoch can be at most M + 1.
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When the mitigator transitions from epoch n to epoch n + 1, it chooses the
schedule for the next epoch. Since the predictor can rely on public informa-
tion, the “schedule” is actually an algorithm parameterized by public inputs.
However, this algorithm may be chosen based on non-public inputs, in which
case the choice of schedule may convey additional information to the adversary.
Following Section 4.2, we denote by ΛN the number of possible schedules when
transitioning between epochs n and n+1. Its value depends on the details of the
schedule selector. For simple mitigation schemes, where the choice of the next
schedule does not depend on secrets, we have ΛN = 1. For adaptive mitigation
(Section 4.2.4), where the choice of schedule depends on internal state such as
the size of the mitigator’s message buffer, ΛN may be greater than one.
Consider a mitigator that at time T has received at most M requests and
reached at most N epochs. The number of possible timing variations of such a
mitigator is at most
(M + 1)N · Λ1 . . .ΛN
Measured in bits, the corresponding bound on leakage is the logarithm of the
number of variations:
N · log(M + 1) +
N∑
i=1
logΛi
Note that for the simple doubling scheme, because Λi = 1, we also have∑N
i=1 logΛi = 0.
We can enforce an arbitrary enforcing bound on leakage. Denote by B(T,M)
the amount of information permitted to be leaked by the mitigator. Enforcing
bound B(T,M) is satisfied if the mitigator ensures this inequality holds:
N · log(M + 1) +
N∑
i=1
logΛi ≤ B(T,M)
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This equation requires a relationship between the number of epochs, the
elapsed time, and the number of received messages. The exact nature of this
relationship is determined by penalty policies.
4.7.2 Penalty policies
Recall that the function p(S, r) predicts a bound on computation time for request
type r in state S. The intuition is that the more mispredictions have happened
in the past (as recorded in S), the larger is the value of p(S, r). The computation
is penalized by delivering its response later.
Designing a penalty policy function opens up a space of possibilities. The
question is how mispredictions on different request types are interconnected—
for example, whether a particular request type should be penalized for mispre-
dictions on other request types, and if so, then how much.
On one side of the spectrum, we can use a global penalty policy that penalizes
all request types when a misprediction occurs. If all request types are penalized,
it becomes harder to trigger mispredictions on any of them in future. Therefore,
this policy provides a tight bound on N. Intuitively, an adversary gains no addi-
tional power to leak information by switching between request types. However,
performance of all request types is hurt by mispredictions on any request type.
On the other end of the spectrum is a local penalty policy in which request
types are not penalized by mispredictions on other types. This improves per-
formance but offers weaker bounds on leakage. To see this, assume that the
number of mispredictions a single request type can make is N. Since penalties
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are not shared between request types, with R types, as many as R × N mispre-
dictions can occur. Timing leakage might be high if R is large; intuitively, the
adversary can attack each request type independently.
Aiming for more control of the tradeoff between security and performance,
we explore penalty policies that fill in the space between the global and local
penalty policies. The key insight is that the request types with few mispredic-
tions contribute little to total leakage, so they should share little penalty. This
insight brings an l-level grace period policy. In a l-level grace period policy, re-
quest type r is only penalized by other types when the number mispredictions
on r is greater than l.
For more complex penalty policies, leakage analysis becomes more challeng-
ing. In Section 4.7.4, we present an efficient and precise way of bounding N for
some penalty policies.
4.7.3 Generalized penalty policies
We refine the state S to record the number of mispredictions for each request
type. If mr denotes the number of mispredictions on request type r, the mitigator
state contains a vector of misprediction counts ~m = m1, . . . ,mR. Initially all mr are
zero. When the request type r has a misprediction, mr is increased by one. In the
following, we assume S = ~m, and write the penalty function as p(~m, r).
Recall that during an epoch, predictions for all types are met. Given a vector
of mispredictions ~m, the number of epochs N is simply N = 1+
∑R
i=1mi. Thus, the
problem of bounding N is the same as bounding the sum
∑R
i=1mi.
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For convenience, let us focus on a family of penalty functions p that are a
composition of three functions:
p(~m, r) = q(r) × (φ ◦ idx)(~m, r)
Here function φ(n) is a baseline penalty function, which given a penalty index
n returns the prediction for n. The penalty index represents how severely this
request type is penalized. It is computed by function idx(~m, r), which returns the
value of the index in the current state ~m for request type r. Finally, q(r) returns
an initial penalty for request type r, and allows us to model different initial
estimates of how long it takes to respond to the request of type r. For instance,
if one knows that request type r1 needs at least one second, and request type r2
needs at least 100 seconds, then one can set q(r1) = 1, q(r2) = 100.
Examples For penalty policies based on fast doubling, we set φ(n) = 2n, and
q(r) = q0 for all r with some initial quantum q0. For the global penalty policy,
idx can be set to idx(~m, r) =
∑R
i=1mi. For the local penalty policy, idx is chosen as
idx(~m, r) = mr. For an l-level grace period policy, we define idx to depend on the
parameter l:
idx(~m, r) =

mr if mr ≤ l∑R
i=1mi otherwise
4.7.4 Generalized leakage analysis
As discussed earlier, different penalty functions yield different bounds on N.
While it is possible to analyze such bounds for specific penalty policies, in gen-
eral it is hard to bound leakage for more complex penalty policies.
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This section describes a precise method for deriving such bounds for several
classes of penalty policies. We transform the problem of finding a bound on the
number of epochs N into an optimization problem with R constraints, where R
is the number of request types. These constraints can be nonlinear in general,
but all considered classes of penalty functions can be solved in constant time.
We focus on penalty functions where p(~m, r) is monotonic. Because mono-
tonicity is natural for a “penalty”, this requirement does not really constrain the
generality of the analysis.
State validity We write ~0 for the initial state ~0 in which no mispredictions have
happened. At the core of our analysis are two notions: state reachability and
state validity. Informally, a state ~m is reachable at time T if there is a sequence of
mispredictions that, starting from ~0, lead to ~m by time T . To bound the number
of possible epochs N at time T , it is sufficient to explore the set of all reachable
states, looking for ~m in which 1 +
∑R
i=1mi (and therefore N) is maximized.
Enumerating all reachable states may be infeasible. In particular, an exact
enumeration requires detailed assumptions about the thread model presented
in Section 4.6.2. Instead, we overapproximate the set of reachable states for
efficient searching of the resulting larger space.
For this, we define the notion of state validity at time T . State validity at
time T is similar to reachability at time T , except that we focus only on the
predicted time to respond to a request, ignoring the time needed to execute
earlier requests.
We first introduce the notion of a valid successor:
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Definition 9 (Valid successor) A state ~m′ is a valid successor of type j (1 ≤ j ≤ R)
for state ~m when m′j = m j + 1 and m
′
i = mi for i , j.
For example, with three different request types (R = 3), the state (0, 0, 1) is a
valid successor of type 3 for state ~0.
We can then define state validity:
Definition 10 (State validity for time T ) For penalty function p(~m, r), a state ~m is
a valid state for time T if there exists a sequence of request types j1, . . . jn−1, jn, such
that, if m0 = ~0, it holds that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
• ~mi is valid successor of type ji for state ~mi−1.
• p(~mi−1, r ji) ≤ T
• ~mn = ~m
The second condition approximates whether the state ~mi−1 can make one
more transition: if execution time is predicted to exceed T , no more transitions
are possible.
Note that we put no requirements on the predictions for ~mn. The reason is
that as long as there is a state ~mn−1 such that ~mn−1 can make one more mispre-
diction to ~mn, then it is possible to reach state ~mn. Validity does not depend on
whether the state can make one more transition In particular, this allows us to
include all states such that after misprediction from ~mn−1 we cannot have any
more mispredictions. These states are the candidates for maximizing N.
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Example Consider the simple case of one request type and time 6 with predic-
tion function p(~m, r) = 2mr .
State ~m = (3) is a valid state for time 6. Consider the request type sequence
1, 1, 1. We have ~m0 = ~0. Since ~m1 is a valid successor of type 1 for state ~m0, we
have ~m1 = (1). Similarly, we have ~m2 = (2) and ~m3 = (3). It is easy to check that
p(~m0) = 1 ≤ 6, p(~m1) = 2 ≤ 6 and p(~m2) = 4 ≤ 6. Since ~m3 = ~m, ~m is valid by
definition.
However, state ~m′ = (4) is not valid. Otherwise, since there is only one request
type in this example, jn must be 1. Therefore, ~mn−1 must be (3) because ~mn is a
valid successor of type 1 for ~mn−1. However, p(~mn−1) = 8 > 6. This contracts the
definition of validity.
Transforming to an optimization problem
In this part, we show how to get the maximal
∑R
i=1mi among all valid states
when prediction function p(~m, r) is monotonic. First, we show a useful lemma.
Lemma 15 Assume p(~m, r) is monotonic. If ~m is a valid successor of some type j for
~m′ such that p(~m′, j) ≤ T , then
~m = (m1, . . . ,mR) is valid for T ⇐⇒ ~m′′ = (m1, . . . ,m j−1, 0,m j+1, . . . ,mR) is valid for T
Proof. ⇐=: since ~m′′ is valid, there is sequence of request types where all in-
termediate states satisfy the constraints. Further, we can construct a sequence
of request types from ~m′′ to ~m by appending j to the previous sequence until
~mi = ~m. Since p(~m′, j) ≤ T and p is monotonic, all new states corresponding to
this sequence still satisfy the constraints.
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=⇒: by definition, there is a sequence of request types r1, . . . , rn such that all
intermediate states satisfy constraints. Moreover, there must be a point i in this
sequence such that ∀l < i, rl , j and ri = j. Thus, the j-th element of ~mi−1 is 0.
Then, a new sequence of request types p1, . . . , pm exists such that pl = rl, 0 ≤
l ≤ i − 1. For l ≥ i, if rl = j, skip this type. Otherwise, add the same type to
sequence ~p. By this construction, two properties of states occurring with ~p are
that the j-th element is always 0, and that there is a corresponding state with
sequence ~r such that they only differ in the j-th element. We denote the final
states with request type sequence ~r, ~p as ~mr and ~mp respectively. Since state ~mr
satisfies p(~mr, rl) ≤ T , by monotonicity, corresponding state ~mp also satisfies this
condition. Since mrn = ~m′′, ~m′′ is valid at T . 
Lemma 15 allows us to describe valid states by R constraints. To see this,
first observe that because ~m is valid for T , there are some j1 and ~m′ such that ~m
is a valid successor of ~m′ of type j1. By Definition 9, p(~m′, j1) ≤ T . This is our
first constraint on the space of valid states.
By Lemma 15, the validity of ~m for T implies the validity of
(m1, ...,m j1−1, 0, . . . ,mR) for T . Repeating the previous step, there is some j2 , j1
and ~m′′ where (m1, ...,m j1−1, 0, . . . ,mR) is a valid successor of ~m′′ of type j2; this
gives us the second constraint, p(~m′′, j2) ≤ T . Proceeding as above, we obtain R
constraints such that ~m is valid iff all constraints are satisfied.
Based on the properties of p, our analysis proceeds as follows. We present
two different classes of p in the order of difficulty of analyzing them, starting
from the easiest.
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Symmetric predictions We first look at prediction policies in which all request
types are penalized symmetrically:
1. for all i, j, such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ R it holds that p(m1, . . . ,mi, . . . ,m j, . . .mR, i) =
p(m1, . . . ,m j, . . . ,mi, . . .mR, j).
2. for all i, j, k, such that 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ R, where i , k, and j , k it holds that
p(m1, . . . ,mi, . . .m j, . . .mR, k) = p(m1, . . . ,m j, . . .mi, . . .mR, k).
These properties allow us to reorder the request types in R constraints that we
have obtained earlier. For example, the first of the obtained constraints can be
rewritten as p((m j1 − 1, . . . ,mR), 1) ≤ T. Moreover, this allows us to rename the
variables in the constraints without loss of generality:
p((m1 − 1,m2, . . . ,mR), 1) ≤ T
p((0,m2 − 1, . . . ,mR), 2) ≤ T
. . .
p((0, 0, . . . ,mR − 1),R) ≤ T
Thus, bounding N is equivalent to finding the maximum sum
∑R
i=1mi satis-
fying all the conditions.
Examples It is easy to verify that starting with same initial quantum, global,
local, and l-level grace period policies penalize all request types symmetrically.
We proceed with the analysis of these policies below.
1. Consider the global penalty function with fast doubling and the starting
quantum q0 = 1. The j-th constraint in the above system has the form
2(
∑R
i= j mi−1) ≤ T
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Here, N = 1+
∑R
i=1mi ≤ logT + 2. This is very close to the bound log(T + 1)+ 1
given in Section 4.2.3.1
Using the leakage bound derived in Section 4.7.4, we obtain that for global
penalty policy, when the mitigator runs for at most time T the leakage is
bounded by function B(T,M) where
B(T,M) = (logT + 2) · log(M + 1)
2. Now consider the local penalty policy with the same penalty scheme and
initial quantum. We have R constraints of the form:
2mi−1 ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ R
It is easy to derive N ≤ R · (logT + 1) + 1.
Using this bound for N, we obtain that at running time time T , leakage is
bounded by function B(T,M,R) such that
B(T,M,R) = (R · (logT + 1) + 1) · log(M + 1)
3. We revisit the l-level grace period policy last. In this case, the j-th con-
straint can be split into two cases:
m j − 1 ≤ logT when m j − 1 ≤ l∑R
i= jmi − 1 ≤ logT when m j − 1 > l
In general, l is ordinarily smaller than logT , so N is maximized when mi = l +
1, 1 ≤ i ≤ R − 1 and mR = blogT c + 1. Thus, N ≤ (R − 1) · (l + 1) + logT + 2.
1Though Section 4.2.3 does not consider request types, the penalty policies considered there
are effectively global penalty policies.
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Using this bound for N we obtain that at running time T , leakage is bounded
by function B(T,M,R, l) such that
B(T,M,R, l) = log(M + 1) · ((R − 1) · (l + 1) + logT + 2)
Partially symmetric predictions Request types starting with different initial
quanta, such as the setup in Section 4.7.5, make the prediction function asym-
metric. We proceed as follows.
Let qmin = minRi=1 q(r), and replace p(r) with qmin for all prediction functions.
The upper bound N of these replaced functions overapproximates that of asym-
metric functions, since any valid state using the latter functions must be valid
for the former ones. Therefore, we can obtain R constraints based on these re-
placed symmetric functions, as for symmetric predictions.
Non-symmetric predictions For other types of penalty functions, we can still
try to partition request types into subsets such that in each subset, request types
are penalized symmetrically. We then generate constraints for validity of these
well-formed subsets.
More formally, we say a vector of mispredictions ~m′ is a subvector of ~m if and
only if m′i = 0 ∨ m′i = mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ R. A set of vectors ~m1, . . . , ~mk is a partition of ~m if
all vectors are subvectors of ~m and for all mi, there is one and only one ~m j such
that m ji = mi.
The following lemma shows that the condition that ~m is valid is stronger
than the validity of all subvectors. Thus, the constraints on vectors in a partition
overapproximates those on the validity of ~m.
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Lemma 16 When p(~m, r) is monotonic, ~m is valid at time T =⇒ any subvector of ~m
is valid at time T .
Proof. By definition, there is a sequence of request types j1, . . . , jn such that all
conditions in Definition 10 are satisfied. For any subvector of ~m, say ~m′, we can
take a projection of the sequence so that only the request types nonzero in the
subvector are kept.
By monotonicity, it is easy to check that all conditions hold in the definition.
Moreover, ~mn = ~m′. So ~m′ is valid by definition. 
Since there are R non-zero mispredictions among all vectors in the partition,
this estimation still gives R constraints.
4.7.5 Security vs. performance
As discussed informally earlier, the global penalty policy enforces the best leak-
age bound but has bad performance; the local penalty policy has the best per-
formance but more leakage. We explore this tradeoff between security and per-
formance through simulations.
Simulation setup We simulate a set of interactive system services character-
ized by various distributions over execution time. Initial penalty is set to be the
mean of the execution time distribution. The fast doubling scheme is used, so
the prediction function is p(~m, r) = q(r) × 2idx(~m,r), where q(r) is the mean time of
simulated type r. The form of idx(~m, r) is defined by penalty policies.
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Figure 4.11: Performance vs. security.
To see the performance for requests with different variances in execution
time, we simulate both regular types and irregular types. For regular types, the
simulated execution time follows Poisson distribution with different means,
since page view requests to a web page can be modeled as a Poisson process; for
irregular types, execution time follows a perturbed normal distribution which
avoids negative execution time.
Result The results in Figure 4.11 demonstrate the impact of execution-time
variation on performance. The x-axis in Figure 4.11 shows the bound on number
of epochs N and the y-axis shows the slowdown for all simulated request types.
All values shown are normalized so that the local policy has a slowdown of 1
and so that for the number of epochs, the global policy has value 1. The standard
deviation is equal to the mean multiplied by a factor ranging from 23 to 27,
generating around 3 to 7 mispredictions. The number on each line denotes the
grace-period level.
The results confirm the intuition that the global penalty policy has the best
security but bad performance, and the local policy has the best performance.
However, the l-level grace period policies have considerably fewer epochs N,
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yet performance similar to that of the local policy when l is no less than mri for
most types.
When the variance of execution time increases, small grace-period level
(l = 3, 4) can bring slowdown that is orders of magnitude higher than in the
global case. The reason is that each irregular request type can trigger l mispre-
dictions. Once misprediction of a request type is larger than l, idx(~m, r) returns
a large number. However using a larger grace-period level (l = 5) could restore
performance at the cost of more leakage.
Penalty policies with other forms are possible to provide more options be-
tween the trade-off of security and performances. We leave a more comprehen-
sive analysis of more penalty policies as future work.
4.7.6 Leakage with a worst-case execution time
In the analysis above, no assumption is made about execution time for each
request type. The adversary can delay responses for an arbitrarily long time to
covertly convey more information.
However, for some specific platforms, such as real-time systems and web
applications with a timeout setting, we can assume a worst-case execution time
Tw. Given this constraint, we can derive a tighter leakage bound.
The analysis works similarly to that in Section 4.7.3, but instead of using the
conservative constraint p(~mi−1, r ji) ≤ T as in Definition 10, worst-case execution
time provides a tighter estimate:
p(~mi−1, r ji) ≤ Tw
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Compared with bounding running time T , this condition more precisely ap-
proximates whether the state ~mi−1 can make one more misprediction to ~mi. The
reason is that whenever p(~mi−1, r ji) > Tw, the state ~mi−1 cannot have another mis-
prediction because execution is bounded by Tw. Therefore, we can reuse the
bound on the number of epochs in Section 4.7.3 by replacing T with Tw.
For example, total leakage with the assumption of worst-case execution time
Tw for the global penalty policy is bounded by
B(T,M) = (logTw + 2) · log(M + 1)
This logarithmic bound is asymptotically the same as that achieved by the
less general bucketing scheme proposed by Ko¨pf et al. [45] for cryptographic
timing channels.
For the l-grace-period penalty policy we can perform a similar analysis to
derive a bound on leakage:
B(T,M,R, l) = log(M + 1) · ((R − 1) · (l + 1) + logTw + 2)
4.8 Composing mitigators
If timing mitigation is used, we can expect large systems to be built by compos-
ing mitigated subsystems. Here, we analyze leakage of composed mitigators.
We analyze composed mitigators by considering the leakage of two gad-
gets: two mitigators connected either in parallel or sequentially (Figures 4.12
and 4.13). More complex systems with mitigated subsystems can be analyzed
by decomposing them into these gadgets.
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Figure 4.12: Parallel composition of mitigators.
S M S'  M'O1 O2
Figure 4.13: Sequential composition of mitigators.
Parallel composition Figure 4.12 is an example of parallel composition of mit-
igators, in which requests received by the system are handled by two indepen-
dent mitigators. The bound on the leakage of the parallel composition is no
greater than the sum of the bounds of the independent mitigators. To see this,
denote by P the total number of variations of the parallel composition, and de-
note by V1 and V2 the number of timing variations of the first and second mitiga-
tors, respectively. We know P ≤ V1 ·V2; consequently, the total leakage of parallel
composition log P is bounded by logV1 + logV2. The same argument generalizes
to n mitigators in parallel.
Sequential composition Suppose we have a security-critical component, such
as an encryption function, and leakage from this component is controlled by a
mitigator that guarantees a tight bound, say at most 10 bits of the encryption
key. We can show that once mitigated, leakage of the encryption key can never
exceed 10 bits, no matter how output of that component is used in the system.
This is true for both Shannon-entropy and min-entropy definitions of leakage.
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Consider sequential composition of two systems as depicted in Figure 4.13.
Suppose that the secrets in the first system are S , and that the outputs of the first
and the second mitigators are O1 and O2 respectively. We consider how much
the output of each of the mitigators leaks about S .
We can view the outputs O1 and O2 as discrete random variables. Since the
second service and its mitigator do not share secret S , the conditional distribu-
tion of O2 depends only on O1 and is conditionally independent of S (in other
words, random variables S ,O1,O2 form a Markov chain). Denoting the proba-
bility mass function of a discrete random variable X as P(X), the joint distribu-
tion of these three random variables has probability mass function P(s, o1, o2) =
P(s)P(o1|s)P(o2|o1). The marginal distribution P(o2, s) is ∑o1∈O1 P(s, o1, o2), and for
any o1, we have
∑
o2∈O2 P(o2|o1) = 1.
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, the leakage of the first mitigator using mutual
information is I(S ;O1) and the leakage of the second is I(S ;O2). Then we can
show that the second mitigator leaks no more information about S 1 than the
first does. We formalize this in the following lemma.
Lemma 17 I(S ;O1) ≥ I(S ;O2)
Proof. The proof follows from the standard data-processing inequality [20] and
the symmetry of mutual information:
I(S ;O2) + I(S ;O1|O2) = I(S ;O1,O2)
= I(S ;O1) + I(S ;O2|O1)
Note that S and O2 are conditionally independent given O1, since the second
mitigator produces outputs based on only the output of the first mitigator M,
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public inputs, and secrets other than S . Thus I(S ;O2|O1) = 0. Replacing this
term with zero in the above equation, we get
I(S ;O2) + I(S ;O1|O2) = I(S ;O1)
Also, we know that I(S ;O1|O2) ≥ 0, so we have
I(S ;O1) ≥ I(S ;O2)

A similar result holds for min-entropy leakage.
Lemma 18 V(S |O1) ≥ V(S |O2)
Proof. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, min-entropy channel capacity is defined
as the maximal value of log V(S |O)V(S ) among all distributions on S . So it suffices to
show V(S |O1) ≥ V(S |O2) for any distribution on S .
V(S |O2) =
∑
o2∈O2
max
s∈S
P(s)P(o2|s)
=
∑
o2∈O2
max
s∈S
∑
o1∈O1
P(s, o1, o2)
=
∑
o2∈O2
max
s∈S
∑
o1∈O1
P(s)P(o1|s)P(o2|o1)
≤
∑
o2∈O2
∑
o1∈O1
P(o2|o1) max
s∈S
P(s)P(o1|s)
=
∑
o1∈O1
max
s∈S
(P(s)P(o1|s))
∑
o2∈O2
P(o2|o1)
=
∑
o1∈O1
max
s∈S
P(s)P(o1|s)
= V(S |O1)
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Discussion Parallel and sequential composition results enable deriving con-
servative bounds for networks of composed subsystems. The bounds derived
may be quite conservative in the case where parallel mitigated systems have
no secrets of their own to leak. If the graph of subsystems contains cycles, it
cannot be decomposed into these two gadgets. We leave a more comprehensive
analysis of mitigator composition to future work.
4.9 Experiments
To evaluate the performance and information leakage of generalized timing mit-
igation, we implemented mitigators for different applications. The widely used
Apache Tomcat web container was modified to mitigate a local hosted appli-
cation. We also developed a mitigating web proxy to estimate the overhead of
mitigating real-world applications—a non-trivial homepage that results in 49
different requests and a HTTPS webmail service that requires stronger security.
We explored how to tune this general mechanism for different security and
performance requirements. The results show that predictive mitigation does
slow down applications to some extent; we suggest the slowdown is acceptable
for some applications.
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4.9.1 Mitigator design and its limitations
We define the system boundary in the following way. Inputs enter the system
at the point when Tomcat dispatches requests to the servlet or JSP code. Results
returned from this code are considered outputs. Thus, all timing leakage arising
during the processing of the servlet and the JSP files is mitigated.
This implementation of mitigation has limitations. Because of shared hard-
ware and operating-system resources such as filesystem caches, memory caches,
buses, and the network, the time required to deliver an application response
may convey information about sensitive application data. Our current imple-
mentation strategy, chosen for ease of implementation, prevents fully address-
ing these timing channels where they affect timing outside the system boundary
as defined.
To completely mitigate timing channels, mitigation should be integrated
at the operating system and hardware levels. For example, the TCP/IP stack
might be extended to support delaying packets until a mitigator-specified time.
With such an extension, all timing channels, including low-level interactions
via hardware caches and bus contention, would be fully mitigated. Although
we leave the design of such a mechanism to future work, we see no reason why
a more complete mitigation mechanism would significantly change the perfor-
mance and security results reported here.
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4.9.2 Mitigator implementation
We implemented the mitigator as a Java library containing 201 lines of Java
source code, excluding comments and the configuration file. This library pro-
vides two functions:
Mitigator startMitigation (String requestType);
void endMitigation (Mitigator miti);
The function startMitigation should be invoked when an input is avail-
able to the system, passing an application-specific request type identifier. The
function endMitigation is used by the application when an output is ready,
passing the mitigator for the related input. Calling endMitigation blocks the
current thread until the time predicted by the mitigator.
Instead of optimizing for specific applications, we heuristically choose the
following parameters for all experiments: 1. Initial penalty: the initial penalty
for all request types is 50 ms, a delay short enough to be unnoticeable to the
user. 2. Penalty policy: we use the 5-level grace period policy since it provides
good tradeoff between security and performance as shown in 4.7.5. 3. Penalty
function: most requests are returned within 250 ms, and the distribution is quite
even. We evenly divide the first 5 epochs to make predictions more precise: 50
ms, 100 ms, 150 ms, 200 ms, 250 ms, doubling progressively thereafter. 4. Worst-
case execution time Tw: We assume worst-case execution time for requests Tw to
be 300 seconds. This is consistent with Firefox browser version 3.6.12, which
uses this value as a default timeout parameter.
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4.9.3 Leakage revisited
Applying the experiment settings into the formula from Section 4.7.6 with R
request types, the following leakage bound obtains:
((R − 1) · (l + 1) + (logTw + 2)) · log(M + 1)
=((R − 1) · 6 + (log 300000 + 2)) · log(M + 1)
≤(6 · R + 15) · log(M + 1)
where M is the number of inputs using the simple doubling scheme.
Intuitively, introducing more request types helps make the prediction more
precise for each request, because processing time varies for different kinds of
requests. However, the leakage bound is proportional to the number of request
types. So it is important to find the right tradeoff between latency and security.
4.9.4 Latency and throughput
To enable the mitigation of unmodified web applications, we modified the open
source Java Servlet and JavaServer Pages container Tomcat 6.0.29 using the mit-
igation library.
Experiment setup Mitigating Tomcat requires only three lines of Java code:
one line generating a request type id from the HTTP request, one line to start
the mitigation, and another line to end mitigation after the servlet is finished.
We deployed a JSP wiki application, JSPWiki2, in the mitigating Tomcat server
2http://www.jspwiki.org
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Figure 4.14: Wiki latency with and without mitigation.
to evaluate how mitigation affects both latency and throughput. Measurements
were made using the Apache HTTP server benchmarking tool ab.3 Since we
focus on the latency and throughput overhead of requesting the main page of
the wiki application, the URI is used as the request type identifier.
Results We measured the latency and throughput of the main page of JSPWiki
for both the mitigated and unmitigated versions. We used a range of different
concurrency settings in ab, controlling the number of multiple requests to per-
form at a time. The size of the Tomcat thread pool is 200 threads in the current
implementation. For each setting, we measured the throughput for 5 minutes.
The results are shown in Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15.
When the concurrency level is 1—the sequential case—the unmitigated Wiki
application has a latency around 11ms. Since the initial penalty is selected to be
50ms in our experiments, the average mitigated latency rises to about 57ms:
about 400% overhead. This is simply an artifact of the choice of initial penalty.
As we increase the number of concurrent requests, the unmitigated appli-
3http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.0/programs/ab.html
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Figure 4.15: Wiki throughput with and without mitigation.
cation exhibits more latency, because concurrent requests compete for limited
resources. On the other hand, the mitigation system is predicting this delayed
time, and we can see that these predictions introduce less overhead: at most
90% after the concurrency level of 50; an even smaller overhead is found for
higher concurrency levels.
The throughput with concurrency level 1 is much reduced from the unmit-
igated case: only about 1/5 of the original throughput. However, when the
concurrency level reaches 50, throughput increases significantly in both cases,
and the mitigated version has 52.73% of the throughput of the unmitigated ver-
sion. For higher levels of concurrency, the throughput of the two versions is
mostly similar.
4.9.5 Real-world applications with proxy
We evaluated the latency overhead of predictive mitigation on existing real-
world web servers. To avoid the need to deploy predictive mitigation directly
on production web servers, we introduce a mitigating proxy between the client
browser and the target host. We modified an open source Java HTTP/HTTPS
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proxy, LittleProxy4, to use the mitigation library, adding about 70 LOC. We used
it to evaluate latency with two remote web servers: a HTTP web page and an
HTTPS webmail service.
With mitigation again done entirely at user level, timing channels that arise
outside the mitigation boundary cannot be mitigated. The mitigation boundary
is defined as follows: the mitigating proxy treats requests from client browser
as inputs, and forwards these requests to the host. The response from the host
is regarded as an output in the black-box model.
The proxy mitigates both the response time of the server and the round-
trip time between the proxy and server. Only the first part corresponds to real
variation that would occur with a mitigating web server. To estimate this part
of latency overhead, we put the proxy in a local network with the real host.
Because we found measured little variation in this configuration, the results
here should estimate latency for real-world applications reasonably accurately.
HTTP web page
Unlike the previous stress test that requests only one URL, we evaluated la-
tency overhead using a non-trivial HTTP web page, a university home page
that causes 49 different requests to the server. Multiple requests bring up the
opportunity of tuning the tradeoff between security and performance. Various
ways to choose request types were explored:
1. TYPE/HOST: all URLs residing on the same host are treated as one request
type, that is, they are predicted the same way.
4http://www.littleshoot.org/littleproxy/index.html
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Figure 4.16: Latency for an HTTP web page.
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Figure 4.17: Leakage bound for an HTTP web page.
2. HOST+URLTYPE: requests on the same host are predicted differently
based on the URL type of the request. We distinguish URL types based on the
file types, such as JPEG files, CSS files and so on. Each of them corresponds to a
different request type.
3. TYPE/URL: individual URLs are predicted differently.
Figure 4.16 shows the latency of loading the whole page and the num-
ber of request types with these options. The results show that latency in the
most restrictive TYPE/HOST case almost triples that of the unmitigated case.
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HOST+URLTYPE and TYPE/URL options have similar latency results, with
about 30% latency overhead.
From the security point of view, the TYPE/HOST option only results in
two request types: one host is in the organization, and the other one is
google-analytics.com, used for the search component in the main page.
HOST+URLTYPE introduces 6 more request types, while using the TYPE/URL
option, there are as many as 49 request types. The information leakage bounds
for different options are shown in Figure 4.17.
The HOST+URLTYPE choice provides a reasonable tradeoff between secu-
rity and performance: it has roughly a 30% latency overhead, yet information
leakage is below 850 bits for 100,000 requests.
HTTPS webmail service
We also evaluate the latency with a webmail service based on Windows Ex-
change Server. After the user passes Kerberos-based authentication (Auth), he
is redirected to the login page (Login) and may then see the list of emails (List)
or read a message (Email).
Request type selection This application accesses sensitive data, so we eval-
uate performance with the most restrictive scheme: one request type per host.
There are actually two hosts: one host is used to serve only AuthPage.
Results We measured the latency overhead of four representative pages for
this service. Each page generates from 6 to 45 different requests. The results in
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Figure 4.18: Latency overhead for HTTPS webmail service.
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Figure 4.19: Leakage bound for HTTPS webmail service.
Figure 4.18 show that the latency overhead ranges from 2 times to 4 times for
these four pages; in the worst case, latency is still less than 1 second. Also, this
overhead can be reduced with different request type selection options.
Figure 4.19 shows the information leakage bound of this mitigated applica-
tion. The leakage is limited to about 300 bits after 100,000 requests and grows
very slowly thereafter.
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4.10 Related work
Cryptographic side-channels One major motivation for controlling timing
channels is the protection of cryptographic keys against side-channels arising
from timing cryptographic operations. A variety of attacks that exploit timing
side-channels have been demonstrated [13, 43]. Cryptographic blinding [15, 43]
is a standard technique for mitigating such channels.
Ko¨pf et al. [45, 46] introduced the mechanism of bucketing to mitigate timing
side channels in cryptographic operations, achieving asymptotically logarith-
mic bounds on information leakage but with stronger assumptions than in this
work. Their security analyses rely on the timing behavior of the system agree-
ing with a previously measured distribution of times; therefore they implicitly
assume that the adversary does not control timing, and that there is a worst-case
execution time. The bucketing approach does not achieve logarithmic bounds
for general computation.
Quantitative information flow We advocate a quantitative approach to con-
trolling information flow through timing channels. Like much other work on
quantitative information flow [16, 53, 45, 46] we draw on information theory to
obtain bounds on leakage. Millen [54] first observed that noninterference im-
plies zero channel capacity between high and low. DiPierro et. al [69] quantify
timing leaks in a language-based setting. Epoch-based mitigation is similar in
spirit to Mode Security [12] which reduces covert channels to changes in modes.
Unlike Mode Security, we also account for leakage within epochs, via a combi-
natorial analysis.
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Mitigation of timing attacks Giles and Hajek present a comprehensive study
of timing channels [27] in which packet arrival is represented by continuous or
discrete waveforms. Similarly to us, they employ periodic quantization. How-
ever, because of the constant periods, the reduction of the timing channel band-
width is only linear. Another difference lies in the semantics of buffer bounds:
while they assume that a jammer has to release a packet from the queue when a
buffer is full, our mitigators block the input source.
One prior approach to timing channel mitigation is adding noise to timing
measurements. There are two ways to do this. First, we can add random delays
to the time taken by various operations, which reduces the bandwidth of the
timing channel, as in [36, 27]. Adding random delays sacrifices performance,
and it does not asymptotically eliminate timing channels, since the noise can
be eliminated to whatever degree is desired by averaging over a sequence of
identical requests. Methods for creating covert timing robust against added
noise have been demonstrated [51].
A second approach to mitigation, also used in [36], is that programs that
read clocks are given results with random noise. This method only applies to
internal timing channels that are based on reading clocks directly.
Wray [90] views every covert channel that originates from comparing two
clocks as a timing channel. In this light, we focus on the channels that arise from
comparing timing of the events to external reference clock that is not modulated
by the attacker. Our results of Section 4.2.5 can be interpreted as mixing external
timing channels and all other covert channels.
The NRL Pump [40] and its follow-ups, like Network Pump [41], are also
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network service handling that handle requests. The Pump work addresses tim-
ing channels arising from message acknowledgments (which correspond to but
are less general than outputs in this work). Acknowledgment timing is stochas-
tically modulated using a moving average of past activity, and leakage in one
window does not affect later windows. Therefore the NRL/Network Pumps
can enforce only a linear leakage bound.
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CHAPTER 5
LANGUAGE-BASED QUANTITATIVE CONTROL
OF TIMING CHANNELS
The programming language in Chapter 2 disallows execution time depending
on confidential information in any way. The limitation is that such a restrictive
language can be impractical for applications where a limited amount of infor-
mation leakage is allowed.
This chapter integrates the general predictive mitigation framework (Chap-
ter 4) into the programming language in Chapter 2. The result is a permissive
programming model which allows tight timing leakage bounds for applications.
5.1 A language with quantitative timing channel leakage
Figure 5.1 gives the full syntax for a simple imperative language for quantitative
timing channel control. Compared with the syntax in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.1), the
new part is the shaded mitigate command. As a technical convenience, each
mitigate in the source has a unique identifier η. These identifiers are mainly
used in Section 5.2; they are omitted where they are not essential.
e ::= n | x | e op e
c ::= skip[`r ,`w] | (x := e)[`r ,`w] | c; c | (while e do c)[`r ,`w]
| (if e then c1 else c2)[`r ,`w]
| (mitigateη (e, `) c)[`r ,`w] | (sleep e)[`r ,`w]
Figure 5.1: Syntax of the full language with the mitigate command.
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〈(mitigate (e, `) c)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈c,m〉
Figure 5.2: Core semantics of the mitigate command.
Γ ` e : ` pc v `w Γ, pc, τ unionsq ` unionsq `r ` c : τ′ τ′ v `′
Γ, pc, τ ` (mitigate (e, `′) c)[`r ,`w] : ` unionsq τ unionsq `r
T-MTG
Figure 5.3: Typing rules: the mitigate command.
For mitigate we give an identity semantics for now: mitigate (e, `) c simply
evaluates to c.
Unlike other rules presented in Figure 3.5, the typing rule for mitigate com-
mand (T-MTG) does not propagate the timing end-labels of subcommands. In-
tuitively, this command “declassifies” information, justified by dynamic mech-
anisms that tighten information leakage from the mitigated commands. Like
other rules, we require pc v `w. This restriction, together with Property 5 in Sec-
tion 2.3.6, ensures that no confidential information about control flow leaks to
the low parts of the machine environment.
In the added rule (T-MTG), the end-label τ′ from command c is bounded by
mitigation label `′, but τ′ does not propagate to the end-label of the mitigate.
Instead, the end-label of the mitigate command only accounts for the timing
of evaluating expression e. This is because the predictive mitigation mechanism
used at run time controls how c’s timing leaks information.
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5.2 Quantitative properties of the type system
The type system in Chapter 2 identifies potential timing channels in a program.
We now introduce a quantitative measure of leakage for multilevel systems, and
show that the type system for the extended language with mitigate command
quantitatively bounds leakage through both timing and storage channels. The
main result of this section is that information leakage can be bounded in the
terms of the variation in the execution time of mitigate commands alone.
5.2.1 Adversary observations
As discussed earlier in Section 2.3.4, an adversary at level `A observes memory,
including timing of updates to memory, at levels up to `A. The adversary does
not directly observe the time of termination of the program, but this is easily
simulated by adding a final low assignment to the program. To formally define
adversary observations, we refine our presentation of the language semantics
with observable assignment events.
Observable assignment events Let α ∈ {(x, v, t), } range over observable
events, which can be either an assignment to variable x of value v at time t,
or an empty event . An event (x, v,G′) is generated by assignment transitions
〈x := e,m, E,G〉 → 〈stop,m′, E′,G′〉, where 〈m, e〉 ⇓ v, and by all transitions
whose derivation includes a subderivation of such a transition.
We write 〈c,m, E,G〉 V (x, v, t) if configuration 〈c,m, E,G〉 produces a se-
quence of events (x, v, t) = (x1, v1, t1) . . . (xn, vn, tn) and reaches a final configura-
tion 〈stop,m′, E′,G′〉 for some m′, E′,G′.
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`A-observable events An event (x, v, t) is observable to the adversary at level `A
when Γ(x) v `A. Given a configuration 〈c,m, E,G〉 such that 〈c,m, E,G〉V (x, v, t),
we write 〈c,m, E,G〉V`A (x′, v′, t′) for the longest subsequence of (x, v, t) such that
for all events (xi, vi, ti) in (x′, v′, t′) it holds that Γ(xi) v `A.
For example, for program l1 := l2; h1 := l1, the H-adversary observes two
assignments: 〈c,m, E,G〉 VH (l1, v1, t1), (h1, v2, t2) for some v1, t1, v2 and t2. For
the L-adversary, we have 〈c,m, E,G〉 VL (l1, v1, t1), which does not include the
assignment to h1.
5.2.2 Measuring leakage in a multilevel environment
Using `A-observable events, we can define a novel information-theoretic mea-
sure of leakage: leakage from a set of security levels L to an adversary level `A.
We start with an observation on our adversary model and the corresponding
auxiliary definition.
Because an adversary observes all levels up to `A, we can exclude these se-
curity levels from the ones that give new information. Let L`A be the subset of
L that excludes all levels observable to `A, that is L`A , {`′ | `′ ∈ L ∧ `′ @ `A}. For
example, for a three-level lattice L v M v H, with `A = M, if L = {M,H} then
L`A = {H}.
Figure 5.4(a) illustrates a general form of this definition. The adversary level
`A is represented by the white point; the levels observable to the adversary cor-
respond to the small rectangular area under the point `A. The set of security
levels L is represented by the dashed rectangle (though in general this set does
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(a) Leakage from L to `A (b) Variations with Lv
Figure 5.4: Quantitative leakage.
not have to be contiguous). The gray area corresponds to the security levels that
are in L`A .
Leakage from L to `A We measure the quantitative leakage as the logarithm
(base 2) of the number of distinguishable observations of the adversary—the
possible (x, v, t) sequences—from indistinguishable memory and machine envi-
ronments. As shown in Section 4.1.2, this measure bounds those of Shannon
entropy and min-entropy, used in the literature [21, 54, 77].
Definition 11 (Quantitative leakage from L to `A ) Given any `A, m, and E, the
leakage of program c from levels L to level `A, denoted by Q(L, `A, c,m, E) is defined as
follows
Q(L, `A, c,m, E) , log(| {(x, v, t) | ∃m′, E′ . (∀`′ . `′ < L`A .
m '`′ m′ ∧ E '`′ E′) ∧ 〈c,m′, E′, 0〉V`A (x, v, t)} |)
This definition usesL`A to restrict the quantification of the memory and machine
environments so that we allow variations only in L`A parts of memory and ma-
chine environments. This is expressed by requiring projected equivalence (on
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the second line of the definition) for all levels `′ not in L`A . Visually, using Fig-
ure 5.4(a), this captures the flows from the gray area to the lower rectangle.
Note that the definition distinguishes flows between different levels. For
example, in a three-level security lattice L v M v H and a program sleep (h)
where h has level H, the leakage from {M} to L is zero even though flow from
{H} to L is not.
5.2.3 Guarantees of the type system
The type system provides an important property: leakage from L to `A is
bounded by the timing variation of the mitigate commands whose mitigation
level `′ is in the upward closure of L`A .
Upward closure In order to correctly approximate leakage from levels in L`A ,
we need to account for all levels that are as restrictive as the ones in L`A . For
example, in a three-level lattice L v M v H, let L be the set {M}, and let `A = L;
then L`A = {M}. Information from M can flow to H, so in order to account
conservatively for leakage from {M}, we must also account for leakage from
H. Our definitions therefore use the upward closure of L`A , written as L`A↑ ,
{`′ | ∃` ∈ L`A ∧ ` v `′}. In this example, L`A↑ = {M,H}. Figure 5.4(b) illustrates
the relationship between L`A and its upper closure, where L`A↑ includes both
shaded areas of gray.
Trace and projection of mitigate commands Next, we focus on the amount of
time a mitigate command takes to execute. Recall from Section 5.1 that each
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mitigate in a program source has an η-identifier. For brevity, we refer to the
command mitigateη as Mη. Consider trace 〈c,m, E,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′, E′,G′〉. We
overload the notation for V, by writing 〈c,m, E,G〉 V (M, t), where (M, t) is a
vector of mitigate commands executed in the above trace. The vector consists
of the individual tuples (M, t) = (Mη1 , t1) . . . (Mηn , tn) where (Mηi , ti) are ordered
by the time of completion, and each (Mηi , ti) corresponds to a mitigateηi taking
time ti to execute.
Further, we define the projection of mitigate commands (M, t) f as the longest
subsequence of (M, t), such that each (Mη, t) in the subsequence satisfies the
predicate f.
Low-determinism of mitigate commands Consider the following well-typed
program that uses mitigate twice.
mitigate1(1,H) {
if (high)
then mitigate2(1, H) { h:=h+1 }
else skip; }
Let us write pc(Mη) for the value of the pc-label at program point η. It is easy to
see that pc(M1) = L, and pc(M2) = H. Because M2 is nested within M1, the timing
of M2 is accumulated in the timing of M1. Therefore, when reasoning about the
timing of the whole program, it is sufficient to only reason about the timing
of M1. In general, given a set of levels L, an adversary level `A, and a vector
(M, t), we filter high mitigate commands by the projection (M, t)  pc(Mη)<L`A↑.
This projection consists of all the mitigate commands whose pc-label is in the
white area in Figure 5.4(b).
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Filtering out high mitigate commands rules out unrelated variations in the
mitigate commands. It turns out that in well-typed programs, the occurrence
of the remaining low mitigate commands is deterministic (we call these com-
mands low-deterministic). This result, formalized in the following lemma, is used
in the derivation of leakage bounds in Section 5.3.
Lemma 19 (Low-determinism of mitigate commands). For all programs c such that
Γ ` c, adversary levels `A, sets of security levels L, and memories and environments
E1, E2,m1,m2 such that (∀`′ < L`A↑ . E1 '`′ E2 ∧ m1 '`′ m2), we have
〈c,m1, E1, 0〉V (M1, t1)∧〈c,m2, E2, 0〉V (M2, t2) =⇒ M1  pc(Mη)<L`A↑ = M2  pc(Mη)<L`A↑
Note that there are no constraints on time components t1 and t2. That is,
the same mitigate commands may take different times to execute in different
traces. The proof is contained in Section 5.4.
Mitigation levels Per Section 5.1, the argument ` in mitigateη (e, `) c is an
upper bound on the timing leakage of command c. Let lev(Mη) be the label
argument of mitigateη command. We call this the mitigation level of Mη. Note
that lev(Mη) is unrelated to pc(Mη). For instance, in the example above, pc(M1) =
L, because M1 appears in the L-context, but lev(M1) = H.
Mitigation levels are connected to how much information an adversary at
level `A may learn. For example, information at level ` can leak to adversary at
level `A (` @ `A ) by a command Mη only when ` v lev(Mη). In general, infor-
mation from a set of levels L can be leaked by mitigate commands such that
lev(Mη) ∈ L`A↑.
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This leads to the definition of timing variations.
Definition 12 (Timing variations of mitigate commands) Given a set of secu-
rity levels L, an adversary level `A, program c, memory m, and a machine environment
E, let V be the timing variations of mitigate commands:
V(L, `A, c,m, E) , {t′ | ∃m′, E′ . (∀`′ < L`A↑ .m '`′ m′∧E '`′ E′)∧〈c,m′, E′, 0〉V (M, t)
∧ (M′, t′) = (M, t) pc(Mη)<L`A↑∧lev(Mη)∈L`A↑}
An interesting component of this definition is the predicate used to project
(M, t). In essence, we only focus on the mitigate commands that appear in low
contexts and have high mitigation levels, such as the first mitigate in the exam-
ple earlier. Also notice that this set counts only the distinct timing components
of the mitigate command projection, ignoring the M′ component. This is suffi-
cient because for well-typed programs the M′ components of the vectors (M′, t′)
are low-deterministic by Lemma 19.
In this definition, memory and machine environments are quantified differ-
ently from Definition 11, by considering variations with respect to a larger set
of security levelsL`A↑. In Figure 5.4(b), this corresponds to flows from both gray
areas to the area observable by the adversary.
Leakage bounds guaranteed by the type system The type system ensures that
only the execution time of mitigate commands within certain projections may
leak information.
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Theorem 6 (Bound on leakage via variations) Given a command c, such that Γ `
c, and an adversary level `A, we have that for all m, E and L it holds that
Q(L, `A, c,m, E) ≤ log |V(L, `A, c,m, E)|
The proof is included in Section 5.4. An interesting corollary of the theorem is
that leakage is zero whenever a program c contains no mitigate command, or
more generally, when all mitigate commands take fixed time since there is only
one timing variation of mitigate commands in this special case.
5.3 Predictive mitigation
The predictive mitigation framework introduced in Chapter 4 removes confi-
dential information from timing of public events by delaying them according
to predefined schedules. We now build upon this framework to enable tight
leakage bounds when mitigate commands are used.
Instead of delaying public assignments themselves, we delay the comple-
tions of mitigate commands that may potentially precede public events. This
is sufficient for well-typed programs, because according to Theorem 6, only tim-
ing variations of mitigate commands carry sensitive information. The idea is
that as long as the execution time of the mitigate command is no greater than
predicted, little information is leaked. Upon a misprediction (when actual exe-
cution time is longer than predicted), a new schedule is chosen in such a way
that future mispredictions are rarer.
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〈update(n, `),m, E,G〉 →
〈(while (t − sη ≥ predict(n, `)) do (Miss[`] := Miss[`] + 1; )[⊥,⊥])[⊥,⊥],m, E,G〉 (S-UPDATE)
〈mitigateη (n, `) c,m, E,G〉 →
〈sη := t[⊥,⊥]; c; update(n, `); (sleep (predict(n, `) − t + sη))[⊥,⊥],m, E,G〉 (S-MTGPRED)
Figure 5.5: Predictive semantics for mitigate.
5.3.1 Mitigating semantics
Figure 5.5 shows the fragment of the small-step semantics that implements pre-
dictive mitigation. We record mispredictions in a special array Miss, assum-
ing Miss is initialized to zeros and is otherwise unreferenced in programs.
Expression time provides the current value of the global clock. Expression
predict(n, `) = max(n, 1) · 2Miss[`] returns the current prediction for level ` with
initial estimate n. This prediction is the fast doubling scheme (Section 4.1.4) with
the local penalty policy (Section 4.7.2); other schemes and penalty policies are
possible (Chapter 4), but are not considered here.
In rule (S-MTGPRED), mitigate transitions to a code fragment that penal-
izes and delays the execution time of c. Variable sη records the time when mit-
igation has started. If execution of c takes less time (time − sη) than predicted,
command update does nothing; the execution idles until the predicted time. If
executing c takes longer than predicted, update increments Miss[`] until the
new prediction is greater than the time that c has consumed.
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5.3.2 Leakage analysis of the global policy
Note that all auxiliary commands in Figure 5.5 have labels [⊥,⊥], ensuring that
no confidential information about machine environments is leaked when exe-
cuting these commands. Moreover, the execution time of the whole mitigated
block is at least predict(n, `). Thus, the timing variation of a single mitigate
command is controlled by the variation of possible values of predict(n, `).
The global policy (Section 4.7.2) penalizes all future mitigate commands
after a misprediction. That is, whenever there is a misprediction, Miss[`] is in-
creased for all ` in the system in Rule (S-UPDATE), rather than just for the level
that triggers the misprediction, as shown in Figure 5.5.
Let us analyze the variation of execution times given a sub-trace of mitigate
commands with pc(Mη) < L`A↑ ∧ lev(Mη) ∈ L`A↑. We call the period when there is
no misprediction (including the mispredictions from other mitigate commands
not in the trace) epoch.
Notice that by Definition 12 and Theorem 6, the only source of leakage is
through the timing variation, which we bound next. The variation of the execu-
tion times of the sub-trace of mitigate commands depends on three factors:
1. Variation in one epoch: since all mitigate commands are delayed accord-
ing to the schedule, variation in one epoch is bounded by the number of miti-
gate commands in the trace, which can be conservatively bounded by K, where
K is the number of relevant mitigate statements in the trace, i.e., the ones that
satisfy pc(Mη) < L`A↑ ∧ lev(Mη) ∈ L`A↑, according to Theorem 6.
2. Possible schedules after misprediction: because in fast doubling scheme
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there is only one possible schedule after every misprediction, this factor does
not contribute to the number of variations.
3. Number of epochs: at the Nth epoch, predicted execution time is tη × 2N−1
for all mitigate commands, where tη is the initial prediction for Mη. Since ∀η.tη ≥
1, we have 2N−1 ≤ tη × 2N−1 ≤ T with running time T . Therefore, N ≤ 1 + logT .
Putting them together, the total variation of execution times is bounded by
(K+1)1+logT . This results in leakage of at most log(K+1)× (1+ logT ) bits. When K
is unknown, it can be conservatively bounded by T , yielding an O(log2 T ) bound
on leakage.
Number of epochs when worst-case execution time is known Note that most
commands take limited time to execute. For example, command sleep(x) takes
at most 28 time units to execute when x ∈ [0, 28 − 1] (we assume interacting with
the machine environment takes less than 1 time unit). Denote by Tw the worst-
case execution time for all mitigated commands. When Tw is known, the number
of epochs can be bounded by 1 + logTw. Therefore, the leakage can be bounded
by log(K + 1) · (1 + logTw).
5.3.3 Leakage analysis of the local policy
In contrast, the local policy (Section 4.7.2) only penalizes future mitigate com-
mands with the same mitigation level. That is, a misprediction of mitigation
level ` only increase Miss[`] in Rule (S-UPDATE), which is the policy shown in
Figure 5.5.
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Consider level `′ and a sub-trace of mitigate commands with lev(Mη) = `′.
By the nature of local penalty policy, the execution time of such commands are
not affected by other mitigate commands executed. We refine the epoch as the
period when there is no misprediction with level `′. Similarly to the analysis
of global penalty policy, the timing variation of the sub-trace is bounded by
(K + 1)1+logT .
For the leakage from L, we only need to analyze the variation of mitigate
commands with lev(Mη) ∈ L`A↑ according to Theorem 6. This gives us a bound
of |L`A↑| × log(K + 1)×(1 + logT ) in total.
This bound on leakage has a nice property: the higher the information is
in the lattice, the tighter is the bound. So, this policy introduces a differential
leakage bound for multiple levels: information with more strict usage—labels
higher in lattice—is enforced to leak less through the timing channel than less
security-sensitive information—labels lower in lattice.
Number of epochs when worst-case execution time is known Similar to
the analysis of the global policy, we can derive a tighter leakage bound when
worst-case execution time is known. Denote by Tw the worst-case execution
time for all mitigated commands. When Tw is known, the number of epochs
can be bounded by 1 + logTw. Therefore, the leakage can be bounded by
|L`A↑| × log(K + 1) · (1 + logTw).
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5.4 Proofs
Like earlier, we use a distinguished label L (“low”) to define what is observable
to the low observer. Since the lemmas and theorems are valid regardless of what
level L is, the propositions proved hold for any label ` in the security lattice.
5.4.1 Extended language
Extended syntax The extended syntax is shown in Figure 5.7. We augment
memories to map high variables to bracketed results. In a similar way, the syn-
tax is augmented to include bracketed results, and bracketed commands. In-
tuitively, bracketed results represent values from high memory, and bracketed
commands represent commands executed in a high pc context (such as in a
branch with a high guard). Moreover, to keep the structure of mitigate com-
mands in the small-step semantics, we introduce braced commands {c}. Braced
commands are executed in mitigate commands.
Extended semantics The operational semantics is augmented to propagate
brackets and braces, as shown in Figure 5.8, 5.9. All rules are extensions to
n ∼ n [n1] ∼ [n2] m1 ∼ m2 =⇒ ∀x.m1(x) ∼ m2(x)
c ∼ c c1 ∼ c3 c2 ∼ c4
c1; c2 ∼ c3; c4
[c1] ∼ [c2]
c1 ∼ c2
{c1} ∼ {c2}
Figure 5.6: Equivalence on memories and commands.
e ::= . . . | [n]
c ::= . . . | [c] | {c}
Figure 5.7: Ex-
tended syntax.
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the original grammar except that (S-ASGN) is split into three rules: (S-ASGN1),
(S-ASGN2), (S-ASGN3), (S-MITIGATE) is replaced with (S-MITIGATE1) which
introduces braced commands. All rules with brackets and braces work the same
way as the normal rules from computational perspective. Brackets and braces
are just syntactic markers.
To make the proof self-contained, typing rules for expressions are shown in
Figure 5.10. Most of these rules are standard, except the rule (T-BRACKETEXP)
that treats bracketed expression as high. Additional typing rules in Figure 5.11
are given to support the soundness proof. A command in bracket is treated as a
command conditioned on high information in the type system, but commands
in braces type-check in the same way as those without braces. The rule (T-STOP)
handles stop, which appears only during evaluation. The subsumption rule (T-
SUB) is introduced to simplify the proof. The intuition is that the end-label can
always be treated more conservatively without hurting security.
Equivalence on memories and commands We define the equivalence of mem-
ories and commands up to the observable level of an adversary as in Fig. 5.6.
Intuitively, bracketed memory and commands are indistinguishable. Braces are
syntactic, so the equivalence on a command in brace is identical to that of a
command without a brace.
We write ` m if the values of all high (and only high) variables have brackets,
and say that such a memory is well-formed.
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〈[n],m〉 ↓ [n] 〈e1,m〉 ↓ [v1] 〈e2,m〉 ↓ v2 v = v1 op v2〈e1 op e2,m〉 ↓ [v]
〈e1,m〉 ↓ v1 〈e2,m〉 ↓ [v2] v = v1 op v2
〈e1 op e2,m〉 ↓ [v]
〈e1,m〉 ↓ [v1] 〈e2,m〉 ↓ [v2] v = v1 op v2
〈e1 op e2,m〉 ↓ [v]
Figure 5.8: Extended semantics of expressions.
S-STOP1
〈[stop],m〉 → 〈stop,m〉
S-STOP2
〈{stop},m〉 → 〈stop,m〉
S-BRACKET
〈c,m〉 → 〈c′,m′〉
〈[c],m〉 → 〈[c′],m′〉
S-BRACE
〈c,m〉 → 〈c′,m′〉
〈{c},m〉 → 〈{c′},m′〉
S-ASGN1
〈e,m〉 ↓ v Γ(x) v L
〈x := e[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈stop,m[x 7→ v]〉
S-ASGN2
〈e,m〉 ↓ v Γ(x) @ L
〈x := e[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈stop,m[x 7→ [v]]〉
S-ASGN3
〈e,m〉 ↓ [v]
〈x := e[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈stop,m[x 7→ [v]]〉
S-IF3
〈e,m〉 ↓ [n] n , 0
〈(if e then c1 else c2)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈[c1],m〉
S-IF4
〈e,m〉 ↓ [n] n = 0
〈(if e then c1 else c2)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈[c2],m〉
S-WHILE3
〈e,m〉 ↓ [n] n , 0
〈(while e do c)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈[c; (while e do c)[`r ,`w]],m〉
S-WHILE4
〈e,m〉 ↓ [n] n = 0
〈(while e do c)[`r ,`w],m〉 → 〈[stop],m〉
S-MITIGATE1
〈mitigate (e, `) c,m〉 → 〈{c},m〉
Figure 5.9: Extended semantics of commands.
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Γ ` n : ⊥ T-CONST
Γ(x) = `
Γ ` x : ` T-VAR
Γ ` e : ` Γ ` e′ : `
Γ ` e op e′ : ` T-OP
Γ ` e : ` ` v `′
Γ ` e : `′ T-SUBEXP
T-BRACKETEXP
` @ L
Γ ` [n] : `
Figure 5.10: Typing rules: expressions.
T-STOP
Γ, pc, τ ` stop : τ
T-BRACKETCMD
Γ, `, τ ` c : τ′ pc v ` ` @ L
Γ, pc, τ ` [c] : τ′
T-BRACECMD
Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′
Γ, pc, τ ` {c} : τ
T-SUB
Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ1 τ1 v τ2
Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ2
Figure 5.11: Extended typing rules.
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5.4.2 Notations
While `A-observable events in big-step style are already defined byV`A , the cor-
responding event in a single step is not defined. We represent the assignment
generated by a single step as
〈c1,m1, E1,G1〉 (x,v)−−→ 〈c′1,m′1, E′1,G′1〉
(x, v) = ∅when evaluating c1 does not generate an assignment. Similarly, that of
multiple steps is denoted as 〈c1,m1, E1,G1〉 (x,v)−−→
∗
〈c′1,m′1, E′1,G′1〉.
The `-projection of observable events (x, v), denoted by (x, v) `, is the longest
subset such that for any (x, v) ∈ (x, v) `,Γ(x) v `. By definition, we have
〈c1,m1, E1,G1〉 (x,v)−−→
∗
〈stop,m′1, E′1,G′1〉 ⇔ 〈c1,m1, E1,G1〉V`A (x, v) `A
5.4.3 Completeness of the extended language
We need to show the extended semantics is complete with regard to the original
semantics. Completeness means every step in the new semantics can be per-
formed in the original semantics (maybe with removal of brackets and braces)
and vice versa.
More formally, given that c is a command in the extended language, let us
use the notation of bcc to denote removal of all brackets and braces from c in
the obvious way, yielding a command from the original language. We define
bmc to convert memory in a similar way. Completenesss can be expressed as the
following lemma.
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Lemma 20 (Completeness of extended language)
` c ∧ 〈bcc, bmc, E,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′, E′,G′〉
=⇒ ∃m′′. 〈c,m, E,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′′, E′,G′〉 ∧ m′ = bm′′c
Proof. By rule induction on each evaluation step. 
5.4.4 Useful lemmas
Lemma 21 Low expressions always evaluate to ordinary integers (without brackets):
` m ∧ Γ ` e : ` ∧ ` v L =⇒ ∃n.〈e,m〉 ↓ n
Proof. By induction on the structure of expressions.
• Case e = n: trivial.
• Case e = [n]: Γ ` [n] : ` ∧ ` @ L by the typing rule. Contradiction.
• Case e = x: two conditions depending on Γ(x):
– Γ(x) v L: since m is well-formed, m(x) = n for some n. Therefore
〈e,m〉 ↓ n.
– Γ(x) @ L: contradicts the condition that ` v L.
• Case e = e1 op e2: suppose Γ ` e1 : `1∧`1 @ L then e cannot be typed as ` v L.
Otherwise, we have `1 v ` by (T-SUBEXP) and `1 v L by the transitivity
of v relation. Contradiction. Similarly, suppose Γ ` e2 : `2, we must have
`2 v L. By the induction assumption, ∃n1, n2.〈e1,m〉 ↓ n1 ∧ 〈e2,m〉 ↓ n2.
Therefore, 〈e,m〉 ↓ n1 op n2.
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Lemma 22 (Monotonicity of TC) The timing end label is no less than the pc label
and timing start label. That is:
Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′ =⇒ pc unionsq τ v τ′
Proof. Induction on the typing derivation Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′. 
Lemma 23 (PC Subsumption)
Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′ ∧ pc′ v pc =⇒ Γ, pc′, τ ` c : τ′
Proof. Induction on the typing derivation Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ1.
• Case (T-SKIP): from the typing rule Γ, pc′, τ ` skip[`r ,`w] : τ unionsq `r.
• Case (T-STOP), (T-BRACECMD): by the typing rule, τ′ = τ.
• Case (T-SUB): by the induction hypothesis.
• Case (T-SLEEP): from the typing rule, Γ ` e : ` ∧ τ′ = τ unionsq ` unionsq `r. Also,
Γ, pc′, τ ` sleep (e) : τ unionsq ` unionsq `r.
• Case (T-ASGN): from the typing rule, τ′ = Γ(x) and ` unionsq pc unionsq τ unionsq `r v Γ(x).
Since pc′ v pc, ` unionsq pc′ unionsq τ unionsq `r v Γ(x). So Γ, pc′, τ ` (x := e)[`r ,`w] : Γ(x).
• Case (T-SEQ): from the typing rule, Γ, pc, τ ` c1 : τ1 ∧ Γ, pc, τ1 ` c2 : τ′. By
the induction hypothesis, we have Γ, pc′, τ ` c1 : τ1 ∧ Γ, pc′, τ1 ` c2 : τ′.
• Case (T-BRACKETCMD): from the typing rule, Γ, `′, τ ` c : τ′∧ pc v `′∧ `′ @
L. Since pc′ v pc v `′ too, Γ, pc′, τ ` [c] : τ′.
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• Case (T-IF): from the typing rule, τ′ = `unionsq τunionsq τ1unionsq τ2 and Γ, `unionsq pc, `unionsq τunionsq `r `
ci : τi where Γ ` e : `. Since pc′ v pc, Γ, ` unionsq pc′, ` unionsq τ unionsq `r ` ci : τi by the
induction hypothesis.
• Case (T-WHILE): from the typing rule, Γ ` e : ` ∧ pc v `w ∧ ` unionsq τ unionsq `r v
τ′ ∧ Γ, ` unionsq pc, τ′ ` c : τ′. By the induction hypothesis, all conditions are still
satisfied by replacing pc with pc′.
• Case (T-MTG): by the typing rule, Γ ` e : `′ ∧ pc v `w ∧ Γ, pc, τ unionsq `′ unionsq `r ` c :
τ′ ∧ τ′ v `. Since pc′ v pc, pc′ v `w. Moreover, Γ, pc′, τ unionsq `′ unionsq `r ` c : τ′ by the
induction hypothesis.

Lemma 24 (TC Subsumption)
Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ1 ∧ τ′ v τ =⇒ Γ, pc, τ′ ` c : τ1
Proof. Induction on the typing derivation Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ1.
• Case (T-SKIP): from the typing rule, τ1 = τ unionsq `r and Γ, pc, τ′ ` c : τ′ unionsq `r.
Since τ′ v τ, Γ, pc, τ′ ` c : τ1 by (T-SUB).
• Case (T-STOP): Γ, pc, τ′ ` c : τ′. Since τ′ v τ, the result is true by (T-SUB).
• Case (T-SUB): by the induction hypothesis.
• Case (T-SLEEP): from the typing rule, Γ ` e : ` ∧ τ1 = τ unionsq ` unionsq `r. Also,
Γ, pc, τ′ ` sleep (e)[`r ,`w] : τ′ unionsq ` unionsq `r. Since τ′ v τ, the result is true by
(T-SUB).
• Case (T-ASGN): from the typing rule, ` unionsq pc unionsq τ unionsq `r v Γ(x). Since τ′ v τ,
` unionsq pc unionsq τ′ unionsq `r v Γ(x) too. So Γ, pc, τ′ ` c : Γ(x).
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• Case (T-SEQ): from the typing rule, Γ, pc, τ ` c1 : τ2 ∧ Γ, pc, τ2 ` c2 : τ1. By
the induction hypothesis, we have Γ, pc, τ′ ` c1 : τ2. Therefore, by (T-SEQ),
Γ, pc, τ ` c1; c2 : τ1.
• Case (T-BRACKETCMD): from the typing rule, Γ, `′, τ ` c : τ1∧pc v `′∧ `′ @
L. Since, τ′ v τ, Γ, L′, τ′ ` c : τ1 by the induction hypothesis. By (T-
BRACKETCMD), Γ, pc, τ′ ` [c] : τ1.
• Case (T-BRACECMD): by the induction hypothesis.
• Case (T-IF): from the typing rule, Γ ` e : `∧Γ, `unionsqpc, `unionsq τunionsq `r ` ci : τi. Since
τ′ v τ, Γ, `unionsqpc, `unionsq τ′unionsq `r ` ci : τi by the induction hypothesis. Result is true
by applying (T-IF) again.
• Case (T-WHILE): from the typing rule, Γ ` e : ` ∧ pc v `w ∧ ` unionsq τ unionsq `r v
τ′′ ∧ Γ, ` unionsq pc, τ′′ ` c : τ′′. Since τ′ v τ, ` unionsq τ′ unionsq `r v τ′′ still holds. Other
conditions are not affected by this replacement.
• Case (T-MTG): from the typing rule, Γ ` e : `′∧Γ, pc, τunionsq`′unionsq`r ` c : τ′′∧τ′′ v
`. Since τ′ v τ, Γ, pc, τ′ unionsq `′ unionsq `r ` c : τ′′ by the induction hypothesis. So by
(T-MTG), the result is true.

Lemma 25 (Preservation)
` m ∧ Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′ ∧ 〈c,m〉 → 〈c′,m′〉 =⇒ ` m′ ∧ Γ, pc, τ ` c′ : τ′
Proof. By rule induction on 〈c,m〉 → 〈c′,m′〉.
• (S-SKIP, S-STOP1, S-STOP2, S-SLEEP, S-WHILE2): ` m′ is trivial since m′ =
m. Since c′ = stop, Γ, pc, τ ` c′ : τ. By Lemma 22, τ v τ′. By (T-SUB),
Γ, pc, τ ` c′ : τ′.
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• (S-BRACKET, S-BRACE): by the induction hypothesis.
• 〈c1; c2,m〉 → 〈c′1; c2,m′〉 ((S-SEQ1)): from the evaluation rule, 〈c1,m〉 →
〈c′1,m′〉. By the typing rule, Γ, pc, τ ` c1 : τ1 ∧ Γ, pc, τ1 ` c2 : τ′. By the
induction hypothesis, ` m′ and Γ, pc, τ ` c′1 : τ1. So, Γ, pc, τ ` c′1; c2 : τ′.
• 〈c1; c2,m〉 → 〈c2,m′〉 ((S-SEQ2)): by the typing rule, Γ, pc, τ ` c1 : τ1 ∧
Γ, pc, τ1 ` c2 : τ′. By Lemma 22, τ v τ1. By Lemma 24, Γ, pc, τ ` c2 : τ′.
By the induction hypothesis, ` m′.
• (S-ASGN1): Γ, pc, τ ` c′ : τ′ is similar to (S-SKIP). Moreover, we have
Γ(x) v L. So changing the mapping of x to an ordinary integer in well-
formed memory will result in well-formed memory too.
• (S-ASGN2) and (S-ASGN3): Similar to (S-ASGN1) except for ` m′. For rule
(S-ASGN2), the type of x is high, so memory m′ is still well-formed after
the mapping for x is changed to a bracketed integer. For rule (S-ASGN3),
Γ ` e : ` ∧ ` @ L since otherwise, ∃v, 〈e,m〉 ↓ v from Lemma 21. From
the typing rule, ` v Γ(x), so Γ(x) @ L. So changing the mapping of x to a
bracketed integer will result in a well-formed memory too.
• (S-IF1) and (S-IF2): ` m′ since m′ = m. From the typing rule, Γ, ` unionsq pc, ` unionsq
τ unionsq `r ` ci : τi. By Lemma 23 and 24, we have Γ, pc, τ ` ci : τi.
• (S-IF3) and (S-IF4): ` m′ since m′ = m. Since in either case, e evaluates to
high value by evaluation rule, Γ ` e : ` ∧ ` @ L by Lemma 21. From the
typing rule, Γ, ` unionsq pc, ` unionsq τ unionsq `r ` ci : τi. Thus, Γ, pc, ` unionsq τ unionsq `r ` [ci] : τi.
By Lemma 24, Γ, pc, τ ` [ci] : τi. Since τ′ = ` unionsq τ unionsq τi, Γ, pc, τ ` [ci] : τ′ by
(T-SUB).
• (S-WHILE1): ` m′ is trivial. From the typing rule, there is a τ′ such that
Γ ` e : `∧`unionsqτunionsq`r v τ′∧Γ, `unionsqpc, τ′ ` c : τ′. By Lemma 23, 24, Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′.
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Also, since ` unionsq τ′ unionsq `r = τ′, we can derive Γ, pc, τ′ ` (while e do c)[`r ,`w] : τ′.
By (T-SEQ), the result is true.
• (S-WHILE3): similar to (S-IF3), we have ` @ L. Setting `′ = ` unionsq pc and by
similar derivation as (S-WHILE1), we have Γ, `′, τ ` c; (while e do c)[`r ,`w] :
τ′. Thus, by (T-BRACKETCMD), the result is true.
• (S-WHILE4): similar to (S-IF3), we get ` @ L. By the typing rule, checking
[stop] has the following form (`′ = ` unionsq pc):
Γ, `′, τ ` stop : τ pc v `′ `′ @ L
Γ, pc, τ ` [stop] : τ
By Lemma 22, τ v τ′. So Γ, pc, τ ` [stop] : τ′ by (T-SUB).
• (S-MITIGATE1): ` m′ since m′ = m. From the typing rule, Γ, pc, τ unionsq ` unionsq `r `
c : τ′′. By Lemma 24, Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′′. So Γ, pc, τ ` {c} : τ by (T-BRACECMD).
By (T-SUB), Γ, pc, τ ` {c} : τ′.

Lemma 26 (High-pc lemma) Commands that type-check in a high-pc context neither
generate low assignments nor modify low machine environment in one step.
∀pc, τ.pc @ L∧Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′∧〈c,m, E,G〉 (x,v)−−→ 〈c′,m′, E′,G′〉 =⇒ (x, v) L = ∅∧E ≈L E′
Proof. First we show E ≈L E′ by induction on the structure of c.
• stop: by the semantics, it does not change E.
• c1; c2, {c}, [c]: by the induction hypothesis.
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• Other commands: all other commands have the form c[`r ,`w]. We have
pc v `w by the typing rule. Since pc @ L, ∀`′ v L, `w @ `′ (otherwise,
by transitivity of v, we have `w v L). Therefore, by Property 5, we have
∀`′ v L, E(`′) = E′(`′). That is, E ≈L E′.
Next, we show (x, v) L = ∅ by rule induction on the core semantics.
• Case (S-SKIP, S-STOP1, S-STOP2, S-SLEEP, S-IF1, S-IF2, S-IF3, S-IF4, S-
WHILE1, S-WHILE2, S-WHILE3, S-WHILE4, S-MITIGATE): trivial since
none of them generate an assignment in one step.
• Case (S-BRACKET): from the typing rule, Γ, `′, τ ` c ∧ `′ @ L. So the result
is true by the induction hypothesis.
• Case (S-BRACE): by the induction hypothesis.
• Case (S-SEQ1): from the typing rule, Γ, pc, τ ` c1. Since pc @ L, (x, v) L = ∅
from the induction hypothesis.
• Case (S-SEQ2): similar to (S-SEQ1).
• Case (S-ASGN1): from the typing rule, `unionsqpcunionsqτunionsq `r v Γ(x), where Γ ` e : `.
Since pc @ L, Γ(x) @ L. This contradicts the condition of (S-ASGN1).
• Case 〈x := e,m, E,G〉 → 〈stop,m[x 7→ [v]], E′,G′〉 ((S-ASGN2) and (S-
ASGN3)): for (S-ASGN2), Γ(x) @ L. By Lemma 21 and typing rule, Γ(x) @ L
for (S-ASGN3). So (x, v) L = ∅.

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Lemma 27 (High-timing lemma) Commands that type-check with high timing start
label do not modify low memory or the machine environment in one step.
∀pc, τ.τ @ L∧Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′∧〈c,m, E,G〉 (x,v)−−→ 〈c′,m′, E′,G′〉 =⇒ (x, v) L = ∅∧E ≈L E′
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 26 except that using the result of
Lemma 26 for bracketed commands. 
Lemma 28
∀`.m1 ∼` m2 ∧ Γ ` e : `′ ∧ `′ v ` ∧ 〈e,m1〉 ↓ v1 =⇒ ∃v2.〈e,m2〉 ↓ v2 ∧ v1 = v2
Proof. By rule induction on expression evaluation. 
Lemma 29 (Unwinding)
` m1∧ ` m2∧ ` c1∧ ` c2∧m1 ≈L m2∧E1 ≈L E2∧c1 ∼ c2∧〈c1,m1, E1,G1〉 (x,v)−−→ 〈c′1,m′1, E′1,G′1〉
=⇒ (∃c′2,m′2, E′2,G′2.c′2 ∼ c′1 ∧ 〈c2,m2, E2,G2〉
(x,v)−−→
∗
〈c′2,m′2, E′2,G′2〉
∧ (x, v) L = (x, v) L ∧ E′1 ≈L E′2) ∨ (〈c2,m2〉 ⇑ ∧∃c.c2 = [c])
Proof. By rule induction on 〈c1,m1, E1,G1〉 → 〈c′1,m′1, E′1,G′1〉.
• Case (S-SKIP, S-SLEEP, S-STOP2, S-MITIGATE1): since c1 ∼ c2. Say c′2 is the
result of taking one step from c2. By the evaluation rule, we have c′1 ∼ c′2.
(x, v) L = (x, v) L since no assignments are generated by these commands.
By Property 7, E′1 ≈L E′2.
• Case (S-STOP1): since c1 ∼ c2, c2 = [c4]. If c2 diverges, we are done with
c = c4. Otherwise, we have 〈[c4],m2, E2,G2〉 →∗ 〈[stop],m′2, E′2,G′2〉 →
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〈stop,m′2, E′2,G′2〉. By the typing rule, c4 is typable with pc @ L. By
Lemma 26 and induction on the number of steps, we have (x, v)  L =
(x, v) L = ∅ ∧ E′1 ≈L E′2. We choose c′2 = stop.
• Case 〈[c],m1, E1,G1〉 → 〈[c′],m′1, E′1,G′1〉 ((S-BRACKET)): since c2 ∼ c1, c2 =
[c4]. By the typing rule, c is typable with L′ @ L. By Lemma 26, we have
(x, v) L = ∅ ∧ E′1 ≈L E1 ≈L E2. Therefore, we choose c′2 = c2.
• Case (S-BRACE, S-SEQ1, S-SEQ2): by the induction hypothesis.
• Case (S-ASGN1, S-ASGN2, S-ASGN3): since c2 ∼ c1, so c2 = c1. Thus the
same evaluation rule will be applied when c2 take one step. So (x, v) has
the form (x′, v′). Since c2 = c1, x = x′. For (S-ASGN1), we have condition
〈e,m1〉 ↓ n. By Lemma 28, 〈e,m2〉 ↓ n. So v = v′. For (S-ASGN2, S-ASGN3),
we have Γ(x) @ L, thus (x, v) L = (x′, v′) L = ∅. From Property 7, E′1 ≈L E′2.
We choose c′2 = stop.
• Case (S-IF1): assume c1 = (if e then c3 else c4)[`r ,`w]. Since c2 ∼ c1, c2 = c1.
By the evaluation rule, 〈e,m1〉 ↓ n∧ n , 0. By Lemma 28, 〈e,m2〉 ↓ n∧ n , 0.
So we evaluate c2 by one step and choose c′2 = c3. Since no assignment is
generated, (x, v)  L = (x, v)  L = ∅. E′1 ≈L E′2 by Property 7 and transitivity
of ≈L.
• Case (S-IF2, S-WHILE1, S-WHILE2): similar to (S-IF1).
• Case (S-IF3): assume c1 = (if e then c3 else c4)[`r ,`w]. Since c2 ∼ c1, c2 = c1.
By the evaluation rule, we have 〈e,m1〉 ↓ [n]. By Lemma 28, 〈e,m2〉 ↓ [n]. So
c2 may evaluate to either [c5] or [c6] by the evaluation rule. In either case,
choosing c′2 to be the next step gives the desired properties.
• Case (S-IF4, S-WHILE3, S-WHILE4): similar to (S-IF3).

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Lemma 30
∀E1, E2,m1,m2,G, c, ` . Γ ` c ∧ m1 ∼` m2 ∧ E1 ∼` E2
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′1, E′1,G1〉 ∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G〉VL (x1, v1, t1)
∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′2, E′2,G2〉 ∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G〉VL (x2, v2, t2)
=⇒ (x1, v1) = (x2, v2) ∧ E′1 ∼` E′2
Proof. Induction on the number of steps using Lemma 25 and 29. 
Proof of Theorem 1
∀E1, E2,m1,m2,G, c, ` . Γ ` c ∧ m1 ∼` m2 ∧ E1 ∼` E2
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′1, E′1,G1〉 ∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′2, E′2,G2〉
=⇒ m′1 ∼` m′2 ∧ E′1 ∼` E′2
Proof. Note that memory below level L can only be modified by assignments
where Γ(x) v L. The result is directly implied by Lemma 30. 
Corollary 1
∀E1, E2,m1,m2,G, c, ` . Γ ` c ∧ (∀`′ < L`A↑.m1 '`′ m2 ∧ E1 '`′ E2)
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′1, E′1,G1〉 ∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′2, E′2,G2〉
=⇒ ∀`′ < L`A↑ . m′1 '`′ m′2 ∧ E′1 '`′ E′2
Proof. Consider any `1 < L`A↑ and any `2 v `1. We have `2 < L`A↑ since otherwise,
by definition of upward closure, we have `1 ∈ L`A↑. Contradiction. Therefore,
by condition, we have m1 '`2 m2 ∧ E1 '`2 E2. Since this is true for all `2 v `1,
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m1 ∼`1 m2 ∧E1 ∼`1 E2. By Theorem 1, we have m′1 ∼`1 m′2 ∧E′1 ∼`1 E′2. In particular,
m′1 '`1 m′2 ∧ E′1 '`1 E′2. Notice that this result applies to all `1 < L`A↑, thus we get
the desired result. 
5.4.5 Proof of timing properties
Lemma 31
∀` < L`A↑ . m1 ∼` m2 ∧ E1 ∼` E2 ⇐⇒ ∀` < L`A↑ . m1 '` m2 ∧ E1 '` E2
Proof. =⇒ : by definition of ∼.
⇐=: for any level ` and `′ v `, we have `′ < L`A↑ since otherwise, ` ∈ L`A↑ by
definition of upward closure. Contradiction. Therefore, m1 '`′ m2 ∧ E1 '`′
E2. Since this is true for all `′ v `, we have m1 ∼` m2 ∧ E1 ∼` E2.

Proof of Lemma 19 For all programs c, such that Γ ` c, adversary levels `A,
sets of security levels L, and memories and environments E1, E2,m1,m2 such
that (∀`′ < L`A↑.E1 '`′ E2 ∧ m1 '`′ m2), we have
〈c,m1, E1, 0〉V (M1, t1)∧〈c,m2, E2, 0〉V (M2, t2) =⇒ M1  pc(Mη)<L`A↑ = M2  pc(Mη)<L`A↑
Proof. Consider any label L < L`A↑, we have E1 ∼L E2 ∧ m1 ∼L m2 by condition
and Lemma 31. First consider all mitigate commands in the trace such that
pc(Mη) v L.
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By the definition of environment pc, we have Γ, pc(Mη), τ ` Mη : τ′ for some
Γ, τ, τ′. By the rule (T-BRACKETCMD), we know that Mη cannot appear in brack-
ets since otherwise, we have pc(Mη) @ L by typing rule. Therefore, similar to the
proof of Lemma 29, we can show M1  pc(Mη)vL = M2  pc(Mη)vL. Since L can be an
arbitrary label satisfying L < L`A↑, the whole projection is identical. 
Lemma 32
∀e,Γ,m1,m2 . m1 ≈L m2 ∧ Γ ` e : L =⇒ ∀x ∈ Varse.m1(x) = m2(x)
Proof. By induction on the structure of e. 
Lemma 33 (Timing determinism) Starting from memory and machine environ-
ment that only differ in L`A↑, execution time of any command that type checks with
end timing label that is not in L`A↑ is determined by low-deterministic mitigate trace
s.t. lev(Mη) ∈ L`A↑. That is
∀pc, τ, c,m1,m2, E1, E2,G1,G2 . Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′∧τ′ < L`A↑∧(∀`′ < L`A↑.E1 ∼`′ E2∧m1 ∼`′ m2)
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G0〉V (M1, t1) ∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G0〉V (M2, t2)
∧ (M1, t1) pc(Mη)<L`A↑∧lev(Mη)∈L`A↑ = (M2, t2) pc(Mη)<L`A↑∧lev(Mη)∈L`A↑
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G0〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′1, E′1,G1〉 ∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G0〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′2, E′2,G2〉
=⇒ G1 = G2
Proof. Induction on the structure of c.
• stop: trivial since G1 = G0 = G2.
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• skip[`r ,`w]: by the typing rule, `r v τ′. Therefore, `r < L`A↑, since otherwise
τ′ ∈ L`A↑ by the definition of upward closure. Therefore, E1 ∼`r E2 by the
condition. By Property 6, G1 = G2.
• sleep (e)[`r ,`w]: by the typing rule, Γ ` e : ` ∧ ` unionsq `r v L`A↑. Similar to skip,
E1 ∼`r E2 ∧ m1 ∼`r m2. By Lemma 32 and Property 6, G1 = G2.
• x := e[`r ,`w]: similar to sleep command.
• [c]: by (T-BRACKETCMD), Γ, `1, τ ` c : τ′ for some `1. Since τ′ < L`A↑ by
condition, G1 = G2 by the induction hypothesis.
• c1; c2: The evaluation must take the form 〈c1; c2,m, E,G0〉 →∗
〈c2,m′, E′,G′〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′′, E′′,G〉. Suppose that 〈c1,m, E,G0〉 V (M′1, t′1)
and 〈c2,m′, E′,G0〉 V (M′2, t′2) . We distinguish the notations starting from
〈m1, E1〉 and 〈m2, E2〉 using subscript 1 and 2 in the obvious way. Then we
have (M1, t1) = (M′1 ·M′′1 , t′1 · t′′2 ). Similarly for (M2, t2).
By Lemma 19, M′1 
pc(Mη)<L`A↑ = M′2 
pc(Mη)<L`A↑. Therefore, we have
(M′1, t
′
1)
pc(Mη)<L`A↑∧lev(Mη)∈L`A↑ = (M′2, t
′
2)
pc(Mη)<L`A↑∧lev(Mη)∈L`A↑
and
(M′′1 , t
′′
1 )
pc(Mη)<L`A↑∧lev(Mη)∈L`A↑ = (M′′2 , t
′′
2 )
pc(Mη)<L`A↑∧lev(Mη)∈L`A↑
By the typing rule, we have Γ, pc, τ ` c1 : τ1 and Γ, pc, τ1 ` c2 : τ′. By
Lemma 22, τ1 v τ′. Since τ′ < L`A↑, we have τ1 < L`A↑. Thus by the
induction hypothesis on c1, we have G′1 = G
′
2. By Corollary 1, we have
∀`′′ < L`A↑.m′1 '`′′ m′2 ∧ E′1 '`′′ E′2. By the induction hypothesis on c2, we
have G1 = G2.
• (if e then c1 else c2)[`r ,`w]: suppose i = 1, 2. We have Γ ` e : ` ∧ Γ, ` unionsq pc, ` unionsq
τunionsq `r ` ci : τi ∧ τ1 unionsq τ2 < L`A↑ by (T-IF). Therefore, `r < L`A↑ ∧ ` < L`A↑. Thus,
m1 ∼` m2 by the condition.
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By Lemma 28, e evaluates to the same value whether in 〈m1, E1〉 or 〈m2, E2〉.
So the same rule must be applied. Without losing generality, let us con-
tinue rule (S-IF) when e , 0. The evaluation must take this form:
〈if e then c1 else c2,mi, Ei,G0〉 → 〈c1,mi, E′′i ,G′′i 〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′i , E′i ,Gi〉
Since `r < L`A↑, we have E1 ∼`r E2. As m1 ∼` m2, we have G′′1 = G′′2 by
Property 6. Since the first step produces no mitigate command event,
the second part produces identical mitigate command projections. By
Property 7 and condition, we have ∀`′′ < L`A↑.E′′1 '`′ E′′2 . By Lemma 25,
Γ, pc, τ ` c1 : τ′. Therefore, G1 = G2 by the induction hypothesis.
• (while e do c)[`r ,`w]: by the typing rule, we have Γ ` e : `1 ∧ `1 unionsq τ unionsq `r v τ′.
So `1 v τ′ ∧ `r v τ′. Therefore, we have `1 < L`A↑ ∧ `r < L`A↑ since τ′ < L`A↑.
Thus m1 ∼`1 m2 and E1 ∼`r E2 by the assumption.
Similarly to the case of an if command, the same evaluation rule can be
applied. We proceed with (S-WHILE1) and (S-WHILE2) since (S-WHILE3)
is similar to (S-WHILE1) and (S-WHILE4) is similar to (S-WHILE2). We
proceed by induction on the evaluation rule.
– (S-WHILE2): since m1 ∼`1 m2 and E1 ∼`r E2, G1 = G2 by Lemma 32 and
the Property 6.
– (S-WHILE1): denote (while e do c)[`r ,`w] as W. Evaluation has the form
〈W,mi, Ei,G0〉 → 〈c;W,mi, E′′i ,G′′i 〉 →∗ 〈W,m′′′i , E′′′i ,G′′′i 〉 →∗
〈stop,m′i , E′i ,G′i〉, where i = 1, 2.
Similarly to the proof for if command, we can show ∀`′′ < L`A↑.E′′1 '`′′
E′′2 ∧ G′′1 = G′′2 . Moreover, as in the proof for composition (c1; c2), we
have
∀`′′ < L`A↑.m′′′1 ∼`′′ m′′′2 ∧ E′′′1 ∼`′′ E′′′2 ∧G′′′1 = G′′′2
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and
(M′1, t
′
1)
pc(Mη)<L`A↑∧lev(Mη)∈L`A↑ = (M′2, t
′
2)
pc(Mη)<L`A↑∧lev(Mη)∈L`A↑
where 〈W,m′′′i , E′′′i ,G′′′i 〉V (M′i , t′i). By the induction hypothesis on the
induction rule, we get G1 = G2.
• (mitigateη (e, `) c)[`r ,`w]: first consider ` ∈ L`A↑. We have Γ, pc, τ `
(mitigate (e, `) c)[`r ,`w] : τ
′ ∧ τ′ < L`A↑ by the condition. Therefore, we
have pc < L`A↑ since otherwise, we have τ′ ∈ L`A↑ because pc v τ′. Contra-
diction. By definition, (η,Gi) is the last element in both projections. Since
these two projections are equal, we have G1 = G2.
Otherwise (when ` < L`A↑), The evaluation must take the form
〈(mitigateη (e, `) c)[`r ,`w],mi, Ei,G0〉 → 〈c,mi, E′′i ,G′′i 〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′i , E′i ,Gi〉
Since ` < L`A↑ and by the typing rule Γ ` e : `′ ∧ `′ unionsq `r v `, we have
`′ < L`A↑ ∧ `r < L`A↑, and thus m1 ∼` m2 and E1 ∼`r E2. So, by Lemma 32 and
the Property 6, we haveG′′1 = G
′′
2 . Since the first step produces no mitigate
command event to the trace (only the end of a mitigate command may
add to a trace), the second part produces the same trace projection.
For all `′′ < L`A↑, we can infer that E1 ∼`′′ E2 by condition. By Property 7,
E′′1 ∼`′′ E′′2 . So we have ∀`′′ < L`A↑.E′′1 ∼`′′ E′′2 . By the typing rule (T-MTG),
we have Γ ` e : `′ ∧ Γ, pc, τ unionsq `′ unionsq `r ` c : τ′ ∧ τ′ v `. Since ` < L`A↑, τ′ < L`A↑
too. Therefore, G1 = G2 by the induction hypothesis.
• {c}: braced command does not appear in the source code. Structural in-
duction does not rely on this case.

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Lemma 34 (Determinism of L-observable assignment events) Focusing on `A =
L for any label L, starting from memory and machine environment that only differ in
LL↑, L-observable assignment events that are generated by well-typed commands are
determined by low-deterministic mitigate trace s.t. lev(Mη) ∈ LL↑. That is
∀pc, τ, τ′, c,m1,m2, E1, E2 . ∧ Γ, pc, τ ` c : τ′ ∧ (∀`′ < LL↑ . m1 ∼`′ m2 ∧ E1 ∼`′ E2)
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G0〉V (M1, t1) ∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G0〉V (M2, t2)
∧ (M1, t1) pc(Mη)<LL↑∧lev(Mη)∈LL↑ = (M2, t2) pc(Mη)<LL↑∧lev(Mη)∈LL↑
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G0〉VL (x1, v1, t1) ∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G0〉VL (x2, v2, t2)
=⇒ (x1, v1, t1) = (x2, v2, t2)
Proof. Induction on the structure of c.
• sleep (e)[`r ,`w], skip[`r ,`w], stop: trivial since they produce no L-observable
assignments.
• [c]: by Lemma 26, it produces no side effects either.
• x := e[`r ,`w]: when Γ(x) @ L, this command does not produce any L-
observable assignment. Otherwise, we have Γ, pc, τ ` x := e[`r ,`w] : L by
(T-ASGN) and (T-SUB). Also, we have Γ ` e : ` ∧ ` v L. By Lemma 28,
v1 = v2.
Suppose 〈c,mi, Ei,G0〉 → 〈stop,m′i , E′i ,G′i〉 where i = 1, 2. By definition, we
have
〈c,mi, Ei,G0〉VL (xi, vi, ti) where ti = G′i −G0. Notice that L < LL↑ by defini-
tion, G′1 = G
′
2 by Lemma 33. So t1 = t2.
• c1; c2: by the typing rule, Γ, pc, τ ` c1 : τ1 and Γ, pc, τ1 ` c2 : τ′. More-
over, the evaluation has the form 〈c1; c2,m, E,G〉 →∗ 〈c2,m′′, E′′,G′′〉 →∗
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〈stop,m′, E′,G′〉. By the induction hypothesis, the first part produces same
L-observable events. When τ1 @ L, by Lemma 27, the second part pro-
duces no L-observable events, so we are done. Otherwise, by Lemma 33,
G′′1 = G
′′
2 . By Corollary 1, ∀`′ < LL↑.m′′1 ∼`′ m′′2 ∧ E′′1 ∼`′ E′′2 . By the induction
hypothesis for c2, the second part produces the same L-observable effects
too.
• (if e then c1 else c2)[`r ,`w]: by the typing rule, Γ ` e : `′∧Γ, pcunionsq`′, τunionsq`′unionsq`r `
ci : τi. When τ unionsq `′ unionsq `r @ L, by Lemma 27, ci produces no L-observable
events. We are done. Otherwise, by Lemma 28, the same branch is taken.
Without loss of generality, assume c1 is executed. Then the evaluation
must have this form:
〈if e then c1 else c2,mi, Ei,G0〉 → 〈c1,mi, E′′i ,G′′i 〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′i , E′i ,Gi〉
By Property 6, we have G′′1 = G
′′
2 . By Property 7, E
′′
1 ≈L E′′2 . Therefore, the
result is true by the induction hypothesis on c1.
• (while e do c)[`r ,`w]: by the typing rule, there is some τ′ such that Γ, pc, τ′ `
c : τ′. When τ′ @ L, c can produce no L-observable events by Lemma 27.
We are done. Otherwise, we have Γ ` e : `′∧`′unionsqτunionsq`r v τ′ v L by the typing
rule (T-WHILE). So only rule (S-WHILE1) and (S-WHILE2) can be applied
and same rule is applied. We proceed by induction on the evaluation rule.
– (S-WHILE2): trivial since no L-observable event is produced.
– (S-WHILE1): denote (while e do c)[`r ,`w] as W, evaluation has the form
〈W,mi, Ei,G0〉 → 〈c;W,mi, E′′i ,G′′i 〉 →∗ 〈W,m′′′i , E′′′i ,G′′′i 〉 →∗
〈stop,m′i , E′i ,G′i〉, where i = 1, 2. Since `′ unionsq `r v L, G′′1 = G′′2 by Prop-
erty 6. Also, E′′1 ∼L E′′2 by Property 7. By the induction hypothesis
on command c;W, the second part of the evaluation produces the
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same L-observable events. Moreover, since τ′ v L and Γ, pc, τ′ ` c : τ′
from (T-WHILE), τ′ < LL↑. Because otherwise, we have L ∈ LL↑,
which contradicts the definition of upward closure. By Lemma 33,
G′′′1 = G
′′′
2 . By Corollary 1, ∀`′ < LL↑ . m′′′1 ∼`′ m′′′2 ∧ E′′′1 ∼`′ E′′′2 .
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis of the evaluation rule of (S-
WHILE1) and (S-WHILE2), the last part in the evaluation trace pro-
duces same L-observable events too.
• (mitigate (e, `) c)[`r ,`w]: By the typing rule, we have Γ ` e : `′∧Γ, pc, τunionsq`unionsq`r `
c : τ′. When τunionsq`unionsq`r @ L, c produces no L-observable events by Lemma 27.
We are done.
Otherwise, the evaluation must take the form
〈(mitigate (e, `) c)[`r ,`w],mi, Ei,G0〉 → 〈c,mi, E′′i ,G′′i 〉 →∗ 〈stop,m′i , E′i ,Gi〉
Since `′ unionsq `r v L, we have G′′1 = G′′2 by Lemma 32 and Property 6. By Prop-
erty 7, E′′1 = E
′′
2 . Therefore, the result is true by the induction hypothesis
on the second step.
• {c}: braced command does not appear in the source code. Structural in-
duction does not rely on this case.

Proof of Theorem 6 Given a command c such that Γ ` c, we have that for all
m, E, L, ` and `A:
Q(L, `A, c,m, E) ≤ log |V(L, `A, c,m, E)|
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Proof. For any L, memory m and machine environment E, consider the case
`A = L, where L is an arbitrary label. We use a larger set Q′, which is same as Q
except that more parts of memory are allowed to vary, to bound Q:
Q′(L, L, c,m, E) , log(| {(x, v, t) | ∃m′, E′ .
(∀`′ . `′ < LL↑ . m ∼`′ m′ ∧ E ∼`′ E′)) ∧ 〈c,m′, E′, 0〉VL (x, v, t)} |)
Consider the following set
V′(L, L, c,m, E) , {(M′, t′) pc(η)<LL↑∧lev(Mη)∈LL↑|
∃ m′, E′ . (∀`′ < LL↑ . m ∼`′ m′ ∧ E ∼`′ E′) ∧ 〈c,m′, E′, 0〉V (M′, t′)}
Notice that memory is quantified using ∼ instead of ' because of Lemma 31.
By Lemma 19, we have V′(L, L, c,m, E) = V(L, L, c,m, E).
Given any element v ∈ V′(L, L, c,m, E), consider this set of memory and ma-
chine environments:
(m,E) = {(m′, E′)|(∀`′ < LL↑ . m′ ∼`′ m ∧ E′ ∼`′ E)
∧ 〈c,m′, E′, 0〉V (M′, t′) ∧ (M′, t′) pc(Mη)<LL↑∧lev(Mη)∈LL↑ = v}
Pick any (m1, E1) ∈ (m,E), say 〈c,m1, E1, 0〉VL (x1, v1, t1). Then by Lemma 34, we
have ∀(m′, E′) ∈ (m,E), 〈c,m′, E′, 0〉VL (x1, v1, t1).
Therefore, for all memory and machine environments that give the same
element in V′, they give the same element in Q′. By definition, both V′ and Q′
are quantifying over the same space of m, E, so we have
Q′(L, L, c,m, E) ≤ log |V′(L, L, c,m, E)|
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Since the proof above works for any L,L,m, E, ` and by the fact that V = V′,
we get
∀m, E,L, `, `A.Q′(L, `A, c,m, E) ≤ log |V(L, `A, c,m, E)|
Since Q(L, `A, c,m, E) ≤ Q′(L, `A, c,m, E), so
∀m, E,L, `, `A.Q(L, `A, c,m, E) ≤ log |V(L, `A, c,m, E)|

Proof of Theorem 2
∀E1, E2,m1,m2,G, c, ` . Γ ` c∧c has no mitigate commands∧m1 ∼` m2∧E1 ∼` E2
∧ 〈c,m1, E1,G〉V` (x1, v1, t1) ∧ 〈c,m2, E2,G〉V` (x2, v2, t2)
=⇒ x1 = x2 ∧ v1 = v2 ∧ t1 = t2
Proof. Direct implication of Theorem 6, since c contains no mitigate com-
mands. 
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CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION
To evaluate our approach on real-world applications, we implemented a sim-
ulation of the partitioned cache design described in Section 2.4.3, as well as a
formally verified MIPS processor using SecVerilog. As case studies, we chose
two applications previously shown to be vulnerable to timing attacks, as well
as security benchmarks. The results suggest that the approach proposed in this
dissertation is sound and has reasonable performance.
6.1 Compilation
We use a modified GCC compiler to compile C applications with timing anno-
tations. Sensitive data in applications are labeled, and timing labels are then
inferred as the least restrictive labels satisfying the typing rules from Figure 3.5
(transferring the rules from Section 2.5 to C is straightforward).
To inform the hardware of the current timing label, a new register is added
in hardware as an interface to communicate the timing label from the software
to the hardware. Simply encoding the timing labels into instructions does not
work, since labels may be required before the instruction is fetched and de-
coded: for example, to guide instruction cache behavior. Labels are also prop-
agated along the pipeline to restrict the behavior of hardware. Assembly code
setting the timing-label register is inserted before and after command blocks
with same labels.
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Name # of sets issue block size latency
L1 Data Cache 128 4-way 32 byte 1 cycle
L2 Data Cache 1024 4-way 64 byte 6 cycles
L1 Inst. Cache 512 1-way 32 byte 1 cycle
L2 Inst. Cache 1024 4-way 64 byte 6 cycles
Data TLB 16 4-way 4KB 30 cycles
Instruction TLB 32 4-way 4KB 30 cycles
Table 6.1: Machine environment parameters.
Selecting the initial prediction With the doubling policy, the slowdown of
mitigation is at most twice the worst-case time. To improve performance, we
can sample the running time of mitigated commands, and then set the initial
prediction to be a little higher than the average. In the experiments, we used
110% of average running time, measured with randomly generated secrets, as
the initial prediction.
6.2 Partitioned cache simulation
We developed a detailed, dynamically scheduled processor model supporting
two-level data and instruction caches, data and instruction TLBs, and specula-
tive execution. Table 6.1 summarizes the features of the machine environment.
We implemented this processor design by modifying the SimpleScalar simula-
tor, version 3.0e [14].
As discussed in Section 2.5.1, commodity cache designs require `r = `w. In
our implementation, we treat this requirement as an extra side condition in the
type system.
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6.2.1 Web login case study
Web applications have been shown vulnerable to timing channel attacks. For
example, Bortz and Boneh [11] have shown that adversaries can probe for valid
usernames using a timing channel in the login process. This is unfortunate since
usernames can be abused for spam, advertising, and phishing.
The pseudo-code for a simple web-application login procedure is shown be-
low. The variable response and user inputs user, pass are public to users. Con-
tents of the preloaded hashmap m (MD5 digests of valid usernames and cor-
responding passwords), password digest hash and the login status state are
secrets. The final assignment to public variable response is always 1 on pur-
pose in order to avoid the storage channel arising from the response. However,
the timing of this assignment might create a timing channel.
Hashmap m:=loadusers()
while true
(user, pass):=input()
uhash:=MD5(user)
if uhash in m
hash:=m.get(uhash)
phash:=MD5(pass)
if phash=hash
state:=success
state:=fail
response:=1
The information leakage is explicit when all confidential data (m, hash and
state) are labeled H. The type system forces line 1 and line 5–10 to have high
timing labels, so without a mitigate command, type checking fails at line 11.
We secure this code by separately mitigating both line 1 and lines 5–10. The
code then type-checks.
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Correctness In each of our experiments, we measured the time needed to per-
form a login attempt using 100 different usernames. Since valid usernames (the
hashmap m) are secrets in this case study, we varied the number of these user-
names that were valid among 10, 50, and 100. The resulting measurements are
shown as three curves in the upper part of Figure 6.1. The horizontal axis shows
which login attempt was measured and the vertical axis is time.
The data for 10 and 50 valid usernames show that an adversary can easily
distinguish invalid and valid usernames using login time. There is also measur-
able variation in timing even among different valid usernames. It is not clear
what a clever adversary could learn from this, but since passwords are used in
the computation, it seems likely that something about them is leaked too.
The lower part of the figure shows the timing of the same experiments with
timing channel mitigation in use. With mitigation enabled, execution time does
not depend on secrets, and therefore all three curves coincide. This result val-
idates the soundness of our approach. The roughly 30-cycle timing difference
between different requests does not represent a security vulnerability because it
is unaffected by secrets; it is influenced only by public information such as the
position in the request sequence.
Performance Table 6.2 shows the execution time of the main loop with various
options, including both valid/invalid usernames, hardware with no partitions
(nopar), and secure hardware both without (moff) and with (mon) mitigation.
As shown in Figure 6.1, for unmitigated logins, valid and invalid usernames
can be easily distinguished, but mitigation prevents this (we also verified that
the tiny difference is unaffected by secrets). Table 6.2 shows that partitioned
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Figure 6.1: Login time with various secrets.
nopar moff mon
ave. time (valid) 70618 78610 86132
ave. time (invalid) 39593 43756 86147
overhead (valid) 1 1.11 1.22
Table 6.2: Login time with various options (in clock cycles).
hardware is slower by about 11%. On valid usernames, language-based mitiga-
tion adds 10% slowdown; slowdown with combined software/hardware miti-
gation is about 22%.
6.2.2 RSA case study
The timing of efficient RSA implementations depends on the private key, cre-
ating a vulnerability to timing attacks [43, 13]. Using the RSA reference im-
plementation, we demonstrate that its timing channels can be mitigated when
decrypting a multi-block message.
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Figure 6.2: Decryption time with various secrets.
In the pseudo-code below, only the fourth line uses the confidential vari-
able key. Therefore, source code corresponding to this line is labeled as high.
Both “preprocess” and “postprocess” include low assignments whose timing is
observable to the adversary.
text:=readText()
for each block b in text
. . . preprocess . . .
compute (p:=bkey mod n)
. . . postprocess . . .
write(output, plain)
Correctness We use 100 encrypted messages and two different private keys to
measure whether secrets affect timing. The upper plot in Figure 6.2 shows that
different private keys have different decryption times, so decryption time does
leak information about the private key. The lower plot shows that mitigated
time is exactly 32,001,922 cycles regardless of the private key. Timing channel
leakage is successfully mitigated.
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Figure 6.3: Language-level vs. system-level mitigation.
Performance To evaluate how mitigation affects decryption time, we use 10
encrypted secret messages whose size ranges from 1 to 10 blocks; the size is
treated as public. We also compared the performance of language-level mitiga-
tion with the black-box mitigation (Section 4.1.1), where the entire decryption
computation is mitigated, even though system-level mitigation is not effective
against the strong, coresident attacker. To simulate system-level mitigation, the
entire code body was wrapped in a single mitigate command. The results in
Figure 6.3 show that fine-grained language-based mitigation is faster because it
does not have to mitigate the timing variation due to the number of decrypted
blocks, which is public information.
6.3 Formally verified MIPS processor
We used SecVerilog (Chapter 3) to design and verify a secure MIPS processor.
We sketch the processor design, and show how SecVerilog helped avoid security
vulnerabilities, including some not identified in prior work. We then provide re-
sults on the overhead of SecVerilog and timing channel protection. Overall, we
found that the capability to statically control information flow at a fine gran-
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ularity enables efficient secure hardware designs, and that the SecVerilog type
system only requires a small number of changes to the Verilog code with no
added run-time overhead.
6.3.1 A secure MIPS processor design
We implemented a SecVerilog compiler based on Icarus Verilog [1]. The con-
straints generated by the type system are solved by Z3 [58]. Using this imple-
mentation, we designed a complete MIPS processor that enforces the timing
label contract discussed in Section 3.1.3. Our processor is based on a classic 5-
stage in-order pipeline with separate instruction and data caches, both of which
are 32kB and 4-way associative. The processor also includes typical pipelining
techniques, such as data hazard detection, stalling and data bypassing, as well
as a floating point unit (FPU) that we constructed using the Synopsys Design-
Ware library.
The Verilog code for our processor has more than 1700 LOC excluding the
FPU, as shown in Table 6.3. LOC for the FPU is not reported because the source
for the DesignWare library component is not available. Table 6.4 summarizes
the processor’s ISA, which is rich enough that we can compile a recent OpenSSL
release with an off-the-shelf GCC compiler. The ISA is at least comparable to
the ISAs of prior processors with formally verified security (e.g., [48]). New
instructions setr and setw are used to set timing labels.
Our secure processor design supports fine-grained sharing of hardware re-
sources between different security levels. For example, the design allows both
high and low cache partitions to be securely used by a single program. This
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Module Name LOC
Fetch 60
Decode + Register File 465
Execute + ALU 218
FPU N/A
Memory + Cache 537
Write Back 20
Control Logic + Forwarding + Stalling 419
Total w/o FPU 1719
Table 6.3: Lines of Code (LOC) for each processor component.
Instruction type Instructions
Additive Arithmetic add, addi, addiu, addu, sub, subu
Binary Arithmetic and, or, xor, nor, srl, sra, sll, sllv
srlv, srav, slt, sltu, slti, sltiu, andi, ori, xori
Multiply/divide mult, multu, div, divu
Floating point add.s, sub.s, mul.s, div.s, neg.s, abs.s
mov.s, cvt.s.w, cvt.w.s, c.lt.s, c.le.s
Branch and jump bne, beq, blez, bgtz, jr, jalr, j, jal
Memory operation lw, lhu, lh, lbu, lb, sw, sh, sb, swc1, lwc1
Others mfhi, mflo, lui, mtc1, mfc1
syscall, break
Security-related setr, setw
Table 6.4: Complete ISA of our MIPS processor.
effectively increases the cache size and improves performance for applications
with multiple security levels.
To implement such a rich policy, we divide a 4-way cache into a low par-
tition and a high partition. When the timing label is H, both low and high
partitions can be used securely. When the timing label is L, both the low and
high partitions are still searched. However, to ensure that timing can be af-
fected only by the low cache partition, a cache access is treated as a miss even
when there is a hit in the high partition. To avoid the problem of data duplica-
tion, the cache line moves from the high partition to the low partition when the
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data arrives from memory, achieving functional correctness without violating
the timing constraint. Since cache states have static labels, they are not zeroed
out when timing label changes.
The pipeline, on the other hand, is dynamically partitioned using the timing
label. When the timing label changes, the pipeline is flushed to avoid leak-
ing information. A pipeline that interleaves high and low instructions without
flushing is indeed insecure, since high instructions may stall low ones.
We found that implementing such a complex policy securely would be diffi-
cult without using SecVerilog. For example, the SecVerilog type checker caught
a security flaw not foreseen by us: the dirty bit copied from the high partition
to the low partition created a potential timing channel. Our solution is to set the
dirty bit for every cache line immediately after it is fetched. This change still
allows store hits to write directly to cache line without writing to memory.
Another security issue caught by the SecVerilog type checker is a stall at the
instruction fetch stage affecting the memory stage: in our pipeline implementa-
tion, a load miss in an instruction could stall instructions in later pipeline stages.
Thus, when the timing label changes, an instruction with timing label H can stall
another instruction with label L, breaking the timing-label contract. To make the
design type-check, the pipeline is flushed at every timing-label switch.
6.3.2 Overhead of SecVerilog
SecVerilog may require designers to add additional branches to establish in-
variants needed to convince the type system of the security of the design. For
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instance, the type system fails to infer in our cache design that variable way can
only be 2 or 3 at a particular point in the code. In this case, the design needs to
include an if-statement establishing this fact. These added branches represents
the overhead of using SecVerilog.
To measure this overhead, we compare our secure MIPS processor written in
SecVerilog (“Verified”) with another secure design written in Verilog (“Unveri-
fied”). The Unverified design is essentially the same as Verified, including the
same timing channel protections. Because it eliminates the if-statements neces-
sary for type checking, it cannot be verified.
Designer effort and verification time The Unverified MIPS processor com-
prises 1692 lines of Verilog code. Converting this design to the Verified proces-
sor requires adding only 27 lines of extra code to the cache module, in order to
establish necessary invariants to convince the type checker, suggesting that very
little overhead is imposed by imprecision of the type system.
The current implementation of SecVerilog requires a programmer to explic-
itly write down one security label for each variable declaration, unless the vari-
able has the default label L. However, most labels can be automatically inferred
via adding type inference (e.g., as in [60, 17, 91]) to the SecVerilog compiler,
which we leave as future work.
The verification process is fast. For our processor design, it takes a total of
two seconds to both generate all obligations and then discharge them with Z3.
Delay, area and power We synthesized the processor designs using the Syn-
opsys synthesis flow, using the 90nm saed90nm_max digital standard cell library.
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For all designs, we increased the frequency of the processors to the maximum
achievable to see what overhead the Verified design adds to the critical path.
The synthesis results are shown in Table 6.5. Here “Insecure” represents the
baseline, unmodified MIPS processor without timing channel protection. We
discuss the baseline result in the next subsection.
The Verified design only adds 27 lines of code to Unverified, so we found
that the delay, area, and power consumption of the two designs are almost iden-
tical. For example, area overhead is only 0.16% even without including cache
SRAM, which is identical for all designs. This overhead is much lower than
that of other secure design techniques, as reported in [48]: GLIFT, 660%; Cais-
son, 100%; and Sapper, 4%. Power consumption of the two designs is identical.
Critical path delay is slightly lower for Verified, likely due to randomness in
synthesis. The results show the benefit of sharing hardware across security lev-
els and of controlling information flow at design time, without run-time checks.
Performance The Verified design does not add any performance overhead
over the Unverified design because the added logic does not change cycle-by-
cycle behavior.
6.3.3 Overhead of timing channel protection
The timing channel protection mechanisms in our processor (“Verified”) adds
overheads compared to the unmodified and unprotected baseline (“Baseline”).
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Baseline Unverified Verified
Delay w/ FPU (ns) 4.20 4.20 4.20
Delay w/o FPU (ns) 1.64 1.67 1.66
Area (µm2) 399400 401420 402079
Power (mW) 575.5 575.6 575.6
Table 6.5: Comparing processor designs.
Delay, area and power When an FPU is included, we found that the critical
path delay is identical for both Verified and Baseline, as shown in Table 6.5.
This is because the critical path of the processor lies in the FPU, which is largely
unmodified for secure designs. To more meaningfully evaluate the impact of
secure design, we also measured the maximum achievable frequency without
an FPU. Nevertheless, the delay overhead is still only 1.22%. The area overhead
of 0.67% is also quite low, and power overhead is almost negligible. Because
SecVerilog allows hardware resources to be shared across security levels while
properly restricting their allocations, timing channel protection mostly does not
require duplicating or adding hardware.
Performance The timing channel protection in our secure processor design
imposes restrictions on cache usage and results in additional pipeline flushes
and cache write-backs. We measured the performance overhead of the Verified
processor and tested its correctness on two security benchmarks.
Our benchmarks include three security programs (blowfish, rijndael, SHA-
1) from MiBench, a popular embedded benchmark suite for architectural de-
signs1 [33], as well as ciphers and hash functions in a recent release (version
1.0.1g) of OpenSSL, a widely used open-source SSL library.
1The only benchmark omitted is PGP, which requires a full-featured OS.
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Figure 6.4: Performance overhead of timing channel protection.
Thanks to the rich ISA of our MIPS processor, compiling and running these
benchmarks requires only modest effort. We use an off-the-shelf GCC com-
piler to cross-compile the benchmarks to the MIPS 1 platform. We use Cadence
NCVerilog to simulate our processor design running these binaries. Because
we lack an operating system on the processor, system calls (e.g., open, read,
close, time) are emulated by Programming Language Interface (PLI) routines.
Dynamic memory allocation is implemented by simple code using preallocated
static memory.
Most test programs in these benchmarks were used as is. The only excep-
tions are a few tests in OpenSSL that take a long time to simulate. To make
evaluation feasible on these tests, we replace long inputs with shorter ones.
We evaluate two security policies: “nomix”, a coarse-grained policy where
the entire program is labeled H, corresponding to the security policy targeted by
previous secure hardware design methods, and “mixed”, a fine-grained policy
allowing mixed H and L instructions, enabled by the new features of SecVerilog.
In the latter case, we use a simple policy to decide timing labels: for ciphers (e.g.,
AES, RSA), the encryption and decryption functions are marked as H; for secure
hash functions (e.g., MD4, SHA512), we pretend part of the input is secret, and
mark the hash functions on these inputs as H. Performance results for a single
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run of each test are shown in Figure 6.4. Multiple runs are unnecessary for our
evaluation since the simulation is deterministic.
From the MiBench suite, only rijndael shows noticeable performance over-
head, at 19.6%. Overhead is reduced to 12.2% when the fine-grained model with
mixed labels is used. Overhead on OpenSSL ranges from 0.3% (Blowfish) to
34.9% (SHA-0), with an average of 21.0%. For the fine-grained model, the over-
head on OpenSSL ranges from −3.9% (CAST5) to 21.7% (DES), with an average
of 8.8%. CAST5 runs faster with the partitioned cache because H instructions
cannot evict frequently used data in the L partition.
The results clearly show the benefit of fine-grained information flow control
within a single application. Most slowdown comes from the restriction that H
instructions cannot write to the low cache partition. Allowing mixed H and L
instructions in a single program improves performance because the restrictions
only apply to a subset of program instructions.
We could not compare our performance overhead with prior work [84, 49,
48] because they do not report the overhead over a baseline design with unpar-
titioned cache2.
2The previous method [48] calls a secure but unverified design “insecure”, and reports the
overhead of verified vs. unverified as we do in Section 6.3.2.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation presents sound and practical methods for full-system timing
channel control. The proposed approach consists of a new software-hardware
timing contract, as well as control mechanisms present at both the software level
and the hardware level.
Solving the timing channel problem requires work at both the hardware level
and the software level. Neither level has enough information to allow accurate
and complete reasoning about timing channels, because timing is a property
that crosses abstraction boundaries. This dissertation introduces a new timing
contract of read and write labels. The new contract makes it possible to control
timing channels completely and effectively across abstraction boundaries.
At the software level, the timing contract provides just enough information
for programming languages to accurately and completely control timing chan-
nels, assuming the underlying hardware obeys the contract. In particular, this
dissertation proposes a novel type system that uses read and write labels to con-
trol timing channels. It is formally proved that any well-typed program has no
timing channel leakage, assuming that the hardware obeys the timing contract.
At the hardware level, this dissertation introduces SecVerilog, a new hard-
ware design language for statically verifying timing-channel-free hardware de-
signs. SecVerilog makes it possible to design complex and efficient hardware
where most resources are shared across security domains. This is enabled by
novel features such as type-valued functions for dependent labels, the ability
to soundly and precisely use mutable variables within labels, and the modular
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incorporation of program analyses to improve precision. Moreover, SecVerilog
comes with strong security assurance; we formally prove that all forms of in-
formation flow, including explicit flows, implicit flows, and flows via timing
channels, are controlled in a well-typed hardware design.
For applications where entirely blocking timing channels is too restrictive,
this dissertation proposes a general framework, called predictive mitigation, to
improve the tradeoff between security and performance. Predictive mitigation
offers the possibility of mitigating timing channels for general computations,
while ensuring rigorous leakage bound: timing channel leakage is provably
bounded by a programmer-specified function. Experiments show that predic-
tive mitigation successfully defends against several published timing channel
attacks, with an acceptable performance overhead. Moreover, this disserta-
tion integrates predictive mitigation into the aforementioned restrictive soft-
ware language which provably eliminates all timing channels. The result is a
permissive programming model which improves the tradeoff between security
and performance for many real-world applications.
Finally, we implement the proposed approach and apply it to real-world
security-sensitive applications. Notably, using SecVerilog, we design and for-
mally verify a reasonably complex MIPS processor which satisfies the proposed
timing contract. Applications with read and write labels are run on the secure
processor via a modified compiler. The results suggest that the mechanisms
present at both the software level and the hardware level together control timing
channels in these applications. Moreover, the verified processor has overheads
of only about 1% in chip area, delay and power consumption. The application
performance overhead is reasonable, with an average of about 20%.
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